United States v. Gabriel Lewis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
• Decided: May 29, 2024
• Docket: 22-7120
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 22-7120 Doc: 35 Filed: 05/29/2024 Pg: 1 of 3

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-7120

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

GABRIEL OSHEL LEWIS,

Respondent - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (5:16-hc-02209-BO)

Submitted: March 20, 2024 Decided: May 29, 2024

Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, Genna D. Petre, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 22-7120 Doc: 35 Filed: 05/29/2024 Pg: 2 of 3

PER CURIAM:

Gabriel Oshel Lewis appeals from the district court’s order revoking his conditional

release and remanding him to the custody of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 4246. On appeal, Lewis contends that the court’s finding that his continued release would

create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious damage to property of another

was clearly erroneous. Finding no error, we affirm.

When a district court is asked to revoke an individual’s conditional release granted

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246(e), it must hold a hearing to:

determine whether the [individual in question] should be remanded to a suitable facility on the ground that, in light of his failure to comply with the prescribed regimen of medical, psychiatric, or psychological care or treatment, his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property of another.

18 U.S.C. § 4246(f). Accordingly, a district court may revoke conditional release on

finding by a preponderance of the evidence “that (1) the individual failed to comply with

his treatment regimen, including all conditions reasonably related thereto, and that, in light

of that failure, (2) his continued release would create a substantial risk of bodily injury to

another.” United States v. Perkins, 67 F.4th 583, 615, 637 (4th Cir. 2023). We review the

court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Id. at 589-90. We

have acknowledged that “district courts generally are accorded great latitude when

determining whether a mentally ill defendant is ready to be released and under what

conditions. But the district court’s finding(s) in support of revocation, or permitting

continued conditional release (with or without modified conditions), must, as we have

noted, contain a reasoned and logical linkage of the statutory questions sufficient for us to

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perform our obligations on review.” Id. at 637 (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted).

If “a conditionally released individual is homeless, suffering from schizophrenia,

exhibiting paranoia, refusing to take psychotropic medication, and avoiding further

psychiatric evaluation, the dots are readily connected with little in the way of explanation.”

Id. at 636 (noting the district court’s requirement to explain on the record why the subject

is a substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious damage to property). Plus, past

overt acts of violence are not required to prove substantial dangerousness under § 4246.

See United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 1990). A finding of

substantial risk under § 4246 “may be based on any activity that evinces a genuine

possibility of future harm to persons or property.” Id. at 1207.

We conclude that the district court did not err in finding that, based on the record

and the opinion of the forensic psychologist, that Lewis’ continued release would create a

substantial risk of bodily injury to another or serious damage to the property of another.

Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED