United States v. Finkelstein

526 F.2d 517
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedDecember 1, 1975
DocketNos. 162, 163, 182 and 253, Dockets 75-1154, 75-1155, 75-1170 and 75-1171
StatusPublished
Cited by150 cases

This text of 526 F.2d 517 (United States v. Finkelstein) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517 (2d Cir. 1975).

Opinion

MOORE, Circuit Judge:

Viewed, as it must be, in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence introduced below established n that from early 1969 until the spring of 1970 Alan Segal (“Segal”), Anthony Scardino (“Scardino”), Burney Acton (“Acton”), Michael Clegg (“Clegg”) and others devised and executed a fraudulent scheme to amass and distribute to unsuspecting buyers thousands of shares of worthless stock of Pioneer Development Corporation (“Pioneer”), swindling them out of [520]*520over three hundred thousand dollars in the process. To facilitate examination of the various alleged errors raised by appellants on appeal the salient aspects of their cabal are set forth as follows.

In early 1969 Acton and Clegg became interested in obtaining control of the outstanding shares of Pioneer, a dormant shell corporation whose stock was originally issued prior to the passage of the 1933 Securities Act. By July 31, 1969, they had accumulated enough shares to control Pioneer.

During the spring and summer of 1969, Acton and Clegg met and talked with Scardino at his recently acquired Riverside Hotel in Reno, Nevada. They explained their interest in initiating trading in the Pioneer stock which they were ip the process of acquiring. Scardino told them that Alan Segal, a partner in the Riverside Hotel and a New York promoter, was very adept at stock trading and suggested that Clegg contact Segal. Shortly afterwards, Scardino arranged a meeting in Dallas. Scardino, Acton, Clegg and Segal were present. Clegg explained to Segal that Acton and he controlled the majority of outstanding Pioneer stock and presented Segal with documentary material about Pioneer, Lone Tree Mining, and Precise Power, the latter two being companies which Pioneer had options to purchase. Segal took some of the stock and agreed that he would provide them with $500,000 in operating capital by trading it in New York. He stated that he would determine the price at which it would open and support the stock to make sure it did not decline in value. He also stipulated that the stock remaining with Acton and Clegg in the West was not to be sold on the open market. After the Dallas meeting, Acton, Scardino, Segal and others met at the Riverside Hotel in Reno and discussed their scheme further.

In late September or early October, Segal, Acton, Clegg, Schiffman (Segal’s attorney), and others met in Los Angeles. Segal repeated his promises and assurances, reminding his co-conspirators that he had to “keep the shoe box” to be able to keep the price of the stock where he wanted it. Another meeting took place on October 23, 1969 at the Riverside Hotel, at which Segal received over 50,000 Pioneer shares to take to New York and begin trading.

By October 30, 1969, Segal had commenced trading in Pioneer stock in New York at Karen & Co. through Joseph Azzerone, a broker, using a nominee, Francine Zahl, who was Segal’s secretary. He arbitrarily selected $5.00 as the stock’s opening price, and by means of directed trades, touting, misrepresentations, and a host of other incriminating misdeeds, he manipulated the price of the stock upward until it reached $9.00 per share. To sustain market activity in the stock he guaranteed purchases which he arranged to be made by personal friends. He also used nominees to procure loans by pledging Pioneer stock as collateral.

When, in early November, the $500,000 that Segal had promised to send to Acton and Clegg had not been received, Acton turned to Scardino for assistance. He informed Scardino that he needed money and that although he had promised Segal that he would not sell the stock, Segal would allow him to use it as collateral for a loan. Scardino agreed to secure a loan by pledging Pioneer stock which Acton would issue to him. However, upon receiving the stock Scardino and his employee, McKibbon, sold it. Part of the proceeds were given to Acton; Scardino and McKibbon split the rest. Not realizing the shares were being sold, Acton subsequently asked Scardino to arrange another “loan”, using additional shares. Either Scardino or McKibbon sold these shares as well.

When these shares began to reach the eastern market, Segal reacted quickly. He contacted an associate, Gardner, told him the people he was working with in the West were robbing him, and asked him if he knew anyone who could resolve his problem. Gardner suggested Howard Finkelstein (“Finkelstein”) and arranged for him to meet Segal. At the meeting Segal informed Finkelstein of the sitúa[521]*521tion, and Finkelstein agreed to act as Segal’s enforcer.

Finkelstein went West to investigate the “backdooring”, bringing along Anthony Zuber (“Zuber”) who, according to at least some of the testimony, carried a gun with him. Zuber confronted Clegg and demanded to know who had been selling Pioneer in the West. Clegg denied having sold any stock and telephoned Segal to tell him as much. Clegg then handed the phone to Zuber who conversed with Segal. Shortly thereafter, Zuber forced Acton to enter a car and accompany him and Finkelstein to the Holiday Inn in Reno. By way of explanation, he informed Acton that “we got to get the stock situation straightened out”. Upon arriving at the motel, Zuber, Finkelstein, and Acton met with Scardino and McKibbon. Scardino professed amazement when he was probed about the western sales. McKibbon also denied knowing anything about them, but under physical coercion confessed to having made the sales and agreed to repay Segal. Thereupon, Scardino also promised to give Segal the proceeds which he had received from the western sales.

Upon returning to New York, Finkelstein and Zuber evidenced interest in profiting personally from the fraudulent scheme. Finkelstein asked Gardner if he knew a furrier who would be willing to deal in stock rather than cash. Gardner suggested Allen Grant and arranged for them to meet Grant at his shop, which they did the same day. Zuber offered to exchange Pioneer stock for coats but stipulated that he would not make any deal unless Grant gave him a 60-day repurchase option at $10 a share. Zuber proceeded to make various misrepresentations about the stock. Grant agreed to exchange seven fur coats valued at $15,-000 for $42,000 of Pioneer stock, and Zuber and Grant executed the. option, which Finkelstein initialled. It was understood that as part of the arrangement Finkelstein was to receive “something”, although there is no evidence of what, if anything, was his ultimate reward.

Throughout the duration of this conspiracy, Pioneer remained an empty shell. It possessed options to purchase a Nevada mercury mine and a company called Precise Power, and on October 29, 1969, Acton and Clegg exercised the Precise Power option and acquired that company in exchange for 600,000 shares of restricted Pioneer stock. However, Precise Power’s assets were worth less than $5,000 and it never produced any revenues. Pioneer also acquired the Nevada mercury mine on December 3, 1969, several weeks after trading in Pioneer stock had begun, but it never produced any revenues either.

PREJUDICIAL VARIANCE

Having sketched the background, we may now delineate appellants’ contentions. We first consider the claim of appellants Scardino and Segal that the government’s proof demonstrated the existence of multiple conspiracies. They interpret the indictment narrowly and assert that it does not encompass the western sales made by Scardino and McKibbon in violation of Segal’s instructions.

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Bluebook (online)
526 F.2d 517, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-finkelstein-ca2-1975.