F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit PUBLISH AUG 4 1998 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS PATRICK FISHER Clerk TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 96-1152 DANNY FLORES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 95-CR-34-1)
Andrew A. Vogt, Assistant United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado (Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Stephen M. Wheeler, Evergreen, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Danny Flores was convicted of conspiracy to distribute, and possession
with intent to distribute, methamphetamine. The district court enhanced his
sentence for being a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity and for
possessing a firearm during the course of a crime. Flores appeals the district court’s refusal to dismiss his conspiracy charge, the district court’s evidentiary
rulings, and the district court’s enhancement of his sentence. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Flores’ arrest and conviction stem from his involvement in a
methamphetamine distribution ring operating out of Colorado Springs, Colorado,
from early 1994 through January 1995. Flores’ involvement with the ring became
known to the Government on December 5, 1994. On that date, an undercover
federal agent, Scot Thomasson (“Agent Thomasson”) arranged to meet with the
alleged leader of the ring, James Maass (“Maass”), to purchase a large quantity of
methamphetamine. They met that night in the lighted parking lot of the Penny
Arcade in Manitou Springs. Although Agent Thomasson expected to meet only
with Maass, two additional individuals, previously unknown to Agent Thomasson,
were present and waiting. One of these individuals approached Agent Thomasson
and Maass, and expressed concerns to Maass about the safety of dealing with
Thomasson. After Maass showed the individual the money that Agent Thomasson
had given him for the drugs and convinced him that Agent Thomasson was safe,
the individual entered Maass’ car, where he proceeded to conduct a
methamphetamine transaction with Maass. Maass then sold the drugs to Agent
Thomasson.
-2- Agent Thomasson had been told by Maass that a local street gang known as
“the Banditos” was a supplier of methamphetamine for Maass’ distribution ring.
Subsequent to the transaction at the Penny Arcade, Agent Thomasson learned that
local police detectives had interviewed and photographed a number of the
members of the Banditos during the course of an unrelated investigation. Agent
Thomasson met with one of the detectives, who began laying out a stack of nine
photos of Banditos members on a desk. Immediately upon viewing Flores’ photo,
Agent Thomasson identified him as the first unidentified individual he had
encountered at the Penny Arcade transaction. Agent Thomasson apparently did
not identify the second individual from the photos shown him.
A warrant was issued for Flores’ arrest. Officers found Flores at home in
his kitchen, standing approximately two feet away from his refrigerator. After
handcuffing Flores, officers found a loaded firearm on top of the refrigerator.
Officers conducted a protective sweep of the house for other individuals who
might pose a danger. Officers noticed a loaded shotgun on the headboard of
Flores’ bed. They entered the bedroom to secure the gun. As officers secured
the shotgun, they noticed a plastic bag containing a substance appearing to be
methamphetamine in a small glass-doored compartment in the headboard. Also,
on the windowsill in the bedroom, officers found a small amount of a substance
that police suspected to be methamphetamine, along with assorted drug
-3- paraphernalia. Officers obtained a warrant to search the headboard compartment.
Subsequent laboratory tests showed that the substances found on the windowsill
and in the headboard compartment were indeed methamphetamine, totaling 13.8
grams.
Flores was charged with various federal crimes, including conspiracy to
distribute more than 100 grams of methamphetamine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii); distribution and possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii), and (b)(1)(C); and using and carrying a firearm in
relation to drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was tried in
federal district court along with co-defendants Maass, Jason Haley, and Shannon
McKane. Before trial, Flores’ filed motions seeking dismissal of the conspiracy
count, suppression of the evidence found in his home, and suppression of the
federal agent’s in-court identification, all of which were denied. At the close of
the government’s evidence, Flores’ motion for judgment of acquittal was denied,
but then reconsidered the following day in light of the Supreme Court’s
announcement of its decision in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
Relying on Bailey, the district court dismissed the charge of carrying a firearm in
relation to drug trafficking against Flores. At the conclusion of trial, Flores was
found guilty on all remaining counts.
-4- At sentencing, the district court enhanced Flores’ base offense level of 32
by a total of five points: three points for being a supervisor/manager of a
criminal enterprise, and two for possessing firearms in connection with the crime.
Flores’ criminal history category was set at II because of two prior state
convictions. Flores was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, followed by five
years of supervised release.
I. Conspiracy
Flores first argues that because he was a mere supplier of the drug to
Maass’ methamphetamine distribution ring, and that insufficient evidence was
presented to show that he was a member of the ring, the district court erred in not
dismissing the conspiracy charge against him. This court reviews a district
court’s decision not to dismiss a charge for abuse of discretion. See United States
v. Kingston, 971 F.2d 481, 490 (10th Cir. 1992). We review claims of
insufficiency of the evidence by “review[ing] the record de novo and ask[ing]
only whether, taking the evidence -- both direct and circumstantial, together with
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom -- in the light most favorable to
the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996)
(quotations and citations omitted).
In order to obtain a conspiracy conviction “the government must show
-5- [1] that two or more persons agreed to violate the law, [2] that the Defendant
knew at least the essential objectives of the conspiracy, . . . [3] that the Defendant
knowingly and voluntarily became a part of it, and [4] that the alleged
coconspirators were interdependent.” United States v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1285
(10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to meet the
requirements of Ivy. In addition to Agent Thomasson’s testimony that Flores
supplied the drugs for the Penny Arcade transaction and questioned Maass as to
the safety of dealing with Agent Thomasson, there was evidence presented at trial
that Flores on other occasions delivered drugs to other members of the conspiracy
and acted as an intermediary between the Maass ring and the Banditos to help
settle a dispute between members of the two groups. These actions are sufficient
to qualify Flores as a member of the Maass methamphetamine distribution
conspiracy. See Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1286 (holding that evidence that low-level dealer
purchased cocaine from members of a cocaine distribution organization, exhibited
ties to the organization, and gave advice to its members was “more than enough to
link” the dealer to the conspiracy).
Flores argues that he cannot be held to be a member of the Maass
conspiracy because his relationship with Maass was merely that of buyer-seller.
For this proposition Flores relies upon this court’s decisions in United States v.
-6- Fox, 902 F.2d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990), and United States v. McIntyre, 836
F.2d 467, 471 (10th Cir. 1987). In those cases we held that the buyer in a retail
drug transaction cannot, as a general rule, be deemed part of the larger conspiracy
that brought him the drug. See Fox, 902 F.2d at 1514 (“One who merely
purchases drugs or other property from a conspirator does not thereby become a
member of the conspiracy.”); McIntyre, 836 F.2d at 471 (“[P]roof of the existence
of a buyer-seller relationship, without more, is inadequate to tie the buyer to a
larger conspiracy . . . .”) (further quotation and citation omitted). However, “the
purpose of the buyer-seller rule is to separate consumers, who do not plan to
redistribute drugs for profit, from street-level, mid-level, and other distributors,
who do intend to redistribute drugs for profit, thereby furthering the objective of
the conspiracy.” Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1285-86. Flores was not a street-level retail
drug purchaser, he was a wholesale seller who knowingly helped supply large
quantities of methamphetamine to a distribution organization, an organization that
in turn relied in great part upon Flores’ efforts for its success. The retail buyer
rule simply does not apply to Flores. Based on the evidence adduced at trial, a
reasonable jury easily could have found that Flores was a willing member of the
distribution conspiracy.
-7- II. Search and Seizure of Evidence
Flores next argues that the court erred in refusing to suppress the
methamphetamine seized from the cabinet in the headboard of his bed. Flores
claims that this evidence was located behind a closed door in a small cabinet
space, much too narrow to conceal a person, thus it was illegally found as the
result of an impermissible search that fell outside the scope of the protective
sweep.
We review the reasonableness of a search and seizure de novo. See United
States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 634 (10th Cir. 1992). However, we review a trial
court’s factual findings with regards to a search and seizure for clear error, see
id., viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government in an
appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress. See United States v. Janus
Industries, 48 F.3d 1548, 1552 (10th Cir. 1995).
It is well established that officers conducting an arrest of an individual in a
dwelling may conduct a warrantless protective search of that dwelling when they
have a reasonable suspicion that “the house is harboring a person posing a danger
to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336 (1990). The
protective sweep “may extend only to a cursory inspection of those spaces where
a person may be found.” Id. at 335. A warrantless search does not violate the
Fourth Amendment so long as “the exigencies of the situation make that course
-8- imperative.” United States v. Franco, 981 F.2d 470, 472 (10th Cir. 1992)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). However, if police officers
conducting a proper protective sweep of a dwelling come across evidence of
criminal activity in plain view they may seize it, so long as that evidence is such
that a reasonable police officer would conclude, based on experience and the
circumstances, that the item is probably incriminating. See United States v.
Tisdale, 921 F.2d 1095, 1097 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-71 (1971); Janus Industries, 48 F.3d at 1554-55.
Flores does not contest the propriety of the protective sweep of his home.
Instead, he argues that the compartment in the headboard of his waterbed where
officers found a bag of methamphetamine was too small to conceal a person, thus
police must have illegally opened and searched the compartment during the course
of their protective sweep. Key to this argument is Flores’ contention that items
behind the etched glass door in question cannot readily be seen, and that the only
way to view the contents therein is to open the door.
At the suppression hearing, Flores’ wife testified that items cannot be
readily seen behind the glass door in question. However, officers testified that
the bag was in plain view through the glass, that its illegal character was
immediately evident to the experienced officers conducting the search, and that
they did not open the door until they had received a search warrant. After
-9- considering all the evidence offered by both sides, including witness testimony
and photographs of the glass compartment door taken by Flores’ wife, the district
court made a finding of fact that the glass door was transparent and found that
because the officers conducting a proper protective sweep had a plain view of the
bag of methamphetamine through the glass door, they legally could have seized it
at that point, even without the added precaution of a search warrant. Because the
court’s factual findings that the glass door was transparent and that the drugs
inside the compartment were in plain view were not clearly erroneous, the court’s
decision not to suppress the admission of this evidence is affirmed.
III. Identification
Flores next argues that because Agent Thomasson initially identified him as
the result of an unnecessarily suggestive photo line-up, his in-court identification
of Flores should have been disallowed by the court. Flores argues that the photo
line-up used to identify him was unnecessarily suggestive because (1) the photos
were shown to Agent Thomasson one-by-one, not in a single layout display; (2)
although all of the photos shown to the agent were of young Hispanic men, in his
photograph the eyes are very distinctive from the other photographs; and (3) his is
the only photo of a man with a goatee. We conclude that there was nothing
unlawful about the procedure whereby Agent Thomasson identified Flores.
- 10 - The constitutionality of an identification procedure is decided by the
reviewing court de novo. See U.S. v. Kimball, 73 F.3d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 1995).
Factual findings of the trial court are reviewed for clear error. See id. When the
police employ a photo line-up for identification purposes, the procedure must not
be “unnecessarily suggestive.” Grubbs v. Hannigan, 982 F.2d 1483, 1489-90
(10th Cir. 1993). This court has held that a photo array containing only six
pictures, among which the defendant’s photo was the only one of a person with
his eyes closed, was not unnecessarily suggestive. See United States v. Sanchez,
24 F.3d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 1994). Even if a photo line-up is unnecessarily
suggestive, it will not invalidate a subsequent in-court identification unless the
line-up is so unnecessarily suggestive that it overwhelmed the other indicia of
reliability that might validate the in-court identification. See Grubbs, 982 F.2d at
1490. Indeed, a photo array consisting of only one photo may be acceptable if the
witness has had a clear opportunity to positively identify the suspect prior to the
array, the witness expresses a great deal of certainty with regard to the
identification, and the circumstances of the identification show a lack of coercive
pressure on the identifying witness to make an identification from that photo. See
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave
& Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 7.4(e) (1984). The ultimate test is
whether the suggestive line-up created a “very substantial likelihood of
- 11 - irreparable misidentification.” Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 (quotation and citation
omitted).
We find that the photo array in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive.
The nine photographs were all of Hispanic males of roughly similar build, height,
age, and hairstyles. Further, the officer providing Agent Thomasson with the file
of photographs had no idea who Agent Thomasson might be looking for, outside
the fact that the suspect might be a member of the Banditos gang. Thus, there
was no risk that these pictures were assembled to direct Agent Thomasson’s
attention toward any one particular individual. The fears expressed by Justice
Marshall in his dissent in Manson regarding the polluting of a witness’
identification by biased police officials who prepare and present photo line-ups
are not implicated in this case. See Manson, 432 U.S. at 132-34 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, Agent Thomasson did not identify the second individual
at the transaction from the photos shown him, suggesting that he was under no
pressure to make an identification from those particular photographs.
Furthermore, this array of pictures did not generate a substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification during the subsequent in-court identification.
Agent Thomasson had a clear view of Flores during the transaction at the Penny
Arcade, and plenty of time to observe Flores’ features. Agent Thomasson
identified Flores from his photo immediately, without any prompting from the
- 12 - detective. Absent any indicia that Agent Thomassons’ identification of Flores
was unduly influenced by the detective showing him the photos in his possession,
we cannot say that there was a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification of Flores by Agent Thomasson. The district court did not err in
refusing to suppress Agent Thomassons’ in-court identification.
IV. Sentencing
Finally, Flores challenges the court’s determination of his sentence under
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. We review the district court’s
interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. See United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1078 (10th
Cir. 1997). Flores asserts that because he was a mere supplier of
methamphetamine to the Maass ring, and did not exert direct control over any
subordinates in that ring, the district court erred in assessing him three levels for
being a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity, pursuant to U.S.S.G. §
3B1.1(b). We note that the district court explicitly rejected the Government’s
request that Flores’ sentence be enhanced by four levels for being an organizer or
leader, but accepted the Presentence Report’s suggestion that Flores qualified as a
manager or supervisor of the Maass distribution ring.
- 13 - Evidence before the district court indicated that Flores exerted control over
the supply and price of the methamphetamine flowing from the Banditos to the
Maass ring. He personally delivered quantities of methamphetamine to members
of the conspiracy. On at least one occasion, Flores acted as a dispute mediator
between members of the Maass ring and members of the Banditos. In short, the
court specifically found Flores was “if not the supplier, certainly the principal
supplier” for the organization, who set the price of the methamphetamine that
flowed from the Banditos to the Maass ring. In the district court’s words,
“[w]ithout Flores and the Banditos Maass had no supply, and without a supply
Maass had no customers, and without customers he had no organization.” The
district court did not clearly err in its factual findings that Flores exerted control
over the Maass organization and members of the organization. Thus,
enhancement of Flores’ sentence under § 3B1.1(b) was appropriate.
Flores also appeals the district court’s two-level enhancement for his
possession of a dangerous weapon in connection with a drug crime under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Flores argues that because the evidence was insufficient
to show that the guns found in his home had any connection to his drug dealing,
the district court’s enhancement was improper. 1 We disagree.
Flores also argues that the district court’s enhancement for possessing a 1
weapon in connection with a crime was in error because the Supreme Court’s (continued...)
- 14 - “[T]he government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that the gun was proximate to the drug offense.” United States v. Lang ,
81 F.3d 955, 964 (10th Cir. 1996). Possession of a weapon in connection with a
drug trafficking offense “is established if the government proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that a temporal and spacial relation existed
between the weapon, the drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” United
States v. Roederer , 11 F.3d 973, 982 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). This nexus may be established by showing that the weapon was
located nearby the general location “where drugs or drug paraphernalia are stored
or where part of the transaction occurred.” Id. at 983 (citation omitted). Once
the government establishes that the gun was possessed in proximity to the drugs
or transaction, the burden shifts to the defendant to “show it is clearly improbable
that the weapon was related to the offense.” United States v. Robertson , 45 F.3d
1423, 1449 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
1 (...continued) ruling in Bailey v. United States , 516 U.S. 137 (1995), modified the Sentencing Guidelines as they apply to the interaction between firearms and crimes . This argument is utterly without merit. Bailey modified only the interpretation and application of the term “use” as applied to firearms. See United States v. Hallum, 103 F.3d 87, 89 (10th Cir. 1996). Because Flores’s sentence was enhanced for possessing a dangerous weapon in connection with a crime, his Bailey argument fails.
- 15 - Flores does not dispute that a loaded shotgun was found in close proximity
to a large quantity of drugs stored in the headboard of his bed. Instead, he relies
upon this court’s unpublished decision in United States v. King , 1996 WL
470321(10th Cir. Aug. 20, 1996), for the proposition that because the government
failed to prove that any drug transactions occurred at his home, it thereby failed to
prove a nexus between the weapon and his crime of drug distribution. In King
this court held that a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement “should be applied if the weapon
was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with
the offense.” Id. at *2 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), cmt. (n.3)). This
statement is simply a reiteration of the Robertson rule: once the Government
proves that a weapon was found in near proximity to a distributable quantity of
illegal drugs, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that it was highly
unlikely that the weapon had anything to do with the drug offense. As this court
has previously noted, enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) is designed to reflect the
increased danger of violence when drug traffickers add firearms to the mix. See
United States v. Contreras , 59 F.3d 1038, 1040 (10th Cir. 1995). Although in
many cases the weapon will be involved with some sort of illegal transaction, it is
not necessary for the Government to show that drugs and money changed hands
near the weapon; the weapon may simply serve as a potentially deadly means of
protecting the trafficker’s goods, thereby increasing the danger of violence.
- 16 - In this case, Flores was convicted of possession with intent to distribute as
well as actual distribution of methamphetamine. Because Flores failed to show
that it was clearly improbable that the shotgun on his headboard had any relation
to his possession and control of the large quantity of methamphetamine contained
within, he failed to meet his burden of proof under Robertson . The district court
did not err in enhancing his offense level under § 2D1.1(b)(1).
Finally, Flores argues that the court improperly increased his criminal
history score by one point under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(c), resulting in criminal history
category II, based upon his July 7, 1995 state conviction of possession of
marijuana. 2 Flores argues that because the state court decided to continue his
marijuana possession sentence and have it run concurrently with whatever
sentence he would receive for the federal conviction in this case, and because the
Banditos were also selling marijuana, his possession of marijuana was conduct
that was part of the instant offense and thus should not be counted as a “prior
sentence” under § 4A1.1.
According to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, the sentencing court is to increase the
points used to calculate the defendant’s criminal category for his prior sentences.
2 Flores does not contest the court’s other one-point increase for a May, 1994, state conviction for possession of a controlled substance: drug paraphernalia.
- 17 - A “prior sentence” is defined as “any sentence previously imposed upon
adjudication of guilt . . . for conduct not a part of the instant offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 4A1.2(a)(1) (1995). Conduct that is “part of the instant offense” is in turn
defined under § 1B1.3 as “relevant conduct.” See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt.1.
Under § 1B1.3, the definition of “relevant conduct” further depends upon whether
the conduct that the defendant seeks to have combined is subject to grouping
under § 3D1.2(d). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2); United States v. Cuthbertson , 138
F.3d 1325, 1327 (10th Cir. 1998). Conduct that is groupable under § 3D1.2(d) is
“relevant conduct” if it constitutes an act or omission that was “part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.”
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2). If the conduct at issue is not groupable under § 3D1.2(d),
then it qualifies as “relevant conduct” only if it “occurred during the commission
of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of
attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.3(a)(1); see Cuthbertson , 138 F.3d at 1327.
Although Flores was charged in state court with one count of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute, and one count of possession of more than
eight ounces of marijuana, he plead guilty to and was convicted only of the
possession count. Possession of a controlled substance is governed by § 2D2.1 of
the Guidelines; § 2D2.1 is specifically excluded from grouping under U.S.S.G.
- 18 - § 3D1.2(d). Thus Flores’ state marijuana possession conviction can be deemed to
be “part of” his federal conviction for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine
only if his marijuana possession “occurred during the commission of” the instant
crime of possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine. 3 Cuthbertson , 138 F.3d at 1327 (quotations and citations
We first note that Flores was arrested in connection with his state
conviction for possession of marijuana on November 17, 1994, whereas the Penny
Arcade methamphetamine transaction involved in the instant federal charge
occurred on December 5, 1994, and defendant was arrested for the federal
methamphetamine-related offenses on January 10, 1995. It is not obvious how the
mere possession of marijuana is in any way relevant to Flores’ conviction of
conspiring to distribute methamphetamine to a wide consumer base. Distinct
offenses that did not occur contemporaneously and do not represent essentially
one composite harm cannot be said to have occurred during the commission of
one another. Because the conduct underlying Flores’ possession of marijuana
conviction is “readily broken into [a] discrete identifiable unit[]” separate from
3 It goes without saying that possession of marijuana cannot be argued to be an act committed “in preparation for” or “in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for” the offense of possession with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
- 19 - the conduct underlying his methamphetamine distribution activities, Flores’
marijuana possession did not occur “during the commission of” and thus was not
“related to” his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine. Id. (quotations and citations omitted). That the
state court chose to put off Flores’ sentence until after his federal trial, and that
his street gang was also involved in the sale of marijuana are not determinative.
See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(4). The district court did not err in treating Flores’ state
conviction for possession of marijuana as a prior sentence under § 4A1.1(c). 4
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the district court’s denial of Flores’ motion to
dismiss the conspiracy charge is AFFIRMED; the district court’s denial of Flores’
motion to suppress evidence seized is AFFIRMED; the district court’s refusal to
suppress Agent Thomasson’s in-court identification is AFFIRMED, and the
4 Although at the sentencing hearing the district court did not discuss the question of Flores’ prior conviction for possession of marijuana, it did specifically incorporate the Government’s presentence report into its findings. Because the presentence report recommended that the court enhance Flores’ criminal history category to II based in part upon Flores’ prior conviction for possession of marijuana at issue on appeal, we can assume that this prior conviction was incorporated into the court’s final decision and calculation of Flores’ criminal history category.
- 20 - district court’s calculations of Flores’ offense level and criminal history category
are all AFFIRMED.
- 21 -