United States v. Flowers
This text of 789 F.2d 569 (United States v. Flowers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
We have consolidated these two cases for the limited purpose of discussing a recurring issue that involves the gray area of where the district court’s authority ends and where our authority begins in the area of supervising trial attorneys who do not want to handle their client’s appeal. In both cases, the district court granted motions to withdraw filed after judgment was entered. We vacate both orders.
In 86-1514, an appeal of a criminal conviction, defendant Flowers was represented at trial by Steven R. Decker, his retained attorney. On the same day that Decker filed his client’s notice of appeal and motion to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, Decker filed a motion to withdraw, which was granted by the district court. Circuit Rule 2(c),1 however, provides that counsel in a criminal case, whether retained or appointed, must continue to represent a defendant wishing to appeal unless this court, not the district court, grants a motion to withdraw. Once a defendant in a criminal case is convicted and sentenced, the district court should not rule on an attorney’s motion to withdraw; our responsibility of ensuring that trial counsel perfects a defendant’s appeal — a duty embodied by Circuit Rule 2(c) — requires that we rule on motions to withdraw filed after judgment has been entered. We have seen too many examples of criminal defense attorneys wanting to bail out on appeal while leaving their clients in the lurch. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1985) (per curiam). The purpose of Rule 2(c) is to provide a means by which we can oversee this area on a circuit-wide basis and apply consistent standards in ruling on motions to withdraw.
The situation in 86-1524 is similar but the source of our authority to decide this motion to withdraw is different. Miller is a habeas corpus case. Petitioner filed his pro se notice of appeal on November 14, 1985. The district court subsequently [571]*571granted petitioner’s pro se request for a certificate of probable cause pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 22(b), thus allowing this appeal to proceed; in addition, on February 24, 1986 the district court granted the motion to withdraw filed by petitioner’s court-appointed attorney, Ian McMillan.
Circuit Rule 2(c) applies only to criminal cases; by its terms it does not apply to habeas actions. Attorneys are appointed in habeas corpus cases pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g).2 The Seventh Circuit has adopted a plan to implement the CJA, and one of the plan’s requirements is that court-appointed counsel must represent their clients on appeal unless we grant a motion to withdraw.3 Although the requirements for continued appellate representation in habeas cases are not as stringent as those for criminal appeals,4 once judgment has been entered in the district court any motion to withdraw by counsel must be filed in this court.
Accordingly, we must vacate both district court orders at issue here. If the attorneys wish to renew their motions in this court they must do so within fourteen days of the date of this opinion.
It Is So Ordered.
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789 F.2d 569, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-flowers-ca7-1986.