UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : : : v. : Civil Action No.: 20-2227 (RC) : : Re Document Nos.: 76, 85, 87 FIFTY-THREE VIRTUAL CURRENCY : ACCOUNTS, et al., : : Defendants. :
MEMORANDUM OPINION
GRANTING THE UNITED STATES’ MOTION TO STRIKE; GRANTING CLAIMANT KARATAS’S MOTION TO STRIKE; DENYING THE WEINSTOCK CLAIMANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In this in rem forfeiture action, the United States of America (“United States” or the
“Government”) filed suit against Defendant Properties1—fifty-two virtual accounts, one hundred
and twenty-seven virtual currency properties, five accounts held at a bank, and three internet
domains. After the Internal Revenue Service—Criminal Investigation’s Cyber Crimes Unit
(“IRS-CI”), Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), and Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”) (collectively, the “Government Agencies”) investigated online fundraising activities
conducted by the Hamas-Islamic Republic Movement’s (“Hamas”) military wing, the United
States alleged that individuals associated with the Defendant Properties laundered monetary
instruments, operated unlicensed money transmitting businesses, and provided material support
or resources to Hamas. Because they allege specific property or ownership interest in the
1 This opinion will assume the definition of Defendant Properties included in the Amended Complaint. See Am. Compl., Attach. A, ECF No. 62-1. Defendant Properties, the family members of Yitzchak Weinstock (the “Weinstock Claimants”)
now move for summary judgment dismissing the Government’s Amended Complaint for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The Weinstock Claimants argue that they have no burden to prove in the
motion that the Government does not possess personal jurisdiction over the Defendant
Properties, and the Government contends that the Weinstock Claimants’ motion for summary
judgement fails because the Weinstock Claimants lack standing to participate in this action.
Additionally, the Government and dismissed Claimant Husamettin Karatas (“Claimant Karatas”)
move to strike the answer filed by the Weinstock Claimants and dismiss the claims made against
them by the Weinstock Claimants. In the motions to strike, both the Government’s and Claimant
Karatas’s main argument is that the Weinstock Claimants lack standing. For the foregoing
reasons, the Court grants the United States’ motion to strike, grants Claimant Karatas’s motion to
strike, and denies the Weinstock Claimants’ motion for summary judgment.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Court assumes knowledge of the factual and legal background, as detailed in its
previous memorandum opinion. See Mem. Op. Den. as Moot Claimant Karatas’s Mot. to Stay
Disc., granting Gov’t’s Mot. to Am./Correct Compl., granting Weinstock Claimants’ Mot. for
Leave to File Surreply (“Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 74. A brief overview is provided below.
In December 1993, Yitzchak Weinstock, a United States citizen, was killed in a terrorist
shooting near Jerusalem by Hamas’s military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades. Weinstock
Claimants’ Answer, Cross-cl. Against Claimant Karatas, and Countercl. Against Gov’t Am.
Compl. (“Weinstock Claimants’ Operative Answer”) ¶ 114, ECF No. 75. On May 17, 2019, a
federal court in Florida issued a final judgment of $78,873,000 in favor of the Weinstock
Claimants—including the estates and family members of Weinstock—and against Hamas. Id.
2 ¶¶ 115–116; Weinstock v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-23272-CIV, 2019 WL 1993778 (S.D.
Fla. May 6, 2019) (“2019 Florida Judgment”). Hamas neither appeared in nor defended that civil
action, and the judgment remains unpaid. Weinstock Claimants’ Verified Claim (“Weinstock
Claimants’ Claim”) at 2, ECF No. 11.
On August 13, 2020, the Government initiated the instant forfeiture action against the
Defendant Properties. Am. Compl. at 1, ECF No. 62-1. Following investigations into the al-
Qassam Brigades’ online fundraising, the Government alleged that individuals associated with
these Defendant Properties conspired to launder money (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)) and provide
material support to Hamas (18 U.S.C. § 2339B). Id. ¶ 2. On October 7, 2020, Claimant Karatas
asserted ownership of Defendant Property 180, one of the virtual accounts included in the
original suit, denying any knowledge of unlawful activity. See Claimant Karatas’s Claim, ECF
No. 5. He later filed an answer to the original Complaint, maintaining that he did not support
Hamas or use the account unlawfully and is an “innocent owner.” See Claimant Karatas’s
Answer ¶¶ 1–3, 119, ECF No. 9. On February 16, 2021, the Weinstock Claimants filed a
verified claim, asserting an interest in the Defendant Properties to satisfy their 2019 Florida
Judgment against Hamas. Weinstock Claimants’ Claim at 2; see 2019 Florida Judgment.
In its November 19, 2024 Opinion in this action, this Court found that the Weinstock
Claimants’ counterclaim and crossclaim against Claimant Karatas and the Government, see
Weinstock Claimants’ Answer to Original Compl. ¶¶ 128–151, ECF No. 53, do not create any
lien on the Defendant Properties, as an in personam creditor’s bill does not, on its own, establish
a lien. See Mem. Op. at 12. Additionally, after granting the Government leave to file its
Amended Complaint so that it could drop Defendant Property 180 as a defendant, the Court held
that because neither the Government nor the Weinstock Claimants has a valid interest in
3 Defendant Property 180, ownership of the property reverts to the individual or entity that held
title prior to the initiation of this forfeiture action.2 Id. at 14. Lastly, the Court ruled that neither
the Weinstock Claimants nor Claimant Karatas has standing because they do not maintain any
interest in the Defendant Properties. Id. at 14–20.
After the issuance of that opinion, the Weinstock Claimants filed an answer to the
Amended Complaint,3 crossclaims against Claimant Karatas, and a counterclaim against the
Government. See generally Weinstock Claimants’ Operative Answer. The Weinstock
Claimants also moved for summary judgment, arguing that they “have no burden on this motion”
and that “[t]he Government cannot prove personal jurisdiction.” See Weinstock Claimants’ Mot.
Summ. J. (“Weinstock Claimants’ Mot.”) at 3–5, ECF No. 76. In response, the Government
opposes the Weinstock Claimants’ motion and files a renewed motion to strike the Weinstock
Claimants’ claim and answer and to dismiss their counterclaim against it, arguing that the
Weinstock Claimants lack standing in this suit. See Gov’t Renewed Mot. to Strike Weinstock
Claimants’ Claim & Answer & to Dismiss Their Countercl. Against the U.S. & Opp’n to
Weinstock Claimants’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Gov’t Mot.”), ECF No. 85. Claimant Karatas also
opposes the Weinstock Claimants’ motion and files a renewed motion to strike their claim and
answer and to dismiss their crossclaims against him, also arguing that the Weinstock Claimants
2 Although the Court ruled that Claimant Karatas does not have standing in this action because Defendant Property 180 will no longer be a party in this suit, it declined to decide whether Claimant Karatas is the rightful owner of Defendant Property 180. See Mem. Op. at 14 n.2. 3 From the original Complaint to the Amended Complaint, the Government revised its pleadings to (1) include only those defendant properties it still believes are subject to forfeiture, and (2) assert only the charges it deems applicable to this action. See ECF No. 62-2 (redline reflecting the removal of Defendant Property 180 as a defendant and the omission of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 as a specified unlawful activity). Accordingly, the Court finds that the Government’s amendments to the Complaint do not affect the Court’s standing analysis in its prior Opinion.
4 lack standing. See H. Karatas’s Renewed Mot. to Strike the Weinstock Claimants’ Answer & to
Dismiss Their Crosscls. Against H. Karatas & Opp’n to the Weinstock Claimants’ Mot. for
Summ. J. (“Claimant Karatas’s Mot.”), ECF No. 87. All three of the motions are ripe for the
Court’s review.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Civil forfeiture actions are in rem proceedings brought against property, not individuals.
However, individuals may intervene to protect their interests in the property. See United States
v. All Funds in Account Nos. 747.034/278, 747.009/278, & 747.714/278 in Banco Espanol de
Credito, Spain, 295 F.3d 23, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2002). These actions are governed by 18 U.S.C.
§ 983 and the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture
Actions (“Supplemental Rules”), a subset of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See United
States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius, 480 F. Supp. 3d 1, 11–12 (D.D.C. 2020); see also Fed.
R. Civ. P. Supp. R. A(1)(B).
To contest forfeiture, a claimant must file a verified claim and an answer pursuant to
Supplemental Rule G(5). See Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States
§ 7–13(a), at 371 (3d ed. 2022); United States v. 8 Gilcrease Lane, 641 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–6
(D.D.C. 2009). Courts strictly enforce these requirements, which are referred to as “statutory
standing.” See United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., No. 04-cv-0798,
2023 WL 5000213, at *7–8 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2023).
Statutory standing requires a claimant to assert an interest in the specific property named
as a defendant. See Supp. R. G(5)(a)(i)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(4)(A) (“[A]ny person claiming
an interest in the seized property may file a claim asserting such person’s interest in the
property[.]”). A claimant who fails to assert such an interest lacks standing. See Supp.
5 R. G(8)(c)(i)(B); United States v. Funds from Prudential Secs., 300 F. Supp. 2d 99, 103 (D.D.C.
2004). “The extent of the interest in the defendant property sufficient to meet this standing
requirement is left to case law.” United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., 772
F. Supp. 2d 191, 198 (D.D.C. 2011) (citation omitted); see also Funds from Prudential Secs.,
300 F. Supp. 2d at 103 (stating that a claimant must “demonstrat[e] an interest . . . sufficient to
satisfy the court of his standing”).
In addition to statutory standing, a claimant must also demonstrate Article III standing.
See United States v. $487,825.00 in U.S. Currency, 484 F.3d 662, 664 (3d Cir. 2007). This
requires a “colorable claim” to the property, typically through an ownership or possessory
interest, as such an interest creates an injury-in-fact redressable by return of the property. See
United States v. $17,900.00 in U.S. Currency, 859 F.3d 1085, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting
United States v. Emor, 785 F.3d 671, 676 (D.C. Cir. 2015)); United States v. $515,060.42 in U.S.
Currency, 152 F.3d 491, 497 (6th Cir. 1998)).
To establish standing, a claimant must show a facially colorable interest in the defendant
property—such as actual possession, control, title, or a financial stake. See United States v. Real
Property Located at 475 Martin Lane, 545 F.3d 1134, 1140 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. One
Lincoln Navigator, 328 F.3d 1011, 1013 (8th Cir. 2003). At the summary judgment stage, the
claimant bears the burden of establishing such an interest by a preponderance of the evidence.
See United States v. $148,840 in U.S. Currency, 521 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 2008); Supp.
R. G(8)(c)(ii)(B). However, the claimant need not definitively prove ownership; it must only
demonstrate a sufficiently colorable claim to establish standing. See $148,840, 521 F.3d at 1273;
United States v. $557,933.89, More or Less, in U.S. Funds, 287 F.3d 66, 79 (2d Cir. 2002);
United States v. 116 Emerson St., 942 F.2d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 1991).
6 Ultimately, the purpose of standing in forfeiture cases is to ensure that the government is
required to prove the forfeitability of property only when someone with a legitimate interest
contests the action. See $557,933.89, 287 F.3d at 79. The nature of a claimant’s property
interest is defined by the law of the jurisdiction, state or nation, where the interest arose. At any
time before trial, the United States “may move to strike a claim or answer . . . because the
claimant lacks standing.” Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(B). If appropriate, such a challenge may be
resolved “after a hearing or by summary judgment.” Supp. R. G(8)(c)(ii)(B).
IV. ANALYSIS
At the core of the pending motions is the question of whether the Weinstock Claimants
have standing in this action. This determination affects not only their ability to file an answer to
the Amended Complaint, but also whether they may assert a counterclaim against the United
States or crossclaim against dismissed Claimant Karatas, and whether the Weinstock Claimants’
motion for summary judgment is properly before the Court (or if they are even entitled to file
such a motion in this proceeding). For the reasons stated below, the Court again holds that the
Weinstock Claimants do not have standing in this action because they do not have any interest in
the Defendant Properties. Accordingly, the Court grants the Government’s and Claimant
Karatas’s motions to strike the Weinstock Claimants’ answer, counterclaim, and crossclaims, and
it denies the Weinstock Claimants’ motion for summary judgment.
A. The Weinstock Claimants’ Standing
First, the Court reaffirms its holding from its prior Opinion, see Mem. Op. at 14–20, that
the Weinstock Claimants lack both constitutional and statutory standing to participate in this
civil forfeiture action. The Weinstock Claimants assert a right to the Defendant Properties based
solely on its unsatisfied 2019 Florida judgment against Hamas. See Weinstock Claimants’
7 Opp’n to Mots. to Strike Their Claim & Answer & to Dismiss Their Claims (“Weinstock
Claimants’ Opp’n to Mots. to Strike”) at 1–2, ECF No. 92. However, this claim amounts only to
a general unsecured interest, not a specific ownership or lien against the Defendant Properties.
See 8 Gilcrease Lane, 641 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (“The generalized legal interest movants may have in
the assets of [the Defendant Properties] does not equate to the necessary particularized interest in
any specific asset of [the Defendant Properties] required for standing.”). No lien was perfected
against the Defendant Properties prior to their seizure, and federal sovereign immunity prevents
any post-seizure attachment. See Greenbaum v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 67 F.4th 428, 435
(D.C. Cir. 2023) (holding that “federal sovereign immunity prevents the attachment and
garnishment of” assets obtained through civil forfeiture). Accordingly, the Weinstock
Claimants’ failure to establish a concrete, particularized injury related to the forfeiture of the
Defendant Properties means that they lack constitutional standing. Their property interest, an
unsecured interest resulting from the 2019 Florida judgment, has no direct connection to the
seized assets in this action, nor would a ruling in their favor redress their harm. As this Court
ruled in its prior Opinion, “the Weinstock Claimants have not demonstrated how they suffered a
redressable injury in this action because they have not established any ownership rights of
property interest on the Defendant Properties.” See Mem. Op. at 19.
The Weinstock Claimants likewise fail to meet the statutory standing requirements. They
have not filed a verified claim asserting a specific property interest, nor do they qualify as
“owners” under § 983(d)(6). As numerous courts have held, unsecured creditors “cannot claim
an interest in any particular asset that makes up the debtor’s estate,” and thus lack standing in
forfeiture proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg), S.A., 46 F.3d
1185, 1191–92 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. $20,193.39 in U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d 344, 346
8 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Ribadeneira, 105 F.3d 833, 836–37 (2d Cir. 1997).
“[U]nsecured creditors do not have standing to challenge the civil forfeiture of their debtors’
property.” All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., 772 F. Supp. 2d at 198 (quoting United
States v. One–Sixth Share, 326 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2003)). The Weinstock Claimants have not
shown any perfected lien, nor have they demonstrated a legally recognized interest in the
Defendant Properties. Thus, they lack both constitutional and statutory standing in this action.
The Weinstock Claimants argue that other courts have ruled that judgment creditors who
file a timely claim have constitutional and statutory standing to contest the Government’s
forfeiture action under § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (“TRIA”). See Weinstock
Claimants’ Opp’n to Mots. to Strike at 1–2. However, the Weinstock Claimants’ reliance on
Levin v. Miller, No. 21-cv-1116, 2022 WL 17574574 (2d Cir. Dec. 12, 2022) does not support
their standing in this case. In Levin, the Second Circuit rejected a similar argument from
terrorist-victim creditors, finding that the TRIA did not confer standing on creditors without a
perfected interest in the property. 2022 WL 17574574, at *2 (rejecting the argument by creditors
that “TRIA was superior to the Government’s forfeiture judgment”). The ruling in Levin
reinforces the notion that the Weinstock Claimants, who lack a perfected interest in the
Defendant Properties, similarly do not have standing to contest the forfeiture in this action. Id.
(holding that TRIA does not confer statutory standing on its own, and that creditors lacked
standing to contest forfeiture without a perfected interest in the property, such as a TRIA
turnover order). Thus, and as the Court has concluded here and in its prior Opinion, the
Weinstock Claimants have no standing in this action.
9 B. The Weinstock Claimants’ Counterclaim and Crossclaims
Because the Court finds that the Weinstock Claimants lack standing in this action, it also
holds that their counterclaim against the United States and crossclaim against dismissed
Claimant Karatas are dismissed because the Weinstock Claimants have no right to pursue them.
A court must strike a claimant’s claim and answer if standing is not properly established. See
Supp. R. G(8)(c)(i)(B). Without a valid claim and answer, a party has no procedural or
substantive basis to participate in the action at all, let alone to assert affirmative claims against
other parties.
Once a claimant’s claim and answer are stricken for lack of standing, as is warranted
here, the claimant is effectively no longer a party to the litigation. United States v. PokerStars,
No. 11 Civ. 2564, 2012 WL 1659177, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2012). Consequently,
“someone . . . who is not a claimant in a civil forfeiture action and not otherwise a party to the
litigation, has no right to assert a counterclaim.” Id. The logic is straightforward: without
standing, the Weinstock Claimants do not have a stake in the litigation and thus cannot pursue a
counterclaim or a crossclaim within it. This position aligns with the structure of civil forfeiture
proceedings under Supplemental Rule G, which provides a narrow procedural pathway for third
parties to intervene: by filing a verified claim and an answer under Rule G(5). Once those
documents are invalidated (due to lack of standing or otherwise), the claimants cease to have any
role in the action. Thus, lacking a stake in the Defendant Properties, the Weinstock Claimants
lack a path to assert further claims.
Even if the Weinstock Claimants could establish standing (which they cannot), their
counterclaim against the United States would still be subject to dismissal because claimants in a
forfeiture proceeding are not defendants for purposes of Rule 13 and thus cannot bring
10 counterclaims. “A counterclaim is an action brought by a defendant against the plaintiff.”
United States v. $10,000.00 in U.S. Funds, 863 F. Supp. 812, 816 (S.D. Ill. 1994). However, in
civil forfeiture proceedings, the defendant is the property, not the person laying claim to it.
Accordingly, the Weinstock Claimants are not defendants, and the Government has not asserted
any claim against them personally. In the Weinstock Claimants’ case in this action, “there was
no ‘claim’ to ‘counter.’” United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency, 927 F.2d 30, 34 (1st Cir.
1991); see also United States v. 8 Luxury Vehicles, 88 F. Supp. 3d 1332, 1336 (M.D. Fla. 2015);
United States v. Assorted Computer Equip., No. 03-2356V, 2004 WL 784493, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.
Jan. 9, 2004); United States v. $43,725.00 in U.S. Currency, No. CIV.A. 4:08-1373, 2009 WL
347475, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 3, 2009). Therefore, under the majority rule in other circuits,
counterclaims are generally impermissible in civil forfeiture actions because the structure of in
rem litigation precludes the procedural reciprocity required for a counterclaim.
Assuming that the Weinstock Claimants could validly assert a counterclaim in this
context, such a claim against the United States would nonetheless be barred by sovereign
immunity. The United States, as sovereign, may be sued only where Congress has expressly
waived immunity. See Mullen v. Bureau of Prisons, 843 F. Supp. 2d 112, 115 (D.D.C. 2012)
(“Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States is immune from suit unless
Congress has expressly waived the defense of sovereign immunity by statute.”); United States v.
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued
without its consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”). No such
waiver exists here. Although the Weinstock Claimants appear to rely on TRIA, see Weinstock
Claimants’ Opp’n to Mots. to Strike at 1–2, the D.C. Circuit has held that TRIA does not waive
the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims seeking attachment or execution of assets
11 seized through forfeiture. Greenbaum, 67 F.4th at 430–35 (“TRIA does not, ‘standing
alone,’ . . . clearly waive federal sovereign immunity.”). Thus, any counterclaim premised on
TRIA is barred by the United States’ sovereign immunity.
The Weinstock Claimants’ crossclaim against Claimant Karatas also fails because neither
of them are “parties” or “coparties” in this action within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 13(g). The crossclaim rule permits such claims only “by one party against a coparty.”
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(g). But the Weinstock Claimants are not parties to the litigation once their
claim and answer are stricken for lack of standing, and Claimant Karatas is no longer a named
defendant or claimant either once Defendant Property 180 was dropped from the case. The plain
text of Rule 13(g) must be enforced according to its terms. Courts have interpreted “party” and
“coparty” narrowly in this context. See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 699 F.2d 909, 913
(7th Cir. 1983) (“A Rule 13(g) cross-claim will lie only against an existing defendant.”); see also
Seiffer v. Topsy’s Int’l, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 653, 709 (D. Kan. 1980); Footlick v. Topstep LLC, No.
22 CV 6152, 2025 WL 744069, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2025). Claimant Karatas is not a
defendant in this forfeiture case because the Government’s Amended Complaint does not name
him as a party and he has not made a claim against any of the properties remaining in this case.
See generally Am. Compl. And without standing, the Weinstock Claimants are similarly outside
the litigation. Rule 13(g) does not permit “outsiders” to assert crossclaims, and therefore, the
Weinstock Claimants’ crossclaim must be dismissed as procedurally defective.
Because the Weinstock Claimants lack standing, they have no right to participate in this
forfeiture action under Supplemental Rule G. That deficiency alone mandates dismissal of both
their counterclaim against the United States and their crossclaim against Claimant Karatas.
Moreover, the counterclaim also fails due to the absence of a waiver of the United States’
12 sovereign immunity, and the crossclaim is improper under Rule 13(g) because neither the
Weinstock Claimants nor Claimant Karatas are proper parties. Accordingly, the Weinstock
Claimants’ claims must be dismissed as a matter of law.
C. The Weinstock Claimants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Lastly, the Court concludes that the Weinstock Claimants are not entitled to seek
summary judgment in this action, as again, they lack standing. “[Rule G(8)(c)(ii)] directs that a
motion to strike a claim or answer be decided before any motion by the claimant to dismiss the
action. A claimant who lacks standing is not entitled to challenge the forfeiture on the merits.”
All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co., 2023 WL 5000213, at *18 (quoting Supp. R. G
Advisory Committee’s Notes (2006)). In this case, because the Weinstock Claimants have failed
to demonstrate the requisite standing required to be a party in this forfeiture action, their motion
for summary judgment is improper and must be denied.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the United States’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 85) is
GRANTED, Claimant Karatas’s Motion to Strike (ECF No. 87) is GRANTED, and the
Weinstock Claimants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 76) is DENIED. An order
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is separately and contemporaneously issued.
Dated: September 25, 2025 RUDOLPH CONTRERAS United States District Judge