United States v. Fuller

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS SEP 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-1312 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 4:06-cr-00825-RCC-MAA-1 v. MEMORANDUM* WILLIAM ERNEST FULLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Raner C. Collins, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 15, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: COLLINS, MENDOZA, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.

William Fuller appeals the district court’s revocation of his supervised release.

He argues that there is insufficient evidence that he violated two conditions of his

release. “On a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to a supervised release

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). revocation, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a

violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122,

1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We affirm.

Standard condition #13 required Fuller to follow his probation officer’s

instructions. Fuller’s probation officer instructed him to provide probation a letter

from his employer describing its internet monitoring measures before he used the

internet at work. The probation officer testified that she never received a letter from

Fuller’s employer. And Fuller’s employer testified that he never asked her for a letter

while working for her. Thus, there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to

find that Fuller violated standard condition #13.

Fuller argues that there is no direct evidence he used the internet at work. But

Fuller’s employer testified that he had to use the internet to do his job, and that it

was “understood that he had permission” to use the internet at work. Thus, drawing

all reasonable inferences in the government’s favor, see King, 608 F.3d at 1129, a

rational trier of fact could find that Fuller used the internet at work. Fuller also argues

that there was no deadline to submit the letter. But the absence of a deadline is

irrelevant; Fuller used the internet at work without providing the required letter, and

he failed to follow his probation officer’s instructions, thus violating standard

2 24-1312 condition #13.

Special condition #9 prohibited Fuller from possessing or using any device

capable of accessing the internet without first getting permission from his probation

officer and installing internet monitoring software on the device. Fuller’s internet

use at work without monitoring software or a letter from his employer likewise

violated special condition #9. Fuller also violated the special condition when he

failed to install monitoring software on his personal laptop. Fuller’s privacy concerns

about the monitoring software and his inability to reach his probation officer while

she was on leave did not permit him to ignore special condition #9. Thus, there is

sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find that Fuller violated special

condition #9.

AFFIRMED.

3 24-1312