United States v. Flippen

674 F. Supp. 536, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10901, 1987 WL 4440
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedNovember 25, 1987
DocketCrim. 87-00093-01-R, 87-00094-01-R
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 674 F. Supp. 536 (United States v. Flippen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Flippen, 674 F. Supp. 536, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10901, 1987 WL 4440 (E.D. Va. 1987).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

RICHARD L. WILLIAMS, District Judge.

These matters came before the Court on defendants Clough and Flippen’s motions to suppress evidence seized during searches of their respective houses and on the Government’s motion in limine. 1

The defendants argue that their Fourth Amendment rights have been violated because there was no probable cause to support the search warrants issued. Probable cause for these warrants rested, on two grounds. Two items identified in the warrants were the subject of controlled mail deliveries. The controlled deliveries formed the probable cause for these two items included in the warrants. The statements made by Postal Inspector Gerald Dexter in his affidavit provided the probable cause that other items listed in the search warrants were to be found at the defendants’ respective houses. After considering each of these grounds in turn, the Court concludes that there was insufficient probable cause to support a search warrant for the materials of the controlled deliveries but that there was sufficient probable cause to support a search warrant for the other items. The materials that were the subject of the controlled mail deliveries are admissible, nonetheless, under the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984).

Although all the evidence which fits the warrants’ description is admissible, without the benefit of hearing actual testimony and cross-examination, the Court is hard pressed to authoritatively delineate exactly *538 how the Government may use that evidence. Nonetheless, the Court has acceded to the Government’s wish and tentatively ruled on the admissibility of certain evidence and the circumstances under which it can be used.

Flippen and Clough were both subjects of a government sting operation called “Project Looking Glass,” designed to ensnare collectors and distributors of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252. They were identified as possible subjects through different means.

Mr. Clough first came to the Postal Service’s attention in October of 1985 after Fairfax County Police reported receiving a number of anonymous telephone complaints alleging that young boys were spending an inordinate amount of time near Clough’s home. A subsequent investigation of Clough’s police record revealed that he had been convicted of a sex offense against a child in Pasco County, Florida in April 1981.

Following this discovery, the Postal Service decided to include Clough in an undercover operation it had set up as a “pen pal” club whose members have a common interest in child pornography. Clough was sent a questionnaire designed to elicit specific information on his sexual preferences. He responded that he preferred hard-core pornography depicting homosexual, pre-teen homosexual or teen-age homosexual behavior. He also asserted that he was a collector of pornography.

Dr. Flippen was selected for “Project Looking Glass” because his name and address appeared on a copy of Jewries et Naturels (Young & Natural), a magazine seized by postal inspectors that was considered “erotica for pedophiles.” There had also been reports of anonymous phone calls to the police alleging that young boys had been visiting Dr. Flippen’s apartment. 2

After this, the experiences of Clough and Flippen were nearly identical. They were each mailed a letter of introduction from the Far Eastern Trading Company (“Far Eastern”), a company created by the Postal Service that promised to provide “child pornography.” They each requested more information and were sent a catalog on April 30, 1987. On May 19, 1987, Far Eastern received a $114.95 check from Flippen for the purchase of the video tape Pre-Teen Trio and the magazine Dutch Boys. On June 26 the Service received an order from Clough for four magazines: Skolebome, Children-Love, Boys who Love Boys, and Dutch Boys.

The agents for the Postal Service arranged for “controlled deliveries” — deliveries at a specific time and date — of these materials. On the mornings prior to these controlled deliveries, the agents sought and obtained search warrants for the homes of Flippen and Clough. The searches were to be executed once the contraband materials had arrived at the defendants’ homes. The search warrants allowed for the seizure of the child pornography just delivered, “various other books, magazines, photographs, negatives, films, and/or video cassettes depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct as defined in 18 U.S.C. 2256,” and other things.

On June 10, 1987, Postal Inspector Gerald Dexter witnessed the mail courier deliver Pre-Teen Trio through the mail slot of Flippen's home. After Flippen was warned of the impending search and arrived on the scene, the Postal officials began their search. They seized over 530 video tapes and nearly 30 magazines which Flippen allowed them to view elsewhere.

On July 22, 1987, Postal officials watch Clough pick up his mail at a post office box and carry it back to his home. They executed the search warrant minutes after Clough arrived home. Both Clough and Flippen were indicted on violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2).

The defendants claim there was no probable cause at the time the search warrants were issued to believe that the items named in the search warrant — Pre-Teen *539 Trio and Dutch Boys — were in their homes. The defendants argue that in determining whether to issue a search warrant, the magistrate must find information that would sufficiently convince a man of reasonable caution that the seizable items are located in the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Therefore, at the time the search warrant is issued, the items must presently be in the place to be search. This is the particularity that the Fourth Amendment requires. In the instant cases, the video tape and magazine were not at the place to be searched but were still in the Postal Service’s possession at the time the warrant was issued.

Nevertheless, courts have often recognized the constitutionality of anticipatory search warrants. United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir.1982) (search warrant for person bound for district on nonstop jet); United States v. Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193

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Bluebook (online)
674 F. Supp. 536, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10901, 1987 WL 4440, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-flippen-vaed-1987.