NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0433n.06
No. 24-5536
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Sep 23, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN FRANKIE L. MOFFITT, ) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: CLAY, GIBBONS, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Frankie Moffitt was sentenced to thirty-seven months
in prison and three years of supervised release after he pleaded guilty to one count of possession
of a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Prior to
his guilty plea, the district court denied Moffitt’s motion to suppress evidence discovered in his
car after law enforcement officers pulled him over for a traffic violation. Moffitt argues on appeal
that the district court committed a reversible error by denying his motion to suppress. For the
reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court.
I. BACKGROUND
Moffitt’s conviction for unlawful firearm possession stems from a local law enforcement
officer’s discovery of a pistol stored in the hood of Moffitt’s car. The traffic stop that led to the
search and the discovery of the pistol was partially captured on two video recordings from officers’
body cameras. The traffic stop and subsequent search of Moffitt’s vehicle are discussed below. No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
A. Factual Background
On the night of May 17, 2021, Moffitt was pulled over by law enforcement officers from
the Simpson County Sheriff’s Office while driving along Nashville Road in Simpson County,
Kentucky. One of those officers was Deputy Sheriff Wyatt Harper, whose activation of his patrol
car’s emergency police lights prompted Moffitt to pull over to the side of the road.1 Once Moffitt
pulled over and Harper parked his patrol car behind Moffitt’s vehicle, Harper exited the patrol car,
approached Moffitt’s driver’s side door, and greeted Moffitt before remarking that Moffitt had
been “swerving all over the place.” Ex. A (“Bodycam #1”), R. 21, at 0:00-0:19. Moffitt, who was
retrieving his wallet from his pants pocket with his driver’s side window rolled down at the time
Harper approached, then handed Harper two items, including his driver’s license, from his wallet
while explaining that he had been attempting to use a GPS device prior to being pulled over.2 As
Moffitt handed Harper the first item, Harper asked Moffitt where he was heading. Moffitt
responded that he was driving to see his romantic partner in Franklin, Kentucky. After Moffitt
1 In addition to Harper, two other law enforcement officers are visible in the body camera footage produced by the government. Neither of those officers is identified by name in the record. 2 The district court’s order denying Moffitt’s motion to suppress states that Harper “asked for Moffitt’s driver’s license.” Mem. Op. & Order, R. 41, Page ID #146. The district court’s factual basis for this statement is not apparent from the record. The district court partially adopted the findings of fact from a magistrate judge’s recommendation, but the magistrate judge’s report does not mention Harper’s request for Moffitt’s driver’s license. The transcript of an evidentiary hearing conducted by the magistrate judge also does not contain a reference to this request. In addition, footage from Harper’s body camera shows that Moffitt handed his driver’s license to Harper without express prompting by Harper. To the extent any details of the traffic stop and search as relayed in either the district court’s order or the magistrate judge’s partially adopted recommendation are clearly contradicted by the record evidence, we will not reproduce or rely on those details in this opinion. Instead, consistent with the applicable standard of review, we only recount those facts supported by the evidence before the district court at the time of its motion to suppress ruling. See United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 538 n.3 (6th Cir. 2009) (discounting a district court’s factual findings in motion to suppress order that were “contradicted by [a] video”); see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007) (noting that a Court of Appeals “should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by [a] videotape”). -2- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
handed Harper the items from his wallet, Harper asked Moffitt to pull into a nearby parking lot so
that their vehicles would not obstruct traffic. Harper then returned to his patrol car, and he and
Moffitt drove their respective cars to the parking lot.
After arriving at the parking lot, Harper directed a fellow officer to exit the patrol car, stand
behind the bumper of Moffitt’s car, and observe Moffitt in case Moffitt was “trying to tuck stuff.”
Id. at 1:25-1:32. Harper then used information from Moffitt’s driver’s license to run a search for
outstanding arrest warrants. Harper’s search did not identify any arrest warrants for Moffitt.
Harper then exited his patrol car and returned to the driver’s side window of Moffitt’s car. Once
at the window, Harper asked Moffitt for his vehicle registration. Moffitt then leaned over to his
car’s glove compartment, where he retrieved a clear plastic bag containing multiple pieces of
paper. While Harper shined a flashlight inside Moffitt’s car, Moffitt emptied the bag’s contents
onto his lap, retrieved his car registration from the documents, and handed the registration to
Harper. Moffitt then proceeded to put the remaining pieces of paper back into the plastic bag.
While Moffitt put the documents into the bag, Harper, who was still holding Moffitt’s
vehicle registration, asked Moffitt several questions. First, Harper asked Moffitt where his
romantic partner lived. Moffitt responded to Harper by naming the street on which his romantic
partner resided. After clarifying the street name, Harper next asked Moffitt if he previously lived
in Springfield, Kentucky. Moffitt answered that he still lived in Springfield. Following that
response, Harper asked Moffitt what he had been doing at a hotel before the traffic stop. Moffitt
explained again that he had been entering an address into his GPS device prior to the traffic stop.
Immediately after Moffitt finished detailing his use of the GPS device, Harper, who
remained in possession of Moffitt’s vehicle registration, asked Moffitt during the following
colloquy if he had any illegal items in the car and if he would consent to a search of the car:
-3- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
Harper: Is there anything illegal in the vehicle? Moffitt: Nope. Harper: None whatsoever? Moffitt: Nope. Harper: You have any issues with me searching it? Moffitt: Um, no. Harper: You don’t have any issues with it? Moffitt: No. Harper: I can search, is that what you’re saying? Moffitt: Yeah, you can search. Harper: Okay, alright—no weapons or anything? Moffitt: Nothing. Harper: Okay, hop out for me real quick, bud. I’ll make it quick for you.
Id. at 3:40-3:56. Moffitt then opened the driver’s side door and exited his car. Harper subsequently
directed Moffitt to the back of the car so that another deputy sheriff could frisk Moffitt to detect
potential weapons. After frisking Moffitt, the officer directed Moffitt to the rear of the patrol car,
which was parked behind Moffitt’s car. While at the rear of the patrol car, Moffitt spoke with the
officers who were not searching his vehicle. At one point, Moffitt asked one officer if he wanted
Moffitt to open his car’s trunk to aid the search. The officer deferred, stating, “That’s up to you,
man. If [Harper] wants to look in there, he’ll ask.” Ex. A (“Bodycam #2”), R. 31, at 3:01-3:05.
Meanwhile, after Moffitt had exited his car, Harper began searching inside the vehicle,
including by shining his flashlight in the car’s interior, opening crumpled napkins on the car’s
seats, and rummaging through the contents of the glove compartment and a small bag located in
the front of the car. After searching the interior of Moffitt’s car for approximately five minutes,
Harper eventually proceeded to the front of the car, where he lifted the car’s hood. After lifting
the hood, Harper located a bag containing a nine-millimeter pistol in the car’s engine compartment.
-4- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
Following his discovery of the pistol, Harper walked to the patrol car, where Moffitt was standing
with another law enforcement officer, and directed the other officer to handcuff Moffitt. Moffitt
then asked if he had an outstanding arrest warrant, to which Harper responded that Moffitt had a
gun under the hood of his car.3 Harper next walked back to the hood of Moffitt’s car before
returning to where Moffitt stood, now handcuffed, by the rear of the patrol car. Harper and Moffitt
then had the following exchange:
Harper: Alright, I’m going to read you something real quick.
Moffitt: I thought you said you wanted to search my car, though?
Harper: I did. Isn’t the hood a part of the car?
Moffitt: I guess, if that’s what you want to say.
Bodycam #1, R. 21, at 9:37-9:53. Harper then advised Moffitt of his rights to counsel and to
remain silent.
B. Procedural History
Following this encounter and his arrest, on December 15, 2021, a federal grand jury in the
Western District of Kentucky returned a one-count indictment charging Moffitt with possession of
a firearm by a prohibited person, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Moffitt
eventually moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the May 17, 2021, search of his vehicle.
The district court referred Moffitt’s motion to a magistrate judge, who held a suppression hearing
on Moffitt’s motion at which Moffitt testified and the body camera footage from the traffic stop
3 Due to a previous felony conviction, Moffitt was prohibited by federal law from possessing a firearm. Upon being asked, Moffitt had informed the officers of his criminal history while Harper was searching his car. -5- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
was submitted into evidence.4 During the suppression hearing, Moffitt testified that he intended
to give the officers searching his car consent “[t]o search the inside of [his] car and possibly the
trunk,” but not to search the engine compartment or otherwise disassemble the car during the
search. Suppression Hr’g Tr., R. 31, Page ID #59. Moffitt further explained that, during his three
decades of driving, including multiple experiences of being pulled over by police, officers had
never searched under the hood of the cars he drove.
Following the suppression hearing, Moffitt and the government filed dueling briefs in
support and opposing Moffitt’s motion to suppress. Moffitt argued that his motion to suppress
should be granted because (1) the officers unconstitutionally prolonged the traffic stop past the
time necessary to investigate and issue a citation for the traffic violation; (2) his consent to search
the vehicle and subsequent failure to revoke consent during the search were involuntary; and
(3) his consent to Harper’s search of the car did not extend to a search of the car’s engine
compartment. In contrast, the government contended that Moffitt’s motion should be denied
because the traffic stop was validly extended by Moffitt’s consent to the search of his car, which
was voluntary, unequivocal, and permitted Harper to search the entirety of the car.
The magistrate judge ultimately issued findings of fact and conclusions of law
recommending that the district court grant Moffitt’s motion to suppress. In doing so, the magistrate
judge held that (1) Harper unreasonably extended the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth
Amendment by asking Moffitt about illegal items in his car and (2) Moffitt had consented to a
search of his entire vehicle, including under the hood of the car. The government and Moffitt
4 Harper and the other officers present during the traffic stop did not testify at the suppression hearing. The record below does not contain a report from the officers documenting the traffic stop nor any statements from the officers apart from their recorded remarks on the body camera footage. -6- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
subsequently filed timely objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, with
the government objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the traffic stop had been
unreasonably extended, and Moffitt objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation
concerning the scope of Moffitt’s consent to search his car.
On September 1, 2023, the district court issued a written order sustaining the government’s
objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying Moffitt’s objections and motion
to suppress. The district court held that Harper did not impermissibly extend the vehicle stop in
contravention of the Fourth Amendment because “[t]he request to search and Moffitt’s consent
occurred during the time period when tasks tied to the traffic infraction [were]—or reasonably
should have been ongoing.” Mem. Op. & Order, R. 41, Page ID #147 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition, the district court held that Moffitt’s consent to the search provided the
officers “permission to search the vehicle without limitations” because the consent “lacked an
express limitation which would have put an objectively reasonable person on notice that the scope
of the consent was constrained.” Id. at Page ID #149.
Following the district court’s ruling, Moffitt entered into a plea agreement with the
government and pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a prohibited person.5 The district
court subsequently sentenced Moffitt to 37 months in prison and three years of supervised release.
Moffitt filed a timely notice of appeal on June 4, 2024.
II. DISCUSSION
Moffitt does not contend on appeal that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate
the traffic stop which led to Harper’s discovery of the pistol under the hood of his car. Instead,
5 Pursuant to his plea agreement, Moffitt retained the ability to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. -7- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
Moffitt argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Harper
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by (1) prolonging the traffic stop beyond the time necessary
to account for the alleged traffic violation and (2) exceeding the scope of Moffitt’s consent to the
vehicle search by searching under the hood of Moffitt’s car.
A. Standard of Review
“When reviewing a district court’s decision concerning a motion to suppress, we review
findings of fact under the clear-error standard and review conclusions of law de novo.” United
States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2022). Further, because the district court denied
Moffitt’s motion to suppress, “we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” United States v. Winters, 782 F.3d 289, 295 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States
v. Rose, 714 F.3d 362, 366 (6th Cir. 2013)).
B. Analysis
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Police-initiated traffic stops like the one experienced by
Moffitt constitute “a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v.
Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th
Cir. 2008)). Accordingly, if we determine that the traffic stop at issue in this case was
unconstitutional, all evidence seized from Moffitt’s car “must be suppressed as fruits of the
poisonous tree.” Id. (quoting Blair, 524 F.3d at 748); see also United States v. Marsh, 95 F.4th
464, 467 (6th Cir. 2024) (“The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable traffic stops by
law enforcement officers.”).
-8- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
Traffic stops are typically constitutional initially if supported by reasonable suspicion that
a traffic violation has occurred.6 United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2024). “Yet
even where a traffic stop is originally predicated on the requisite reasonable suspicion of illegal
activity, the stop’s duration may still exceed constitutional limits.” United States v. Williams, 68
F.4th 304, 307 (6th Cir. 2023). To stay within those constitutional limits and “prolong a traffic
stop beyond its original ‘mission,’ police must have reasonable suspicion of additional
wrongdoing,” Jordan, 100 F. 4th at 718 (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355
(2015)), because “[a]uthority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—
or reasonably should have been—completed,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354. In the instant case, the
government does not contend that Harper or any of the other officers at the scene of the traffic stop
had reasonable suspicion to prolong the stop. Rather, the government argues that the traffic stop
had not extended beyond the purpose of its original goal—investigating Moffitt’s alleged traffic
violation—at the time that Moffitt consented to Harper’s search of his car. We disagree.
Traffic stops are only constitutionally permissible when “limited in scope and duration.”
United States v. Taylor, 121 F.4th 590, 594 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Whitley, 34 F.4th at 529). In
etching the durational bounds of constitutional traffic stops initiated upon reasonable suspicion of
traffic violations, we have advised that such stops may last “as long as it takes to perform routine
traffic-violation tasks, such as asking a few questions, inspecting the driver’s license and
registration, and issuing a ticket.” Jordan, 100 F. 4th at 718. With respect to the type of questions
that officers may reasonably pose to drivers following the initiation of a valid traffic stop, we have
recognized that “[q]uestions relating to travel plans, the driver’s authority to operate the vehicle,
6 “Reasonable suspicion exists when an officer has ‘specific and articulable facts’ that provide an ‘objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714, 718 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). -9- No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
or the safety of the officer are the sorts of classic context-framing questions directed at the driver’s
conduct at the time of the stop that rarely offend our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” United
States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 770 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast,
“[e]ven minor police actions aimed at ‘detecting evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing’ or
any purpose beyond addressing the traffic infraction are not tasks incident to the stop.” United
States v. Lott, 954 F.3d 919, 924 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). As we will
explain, a few questions unrelated to a suspected traffic infraction may be permissible in limited
circumstances. As to the permissible duration of a traffic stop, however, “a police stop exceeding
the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield
against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 350.
Applying the above routine-traffic-violation-task framework to the instant case, Harper’s
initial question to Moffitt concerning Moffitt’s travel destination was an “inquir[y] related to the
traffic stop,” and thus does not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Collazo,
818 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2016). Moffitt does not contend otherwise as to that question. Instead,
Moffitt argues that Harper’s questions concerning illegal items in the car and requesting consent
to search were unrelated to the traffic stop and thus improperly extended the traffic stop. We agree.
In doing so, we note the fact-specific nature of this conclusion. At the time that Harper asked
Moffitt about illegal items in the car, Harper had already received information from Moffitt in
response to the “context-framing” questions typical of routine traffic violation inquiries. Williams,
68 F.4th at 307. Indeed, Moffitt provided an explanation for both his alleged erratic driving and
his intended destination when Harper first approached Moffitt’s driver’s side door after pulling
Moffitt over. When Harper returned to Moffitt’s driver’s side door—after running a license check
for Moffitt that did not reveal any outstanding warrants—Harper returned to questioning Moffitt
- 10 - No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
on these very same topics. In doing so, Harper also extended his inquiry beyond the reasons for
the initial traffic stop by asking Moffitt about his activity at a hotel before the traffic stop. Thus,
when Harper next asked Moffitt if he had any illegal items in his car, Harper was no longer asking
questions “‘reasonably related’ to the purpose of the [traffic] stop.” United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d
535, 542 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Townsend, 305 F.3d 537, 541 (6th Cir. 2002)).
Instead, Harper had begun an “[o]n-scene investigation into other crimes,” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
356, and thus “abandoned [his] investigation of the traffic violation,” Whitley, 34 F.4th at 530.
Nevertheless, the government correctly notes that Harper’s questions seeking Moffitt’s
consent to search and inquiring about illegal items may still have been permissible even if
unrelated to Moffitt’s traffic infraction if they “did not measurably extend the duration of the stop.”
Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 18, 7. This is true because “the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain
unrelated investigations that d[o] not lengthen the roadside detention.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at
354; see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (“An officer’s inquiries into matters
unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop . . . do not convert the encounter into something
other than a lawful seizure, so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the
stop.”). For that reason, that Harper’s questioning did not relate directly to Moffitt’s alleged traffic
infraction does not amount to a per se violation of Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. Indeed,
albeit before Rodriguez, we have previously declined to suppress evidence when similar questions
unrelated to a traffic infraction have been posed by officers to drivers during routine traffic stops.
See, e.g., United States v. Ellis, 497 F.3d 606, 610, 613-15 (6th Cir. 2007) (reversing grant of a
motion to suppress where an officer asked a driver “if there was anything illegal” in their truck).
Accordingly, instead of focusing solely on the content of Harper’s questions to resolve our
Fourth Amendment inquiry, we must determine whether Harper’s actions “remained within the
- 11 - No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
proper duration and scope of a traffic stop.” Whitley, 34 F.4th at 530. As explained above,
Harper’s questioning of Moffitt regarding illegal items inside his car fell outside the proper scope
of a traffic stop initiated to investigate a minor traffic infraction. Determining whether the
questions also fell outside the proper duration of the traffic stop requires a context-specific analysis
because “[t]he maximum acceptable length of a routine traffic stop cannot be stated with
mathematical precision.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008). Therefore,
we must heed the Supreme Court’s directive that, absent reasonable suspicion of additional
wrongdoing, individual traffic stops “may ‘last no longer than is necessary’” to address the traffic
infraction, Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)
(plurality opinion)). Therefore, we must assess Harper’s actions by considering what he “‘in fact
d[id],’ not whether ‘the overall duration of the stop remains reasonable in relation to the duration
of other traffic stops involving similar circumstances.’” United States v. Gomez, 877 F.3d 76, 91
(2d Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357).
In making this assessment, a brief sampling of our past cases applying these principles may
prove instructive because determining whether officers’ actions unconnected to the initial traffic
stop are permissible requires a fact-sensitive approach. In United States v. Garrido-Santana, for
example, we held that an officer’s questioning of a driver about contraband during a traffic stop
“did not exceed the time necessary to complete the original purpose of the traffic stop” because
the officer “was still filling out [a] courtesy citation and . . . waiting for the return of the computer
check on the vehicle’s license plate.” 360 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004). Similarly, in United
States v. Whitley, which the government relies upon before this court, we determined that an
officer’s questions to a driver concerning whether he “had anything illegal in the vehicle and where
he was coming from” were “permissible only because [the officer] asked these questions during
- 12 - No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
the time that [the driver] was retrieving his license and registration.” 34 F.4th at 530. In discussing
the traffic stop, Whitley did note that “[w]ithin a few seconds of receiving the requested documents,
[the officer] noticed a scale in Whitley’s lap and asked what the scale was for and if Whitley was
going to buy weed.” Id. Whitley acknowledged some ambiguity regarding whether those
questions were permissible, but it ultimately determined that “Whitley’s detention objectively
exceeded the relevant scope of the traffic stop” when the officer then walked away from Whitley
to confer with another officer about the scale because, “[a]t that point, the traffic stop had morphed
into a drug investigation[.]” Id. More recently, in United States v. King, to which the government
also directs our attention, we held that an officer’s inquiry into a driver’s potential drug possession,
although “unrelated to the traffic stop,” “did not unreasonably prolong the stop” because the
question occurred while the officer “was in the process of verifying [the driver’s] information.”
No. 24-1089, 2025 WL 2172432, at *6 (6th Cir. July 31, 2025).
The scenarios presented in Garrido-Santana, Whitley, and King differ from the facts of the
instant case. As detailed above, by the time Harper inquired about illegal items in Moffitt’s car,
Harper had already run a check for outstanding warrants and asked Moffitt various questions
concerning his activities that night. And unlike the questioning in Whitley, Moffitt had already
provided Harper with his license and registration by the time Harper inquired about illegal items
in Moffitt’s car. See 34 F.4th at 527. Harper was holding Moffitt’s vehicle registration while he
inquired about illegal items in the car, but there is no indication from the record that Harper was
actively reviewing the registration at the time that he posed this question to Moffitt.7 “At that
7 The magistrate judge’s report mentions that Moffitt “produced” his registration to Harper, but does not discuss what, if anything, Harper did with the registration. R. & R., R. 37, Page ID #110. The district court similarly described Harper receiving the registration from Moffitt and noted that Harper “had not yet completed . . . a check of Moffitt’s vehicle registration” at the time he requested Moffitt’s consent to search the vehicle. Mem. Op. & Order, R. 41, Page ID #147. - 13 - No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
point, the traffic stop had morphed into a [separate] investigation.” Id. at 530. That this
transformation occurred earlier here than in Whitley is of no moment, given the distinct factual
circumstances as compared to the timing of the officer’s receipt of Whitley’s documents and the
questions about the scale in that case. See id. In King, bodycam footage produced by the
government depicted the relevant officer “using the computer in his patrol car” to conduct a license
check while questioning the driver about illicit drug possession. 2025 WL 2172432 at *6. No
such license check or other inquiry into the circumstances leading to the traffic stop in the present
case was ongoing at the time Harper asked Moffitt about illegal items because, by that point,
Harper had completed the license check and begun asking about Moffitt’s actions at the hotel.
While Harper had not yet issued a traffic ticket to Moffitt for his alleged erratic driving, that fact
alone does not guide our determination of a traffic stop’s permissible length or whether tasks
reasonably tied to the traffic stop were still ongoing because “[a] stop may be unlawfully extended
beyond the initial purpose even if the officer never formally completes the citation.” Bell, 555
F.3d at 541.
Rather, as we explained in Whitley, the relevant inquiry in determining whether a traffic
stop has been prolonged such that additional reasonable suspicion of illegal activity is required is
whether “the stopped party can show either that the [police activity] was not tied to the traffic
infraction or that the traffic stop reasonably should have been already completed.” 34 F.4th at
531–32 (internal quotation marks and emphases omitted). Here, for the reasons explained above,
Harper’s question concerning illegal items in Moffitt’s car was not tied to the traffic infraction that
led to the traffic stop. While Harper posed that question shortly after asking Moffitt questions
permitted by our caselaw, “[u]nder the Fourth Amendment, even the briefest of detentions is too
long if the police lack a reasonable suspicion of specific criminal activity.” United States v.
- 14 - No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Williams, 68 F.4th at 309 (“[A]ny time (no
matter the duration) added to a traffic stop beyond what was reasonably necessary to investigate
the original cause for the stop must be grounded in independent reasonable suspicion.”);
Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 256 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A]ny extension of a traffic stop absent
independent reasonable suspicion is improper.”). Such is the case here, where Harper, through his
questioning regarding Moffitt’s activities at the hotel, moved beyond the scope of the traffic stop
and began probing Moffitt’s unrelated actions. Because this probing of unrelated actions occurred
at a time when no investigatory tasks tied to the original traffic infraction were ongoing, the traffic
stop was extended in contravention of Moffitt’s Fourth Amendment rights. The district court’s
conclusion to the contrary is erroneous.8
This result is consistent with both our circuit precedent and the analyses of other federal
courts of appeal presented with similar circumstances. We have repeatedly held that an officer’s
“action extend[ing] the scope and duration of [a] stop beyond that necessary to issue a citation”
violates a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights when the officer “ha[s] not developed reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity by that point.” Blair, 524 F.3d at 752. Such actions by
officers which may unconstitutionally extend a traffic stop include mere “unrelated questioning[.]”
Lott, 954 F.3d at 924. Accordingly, in United States v. Stepp, we held that an officer’s questions
unreasonably “prolonged [a] traffic stop beyond its original purposes because the topics covered
more than just context-framing questions.” 680 F.3d 651, 663 (6th Cir. 2012). Our sister circuits
have also held that officers’ questions during traffic stops to drivers and car passengers concerning
8 The government has not argued on appeal that we should affirm the district court’s denial of Moffitt’s motion to suppress on the basis of the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The government has therefore forfeited that argument. See United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (6th Cir. 2009). - 15 - No. 24-5536, United States v. Moffitt
potential criminal conduct of which the officers had no reasonable suspicion violate the Fourth
Amendment when asked in a manner that extends the stop. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell,
26 F.4th 860, 885 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (holding that an officer “unlawfully prolonged [a
traffic] stop” by questioning the driver about potential illegal items in the car); United States v.
Landeros, 913 F.3d 862, 868–70 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that officers’ questioning of car
passenger during a traffic stop unlawfully extended the stop); United States v. Clark, 902 F.3d 404,
411 (3d Cir. 2018) (holding that an officer “impermissibly extended [a traffic] stop” by asking the
driver about his criminal history). We reach the same conclusion here. A decision to the contrary
would effectively “[s]anction[] th[e] kind of brief prolongation” of a traffic stop which the
Supreme Court has expressly labeled unconstitutional. Williams, 68 F.4th at 309. Mindful of the
Supreme Court’s directive, we hold that Officer Harper unconstitutionally prolonged Moffitt’s
traffic stop to probe for potential criminal conduct for which he lacked independent reasonable
suspicion.
Because we hold that the traffic stop was prolonged in contravention of the Fourth
Amendment, we do not address Moffitt’s and the government’s competing arguments concerning
the scope of Moffitt’s consent to search his vehicle. No matter the scope which we might ascribe
to Moffitt’s consent, “the consent was tainted by the illegality” of the prolonged traffic stop and
therefore “ineffective to justify the [subsequent] search.” Royer, 460 U.S. at 507–08. We therefore
reverse the district court’s judgment on the sole ground that its determination regarding the traffic
stop extension was erroneous.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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