United States v. Garcia

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-3708
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-3708 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:13-cr-00071-JLR-1 v. MEMORANDUM* JOSEPH L. GARCIA,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington James L. Robart, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 20, 2025** Seattle, Washington

Before: GOULD, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

Joseph L. Garcia appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised

release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 1. Defendant’s waiver of his right to contest supervised release

violations at a revocation hearing is proper if the waiver is “knowing, intelligent,

and voluntary” given the totality of the circumstances in the record. United States

v. Stocks, 104 F.3d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1997); see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,

421 (1986).

2. Garcia’s waiver was voluntary. Nothing in the record shows that

Garcia’s waiver was caused by “intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Moran, 475

U.S. at 421. By contrast, the district court asked Garcia twice at the revocation

hearing whether, in admitting to the violations, Garcia understood the violations he

was admitting. The district court ensured that Garcia freely admitted the violations

and waived his right to an evidentiary hearing.

3. Garcia’s waiver was knowing and intelligent. First, the record shows

that Garcia knew “the nature of the right being abandoned.” See id. At his initial

hearing, Garcia was advised of his right to contest the violations in an evidentiary

hearing “where the Government would have to show that the[] violations

occurred,” and Garcia said he understood that right. Garcia also submitted a

memorandum a week before the revocation hearing stating that he would admit

four violations with an explanation in exchange for the U.S. Probation Office

withdrawing three violations. In that memorandum, Garcia asked for an

evidentiary hearing on the remaining two disputed violations but stated that “[t]he

2 24-3708 parties are striving to resolve these allegations so the evidentiary hearing is

tentative at this point and will be brief if conducted.” Based on that memorandum,

Garcia understood that he had a right to a revocation hearing if the parties did not

resolve the alleged violations. See id.

Second, the record shows that Garcia knew “the consequences of the

decision to abandon” his right to an evidentiary hearing. See id. The government

stated the maximum penalty for the violations at both the initial hearing and at the

revocation hearing. Garcia’s counsel also told the district court that “with

consultation with Mr. Garcia,” the parties and the U.S. Probation Office had

reached an agreement to withdraw four violations in exchange for Garcia admitting

five violations with explanation. Because “criminal defendants are bound by the

admissions of fact made by their counsel in their presence and with their

authority,” United States v. Hernandez-Hernandez, 431 F.3d 1212, 1219 (9th Cir.

2005), Garcia understood he was abandoning his right to the evidentiary hearing in

exchange for the withdrawal of four violations, see Moran, 475 U.S. at 421.

Although Garcia initially was confused about which violations he was

admitting, the district court paused the hearing to give Garcia time to consult with

counsel and “[t]ake a look” at the specific violations. After consulting his counsel,

Garcia admitted the violations. Although the record does not specify what Garcia

reviewed with his counsel, it is reasonable to conclude that Garcia reviewed the

3 24-3708 alleged violations because his explanations later in the hearing match the violations

he admitted.

We affirm that Garcia’s waiver of his right to contest the violations at the

revocation hearing was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See Stocks, 104 F.3d

at 312.

4. Garcia contends that “[t]he district court did not advise [him] of his

right to call witnesses and cross-examine adverse witnesses.” But because Garcia

admitted the violations and waived the evidentiary hearing, the district court was

not required to advise Garcia of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

32.1(b)(2)’s requirements.

AFFIRMED.

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