United States v. Gamble

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 9, 2026
• Docket: 24-6403
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-6403 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-00267-JAD-EJY-1 v. MEMORANDUM* DAJUAN LAMAR GAMBLE, AKA Popeye,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted January 7, 2026** San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, NGUYEN, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

DaJuan Lamar Gamble, also known as “Popeye,” appeals from his

conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Gamble challenges the district court’s denial of his

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). motion to withdraw his guilty plea and motion to dismiss the indictment. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

“We review a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for

abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ross, 511 F.3d 1233, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008).

A court abuses its discretion in denying a motion to withdraw a plea “when it rests

its decision on an inaccurate view of the law, or on a clearly erroneous finding of

fact.” United States v. Ensminger, 567 F.3d 587, 590 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted). We review the constitutionality of a statute

de novo. United States v. Garcia, 768 F.3d 822, 827 (9th Cir. 2014).

1. A district court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea

before it imposes a sentence if “the defendant can show a fair and just reason for

requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “Fair and just reasons

for withdrawal include inadequate Rule 11 plea colloquies, newly discovered

evidence, intervening circumstances, or any other reason for withdrawing the plea

that did not exist when the defendant entered his plea.” United States v. Davis,

428 F.3d 802, 805 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Ortega-Ascanio, 376

F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2004)).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Gamble had not

shown “a fair and just reason” to withdraw his guilty plea because Gamble failed

to demonstrate that his potential motion to suppress or request for additional

2 24-6403 surveillance footage had any merit and, thus, that his counsel gave him improper

advice. Gamble did not identify the picture that he saw before trial and admitted

that he was not sure if surveillance footage of the alley existed. Further, Gamble

did not identify which officer’s statements he believed were false. Because “[a]

court must ‘indulge a strong presumption’ that counsel’s conduct falls within the

range of competence,” United States v. Alvarez-Tautimez, 160 F.3d 573, 576 (9th

Cir. 1998) (quoting Iaea v. Sunn, 800 F.2d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 1986)), the district

court did not erroneously conclude that counsel’s decision not to file the

suppression motion or request additional surveillance footage was proper.

Gamble was aware of the prospect of his potential motions before entering

the plea but explicitly told the district court that he had no further questions for his

counsel or the court before pleading guilty. See United States v. Mayweather, 634

F.3d 498, 506 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the defendant did not have a fair and

just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea when the defendant was aware of the

prospect of making a suppression motion prior to entering his plea and did not

voice his displeasure with his counsel’s failure to file the motion during the Rule

11 proceeding). Further, the court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that,

even if Gamble was unaware that he could still litigate these issues during trial,

“[f]or a reasonable defendant in Gamble’s position, it would not have moved the

needle to know that these arguments still could be raised by the very same trial

3 24-6403 counsel who the defendant knew was making the affirmative, tactical decision not

to raise them.” See Davis, 428 F.3d at 808 (holding that a defendant need only

show that counsel’s gross mischaracterization could have motivated the plea

decision to establish a fair and just reason for plea withdrawal).

2. Gamble agrees that this Court’s recent holding in United States v.

Duarte, 137 F.4th 743 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc), forecloses his challenge to the

indictment.

AFFIRMED.

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