United States v. Flaxman

304 F. Supp. 1301, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10257
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 17, 1969
DocketNo. 66 Cr. 559
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 304 F. Supp. 1301 (United States v. Flaxman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Flaxman, 304 F. Supp. 1301, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10257 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

Opinion

OPINION

TYLER, District Judge.

Defendant was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1001 for aiding and abetting others in knowingly falsifying and misrepresenting material facts within the jurisdiction of an agency of the Unitea States. In 1963, when the alleged [1302]*1302crimes took place, defendant was a real estate salesman in Queens County, New York, operating out of offices and selling houses in the vicinity of Jamaica. The grand jury charged that defendant caused false representations to be made or aided and abetted in the making of false representations to the Veterans Administration (“VA”) in order to improve the chances of two veteran-applicants, who were buying houses through him, of receiving a home loan guaranty from the VA.

According to the evidence at trial, the representations were included on Finance Form 1802, Application for a Home Loan Guaranty, and on employment verification forms which were sent to the VA with the 1802 form. These forms were made out by the veteran-applicant with at least some assistance from defendant. The government’s evidence tended to show that it was at that point that defendant aided and abetted the veterans in making the admittedly false representations on the forms. The forms were then taken to a prospective lender, Peoples Mortgagee Co., Inc., which was also located in Jamaica, Queens. The lender reviewed, stamped, and signed the application forms and mailed them (with other documents and a covering letter) from Queens to the office of the VA in Manhattan. The lender was not indicted, nor was it in any way accused by the government of being more than an unwitting party to the criminal acts.

Testimony at trial from both the lender and the only official of the VA called to the stand established the mailing to Manhattan as normal procedure. But this established procedure was not in accord with the regulations of the VA:

“To apply for a guaranteed loan the veteran and the prospective lender shall complete and sign in duplicate Finance Form 1802, Application for a Home Loan Guaranty. The lender shall inquire of the nearest office of the Veterans Administration whether the proposed borrower is eligible and the amount of his available guaranty.” 38 C.F.R. § 36.4024(a) (emphasis added).

At the time of mailing, there was a VA office in Brooklyn which was nearer to both the office of the prospective lender and the property on which the loan guaranties were sought.

All the events which were crucial to the criminal act, except the receipt of the forms by the VA in its Manhattan office, took place in Queens and Brooklyn.1 If the lender had sent the forms to the office prescribed by regulation or if the VA had refused to accept the forms at any office except the one prescribed by regulation, all the elements of the criminal transaction, from start to completion, would have taken place in Queens and Brooklyn. Queens and Brooklyn lie in the Eastern District of New York; Manhattan lies in the Southern District of New York.

The government brought this case in the Southern District, basing venue and jury vicinage on the receipt of the falsified forms by the VA office in Manhattan. The defendant timely moved to have the indictment dismissed for improper venue and vicinage and a resulting violation of his rights under Rule 18, F.R.Cr.P.2 and the Sixth Amendment.3 The motion is granted.

The venue rules and the jury vicinage provision of the Sixth Amendment are not to be treated lightly. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276, [1303]*130365 S.Ct. 249, 89 L.Ed. 236 (1944);4 Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 636, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d 107, 115-116 (1st Cir. 1952). The framers of the Bill of Rights considered jury vicinage rights sufficiently fundamental to add to the words of Article III, § 2, “The Trial of all Crimes * * * shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed * * * ”, the more stringent requirements of the Sixth Amendment which guarantee trial before “an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.” Rule 18 applies those standards to venue, limiting the prosecution to a district in which the offense was committed.5

There are a number of policies which find expression in the venue and vicinage provisions of the Constitution and in Rule 18. In order that the defendant be tried before the most informed jury, the Sixth Amendment directs that trial be had among those who know the local conditions surrounding the criminal acts and who should thus be able to draw the most accurate inferences from the evidence presented at trial. The venue provisions seek to avoid the prejudice to a defendant’s case that might well result from facing trial in a place where it would be difficult to obtain witnesses and to prepare for trial. Thus the prosecutor is not to gain an advantage over the defendant by an arbitrary choice of the place in which the defendant is to be tried. Finally, since most crimes take place in the district in which the defendant resides, the venue provisions also generally aim to reduce the hardship to the defendant that would usually be caused by trial at a distance from his home and friends. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 410, 78 S.Ct. 875, 2 L.Ed.2d 873 (1958); see Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1766-1769, Kennedy ed., 214 (1906); 1 Cambridge History of the British Empire 668 (1929).

Frequently the forbidden criminal behavior of the 20th century is complex in the relation of its crucial elements, and those elements may be widely spread out in space. Congress has the power to define the elements of a crime carefully and give the executive power to prosecute it in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements of the crime are performed. Travis v. United States, 364 U.S. 631, 81 S.Ct. 358, 5 L.Ed.2d 340 (1961). Yet in approaching any particular piece of legislation, or a set of facts which must be analyzed by standards set out in a statutory scheme, the proper course for a court is to remain constantly faithful to the policies of the Sixth Amendment and the venue provisions and to consider the import of the statute and factual situation so as to give full scope to those fundamental policies. United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 275, 65 S.Ct. 249, 89 L.Ed. 236 (1944).

In the case at bar, the government contends that venue and jury vicinage properly lie in the Southern District of New York because the crime was not complete until the application forms had passed into the hands of the VA in Manhattan and so come into the jurisdiction of an agency of the United States.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
304 F. Supp. 1301, 1969 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10257, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-flaxman-nysd-1969.