TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
Defendants-appellants (collectively, “defendants”) Felipe Ramirez-Ferrer (“Ramirez-Ferrer”), Jorge L. Suárez-Maya (“Suárez-Maya”) and Raúl Troche-Matos (“Troche-Matos”) appeal to this court their convictions on drug and firearm charges. A panel of this court: 1) affirmed the convictions of all defendants for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute; 2) affirmed the convictions of Suárez-Maya and Ramirez-Ferrer for using a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, but reversed the conviction of Troche-Matos on a similar charge; and 3) reversed the convictions of all defendants for importation of narcotics into the United States. Thereafter, the full court reheard the case en banc. The en banc court now reverses the convictions of all defendants for importation of narcotics into the United States and remands the firearm convictions for further consideration in light of an intervening Supreme Court decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Abreu, 952 F.2d 1458, 1460 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 994, 112 S.Ct. 1695, 118 L.Ed.2d 406 (1992), permitted the jury to find the facts that follow. We emphasize the facts pertinent to the importation charge. On March 13, 1993, the Police of Puerto Rico (“POPR”) received an anonymous telephone call. The caller informed the POPR that defendant Suárez-Maya and three other individuals had left for Mona Island, Puerto Rico, in a boat belonging to a relation of Suárez-Maya, and that the four men were going to acquire a load of cocaine and ferry it to the main island of Puerto Rico. Mona Island is one of numerous small islands near Puerto Rico’s main island, and is part of the Municipality of Cabo Rojo, which also includes part of the main island’s southwest corner.1 Mona Island is physically separated [1133]*1133by about 39 miles of water from the main island of Puerto Rico.
Prior to 1989, the boundaries of the United States extended three miles offshore. United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1073 n. 6 (5th Cir.1980). In that year, they were extended by Presidential Proclamation with qualifications to 12 miles. Proclamation No. 5928, 54 Fed.Reg. 777 (1989) (citing the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, to which the U.S. is a signatory, but which the U.S. had not ratified as of February, 1996). Thus, given the 12-mile limit, to travel from Mona Island to the main island of Puerto Rico requires that a vessel cross international waters.
After verifying that the boat in question was indeed away from its mooring, the United States Customs Service (USCS) and POPR flew to Mona Island on a USCS helicopter. The authorities located the subject boat and Suárez-Maya, accompanied by three other men as described. At approximately 12:30 p.m. the next day, the authorities learned that the boat was leaving Mona Island. The boat was interdicted about one mile off the southwest coast of Puerto Rico.
After the boat was seized, it was found to be carrying about 16 kilograms of cocaine. A subsequent inventory search of the boat turned up a firearm. The seized firearm, a loaded revolver, was found covered by a T-shirt, behind a storage compartment near the location where Ramirez-Ferrer had been seated at the time of the interdiction. The search also revealed evidence linking the vessel to a relative of Suárez-Maya.
On March 31, 1993, a grand jury indicted defendants, charging all three in each of three separate counts. The indictment charged each with possessing approximately 16 kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute (count 1), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1994); with importing such cocaine into the United States (count 2), id. § 952(a) (1994); and with possessing and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime (count 3), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994). A superseding indictment corrected the description of the seized firearm in count 3. .
On September 28, 1993, a jury convicted all three defendants on each count. On counts 1 and 2,. relating to possession and importation of cocaine, Suárez-Maya was sentenced to life imprisonment, Ramirez-Ferrer to a term of 240 months, and Troche-Matos to a term of 120 months. The sentences of Suárez-Maya and Ramirez-Ferrer were enhanced under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b) and 960(b) on account of prior drug crimes. On count 3, the gun count, each appellant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of 60 months to be served consecutively, as required by the statute.
In a decision released April 27, 1995, United States v. Ramirez-Ferrer, 1995 WL 237041 (1st Cir.1995), a panel of this court reversed all three defendants’ importation convictions, reversed Troche-Matos’ firearm conviction, and affirmed the remaining convictions. On June 26,1995, this court agreed to rehear the ease en banc on the issue of the importation statute’s interpretation. Additionally, the court asked the parties to address again the firearms convictions of Ramirez-Ferrer and Suárez-Maya. The en banc court heard oral argument on September 13, 1995. While the case was pending before the en banc court, the Supreme Court on December 6, 1995 issued its opinion in Bailey v. United States, — U.S. —, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), overturning precedent in this and other circuits as to the proper construction of the term “use” in section 924(c)(1).
II. THE POSSESSION CHARGE AND THE FIREARM CHARGE
On the possession charge under count 1, the panel concluded that the evidence was sufficient to show that the defendants knowingly possessed the drugs or aided and abetted their possession. Among other evidence, the testimony permitted the jury to conclude that the drugs were stored in a bag with a broken zipper and that the drugs were plainly visible from outside the bag, easily seen by anyone on the 20-foot boat. The en banc court did not request further argument on this issue.
On the firearm charge, the story is more complicated. Section 924(c)(1) is di[1134]*1134rected against anyone who “uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime” and the district court charged the jury with the language of the statute, defining “use” in accordance with circuit precedent.2 Assuming that each appellant was aware of the revolver, its presence on the vessel made it available for use to protect the drugs. The panel ruled that, assuming knowledge of the firearm, its proximity and potential for use permitted the jury to convict under the so-called “fortress” theory previously adopted by this court and others. See, e.g., United States v. Wilkinson, 926 F.2d 22, 25-26 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211, 111 S.Ct. 2813, 115 L.Ed.2d 985 (1991).
The panel had more difficulty with the question of whether a reasonable jury could find that each of the defendants knew that the gun was present; unlike the drugs, the gun was not in plain view. The panel upheld the conviction of Ramirez-Ferrer, since the revolver was located behind a compartment adjacent to his seat and served an obvious purpose to protect the cocaine. The panel also upheld the conviction of Suárez-Maya, who was the central figure in the drug venture and the captain of the boat. As to Troche-Matos, the court ruled that a reasonable jury could not infer that he knew of the weapon.
In their petitions for rehearing on this issue, Suárez-Maya and . Ramirez-Ferrer drew our attention to United States v. Torres-Maldonado, 14 F.3d 95 (1st Cir.1994), arguing that on somewhat similar facts a panel of this court had found the evidence insufficient to support convictions under section 924(c)(1). In that case, the weapon was found in a zippered opaque tote bag on a sofa in a room in which drugs and money were also found, and the court concluded the evidence was not adequate to establish that two of the individuals in the room actually or constructively possessed the weapon. Id. at 102. Despite its differing outcome, Torres-Maldonado does not conflict with the original Ramirez-Ferrer panel on the proper legal standards to be applied.
Although the en banc court agreed to rehear the case as a whole, sufficiency of the evidence is not normally a question for en banc consideration unless a mistaken legal standard has been used. Any possible tension between the panel opinion and the decision in Torres-Maldonado stems from their appraisals of their own respective facts. But given the kaleidoscope of different facts presented in drug and gun eases and the varying compositions of panels in the court, the en banc court was, and remains, of the view that differences in weighing evidence are inevitable in cases of this kind even within a single circuit. Nothing will produce perfect harmony among outcomes unless the court chooses to hear every drug and gun ease en banc, a course that is neither practical nor useful. Therefore, we conclude that the full court should not seek to decide en banc whether the evidence against each appellant in this case was or was not sufficient on the gun charge. As a result, the en banc court declines to review the adequacy of the evidence on either count 1 or count 3.
This does not end the matter. While the en banc opinion was being prepared, the Supreme Court decided Bailey. There, the Supreme Court determined that a conviction for firearm “use” under section 924(c)(1) required “evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” Bailey, — U.S. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 505. As far as “use” is concerned, the Supreme Court rejected the fortress theory, disagreeing with the suggestion that “a gun placed in the closet is ‘used’ because its mere presence emboldens or protects its owner.” Id., — U.S. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 508.
Although the Supreme Court has rejected the fortress theory of “use” under which defendants were convicted, the issue of their firearm convictions remains unresolved. Section 924(e)(1) imposes a prison term upon a person who “dining and in relation to any ... drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (em[1135]*1135phasis added). Defendants were convicted on a gun count that went to the jury with instructions that permitted the jury to convict if it found that defendants either used or carried the weapon found under the T-shirt behind Ramirez-Ferrer. The interpretive problems posed by the term “carry” are apparent, given the shadow that Bailey casts over previous circuit precedent. Moreover, Bailey contains little comment on the proper scope of “carry” in section 924(c)(1). By contrast, the Supreme Court went on to state that “use” cannot extend to hypothetical situations where the offender has “hid[den the firearm] where he can grab it and use it if necessary,” id., — U.S. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 508, a description that, in the best light for the government, includes the set of facts before this en bane panel. However, the Court went on to state that the carry prong could cover situations that the use prong could not, noting that a firearm can be carried without being used, “e.g., when an offender keeps a gun hidden in his clothing throughout a drug transaction.” Id., — U.S. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 507. As a result, defendants’ conviction for “use” should be vacated, and. they should face only reconsideration of their convictions under the carry prong, since Bailey has both limited the word “use” to the extent that it cannot apply in the instant case and emphasized that “carry” has meanings not covered by “use.” Id., — U.S. at —, 116 S.Ct. at 508-09 (cautioning against readings of the word “use” that render the term “carry” superfluous, and remanding two unrelated defendants’ convictions for consideration under the carry prong).
In light of Bailey, then, we decline to decide en banc defendants’ firearm convictions, and instead require further consideration of count 3 under section 924(c)(1). We think that these problems should be addressed in proceedings before the panel rather than the en banc court.
III. THE IMPORTATION COUNTS
In accord with the panel’s decision, the en banc court has concluded that the importation statute, 21 U.S.C. § 952, does not embrace defendants’ conduct in transporting 16 kilograms of cocaine from Mona Island, Puerto Rico, to approximately one mile offshore of the main island of Puerto Rico, notwithstanding the fact that the contraband traversed international waters during the journey. The court concludes that this interpretation accords with both the wording of the statute and general principles of statutory construction. Furthermore, absent either pertinent legislative history or precedent, the en banc court likewise concludes that the historical application and the potential future application of the statute by the government weigh in favor of this interpretation.
A. Statutory Language
The defendants were convicted under 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) for importing drugs into the United States. In relevant part, § 952(a) provides that
it shall be unlawful ... to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance.
The defendants contend that they did not violate this statute because they did not bring the drugs at issue into the United States from a “place outside thereof.” To the contrary, they argue that the evidence in the record only establishes that they brought the drugs from one location within the jurisdiction of the United States (i.e., Mona Island) to another (i.e., the waters off Puerto Rico’s main island). The government, on the other hand, claims that, because the drugs passed through international waters on their way from Mona Island, the drugs were brought into the United States from a “place outside thereof’ (i.e., international waters). Essentially, the government argues that the quoted language of section 952(a) establishes a kind of transparent curtain around the jurisdictional boundaries of the United States, arid proscribes any deliberate shipment of drugs through that curtain without regard to the “place” from which the shipment actually originated.
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), the Supreme Court stated: ‘We need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute.” Id. at 241, 109 [1136]*1136S.Ct. at 1786. The government’s newly minted interpretation of section 952(a) not only is contrary to the plain language of the statute, and flies in the face of every common and logical meaning of the word “importation,” but also places at risk of prosecution thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of persons who up to now have not been prosecuted under this novel construction of section 952(a).
We should, first of all, leave no doubt as to what this case is not about. We are not faced with a factual situation in which a defendant leaves United States domestic territory empty-handed, proceeds to international waters or to a foreign territory to acquire contraband there, and then returns to domestic territory with this contraband (for example, when a vessel leaves the United States, sails out to sea where it obtains drugs from a “mother ship” anchored in international waters, and then returns to the United States). In that hypothetical situation, the government might have a somewhat more convincing argument that international waters can be deemed the “place” from which the controlled substance is being imported into the United States.3 While we might imagine strong arguments on both sides, we are presently faced with a much narrower factual situation. We need only decide whether Congress intended to treat in-transit international waters as a “place” for purposes of the importation statute when the government’s evidence shows that both the origination and the destination of the controlled substance occurred within United States territory.4
“The starting point in statutory interpretation is ‘the language [of the statute] itself.’” United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 3120, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986). In its argument, the government overlooks the fact that .the text of section 952(a) includes a separate clause not directly at issue in this case. With this separate clause included, section 952(a), entitled “importation of controlled substances,” provides
[i]t shall be unlawful [1] to import into the customs territory of the United States from any place outside thereof (but within the United States), or [2] to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance.
21 U.S.C. § 952(a). The court concludes that, given a proper interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), transport from one part of the United States to another does not rise to the level of importation simply by involving travel through international waters.
The definition of “import” (“any bringing in”) appearing in section 951 does not implicate the origin of a shipment of drugs. Thus, the government argues that the statute does [1137]*1137not require any inquiry into the origin of a shipment of drugs; by the government’s reading, any shipment into the United States that must pass into international waters or airspace would be punishable under clause 2 of section 952(a). However, section 952(a) itself requires that the importation into the United States be “from any place outside thereof’ (emphasis added). It is the word “place” in section 952(a), when read together with “from ... outside,” that needs to be considered in the present circumstances, not just the word “import.” The government’s interpretation rests on the assumption that Congress intended to focus only on a result (ie., each introduction of the drugs into the United States), irrespective of whether its place of origin was another part of the United States. But if this were the case, Congress would not have proscribed importation “from, any place outside thereof,” but merely importation “into the United States,” omitting any mention of a place of origin. Furthermore, we should also consider the following test of the “plain meaning” of the word “place” in section 952(a). Anyone aware of the facts in the record of this case, if asked, “From what ‘place ’ was the illegal substance brought?” would answer “From Mona Island,” not as is argued, “From international waters.”
In addition to its failure to comport with the normal understanding of the word “place,” the government’s interpretation of clause 2 cannot be reconciled with any reasonable reading of clause 1. Clauses 1 and 2 were enacted simultaneously in 1970. If the phrase in clause 2 — “place outside thereof’ refers to the location of the drugs immediately before they pass through the “transparent curtain” into U.S. territory, it must be given the same connotation in clause 1 absent an indication that Congress intended otherwise. See Atlantic Cleaners v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 438, 52 S.Ct. 607, 608-09, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932) (noting presumption that a word or phrase used more than once in statute has same meaning); Fortin v. Marshall, 608 F.2d 525, 528 (1st Cir.1979) (same). The government argues that clause 2 is merely the successor to 21 U.S.C. § 174 (enacted in 1909 and repealed in 1970), whereas clause 1 introduces a new concept added to the statute in 1970 out of “an abundance of caution” lest some unidentified types of transportation from U.S. territories into U.S. customs territory might prove nonproseeutable. Although the government states that clause 2 is the direct successor to repealed 21 U.S.C. § 174, it points to no pre-1970 case law that would corroborate the thesis that § 174 (which imposed penalties against anyone who “fraudulently or knowingly imports or brings any narcotic drug into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction”) had ever been construed so narrowly as to foreclose prosecution of importation from a U.S. territory not part of the U.S. customs territory (e.g., the United States Virgin Islands, Guam) to part of the U.S. which is part of the U.S. customs territory (i.e., Puerto Rico, the 50 states, and the District of Columbia). We must bear in mind the principle that Courts must presume that Congress knows of prior judicial or executive branch interpretations of a statute when it reenacts or amends a statute. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580, 98 S.Ct. 866, 869-70, 55 L.Ed.2d 40 (1978); Sierra Club v. Secretary of the Army, 820 F.2d 513, 522 (1st Cir.1987). If we presume per Lorillard that Congress knew that pre-1970 decisional law portended no risk of less-than-intended enforcement, we cannot accept the government’s thesis that clause 1 was passed out of an “abundance of caution.”5
“A statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant.”6 United States [1138]*1138v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 301 n. 14, 92 S.Ct. 471, 476 n. 14, 30 L.Ed.2d 457 (1971); see United States v. Holmquist, 36 F.3d 154, 160 (1st Cir.1994) (same). The key to the “whole act” approach is that all provisions and other features of the enactment must be given force, and provisions must be interpreted so as not to derogate from the force of other provisions and features of the whole statute. See generally Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 47.02, at 120 (5th ed. 1992). A close analysis of section 952(a) reveals that the government’s broad interpretation of clause 2 would both render clause 1 superfluous and make it technically impossible to violate. Furthermore, the analysis makes it clear that Congress considered the conduct at issue in this case and rejected proscribing it under the statute.
First, clause 1 proscribes the importation of illegal drugs into the customs territory of the United States from a place outside the customs territory of the United States, but within the United States. The “customs territory of the United States” is defined as “the States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.” See Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States, n. 2. Thus, clause 1 proscribes importation from any other U.S. territory not within the customs territory (e.g., U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam) into “the States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.”
That Congress specifically addressed this situation suggests that it believed that the language of clause 2 did not necessarily cover such conduct. The government’s broad reading of clause 2, however, brings any conduct conceivably addressed under clause 1 within the coverage of clause 2. In other words, any contraband shipped from a place inside the United States (but not within the customs territory — e.g., the U.S. Virgin Islands) would first pass through international waters before it entered into the customs territory of the United States. Thus, the conduct aimed at under clause 1 would be proscribed by the government’s interpretation of clause 2. Hence, the government’s reading of clause 2 renders clause 1 completely superfluous.
' Second, the government’s broad reading of clause 2 would make it arguably impossible to prosecute anyone under clause 1. Under the government’s reading, the phrase “any place outside thereof’ essentially means the point at which the drugs were located immediately before passing into the United States (i.e., the international space just outside the jurisdictional limit of the United States). If one applies this reading to the same phrase in clause 1, it is impossible to violate clause 1. In other words, there is no “place” just outside of the jurisdictional limits of the customs territory of the United States, that is also within the United States. Any place that is just outside the customs territory of the United States is international waters. Thus, arguably no individual could ever violate clause 1 because no one could ship from a place within the United States (but outside the customs territory) directly into the customs territory of the United States: the individual would always be directly shipping from international waters. If a prosecutor attempted to charge a defendant under clause 1 for shipping drugs from the U.S. Virgin Islands to Florida (conduct clearly meant to be proscribed by clause 1), the defendant could argue that he or she did not violate the clause because the “place” from which the drugs were imported was not the U.S. Virgin Islands but the international space just outside of Florida. Although the prosecutor could argue that the “place” referred to by the statute included both the international space and the U.S. Virgin Islands, such a reading would be hard to [1139]*1139square with the gloss the government puts on the phrase under clause 2.7
Third, and perhaps most convincing, a close analysis of clause 1 reveals that Congress contemplated whether or not illegal drugs shipped from one part of the United States through international waters and back into the United States should be prohibited under 21 U.S.C. § 952. Specifically, clause 1 evinces Congress’ intent to proscribe such conduct in the certain instances in which drugs are imported into the customs territory of the United States from a point in the United States but outside the customs territory. Clearly, Congress could have gone further and proscribed any shipment of drugs originating inside the United States that passed through international waters and entered back into the United States, but it did not. By explicitly limiting the statute to the conduct proscribed by clause 1, it is fair to infer that Congress did not intend to proscribe the additional conduct at issue in this ease. The reason for this is clear. In enacting § 952, Congress was attacking classic eases of importation, meaning international importation, not domestic transportation, of drugs.8
Thus, unlike the government’s reading, the interpretation adopted by the en banc court both accords with the plain language of the statute and gives meaning to section 952 as a whole act. However, even if such were not the case, the confusion that is patent even from the government’s discussion of the statute brings into play the rule of lenity, and requires us to give defendants the benefit of the doubt on this issue. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, —, 114 S.Ct. 655, 663, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, 341, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931) (Holmes, J.); United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 223 (1st Cir.1990) (Breyer, C.J.).
B. Congressional Intent
On the specific point at issue, there is no legislative history. Nonetheless, the dissent claims that Congress did not “care one whit whether the drugs were brought from international waters [or international airspace9] or from a foreign land, so long as they crossed the U.S. boundary.” See dissent at 1147. But Congress might well be concerned whether the drugs were being brought from one place within the United States to another. The obvious fact that Congress may be generally presumed to oppose the drug trade neither renders the language in question ambiguous nor justifies its strained interpretation. Congress can be similarly presumed to oppose murder, arson and robbery, but we do not rely on such facts as justifying [1140]*1140strained readings of statutes in those areas. We can find no legitimate reason to follow a different course here.
C. The “Precedents”
As discussed, the interpretation urged by the government leads to unreasonable results. Turning to precedent, we see that the case law does not support the outcome proposed by the government. The government views precedent as carrying special weight in formulating its interpretation of § 952(a). This is obviously a principle which we generally agree with, as far as it goes. However, the “precedent” on which the government relies, with one exception, is inapposite.
The language cited from United States v. Peabody, 626 F.2d 1300, 1301 (5th Cir.1980) (“Had the cargo of contraband originated in Texas, that would not alter the fact that it was meant to reenter the United States from international waters. That is enough.”), which is both the seminal authority for the cases that follow and the anchor upon which the government relies for its interpretation of § 952(a), is particularly flawed. Although the cryptic statement in Peabody fits the government’s glove, a reading of that case clearly demonstrates that the proposition for which it stands is total dicta, and is not based on even a superficial analysis of the issues raised in the present appeal. Indeed that opinion does not even cite § 952(a), although it may perhaps be surmised that such is the statute at issue. Nevertheless, nothing in the factual background of that case supports the proposition relied upon by the government. Without question the contraband in Peabody was not coming from another domestic area in the United States, Texas or otherwise, and thus the court’s hyperbole was pure dicta. Peabody and its progeny constitute flimsy precedent upon which to hang one’s hat.
In United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1033 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that the importation “element may be established by evidence that a boat from which marihuana was unloaded went outside United States territorial waters or met with any other vessels that had — for example, a “mother ship”), the facts involved contraband brought directly from Colombia through motherships off Florida. Id. at 987. As in Peabody, the present issue was not decided and the quoted language is again dicta. In United States v. Lueck, 678 F.2d 895, 904-05 (11th Cir.1982), the Eleventh Circuit, relying on the specific language quoted from Peabody, rejected the contention that proof of importing controlled substances from a specific point on foreign soil is required as an element of § 952(a). Id. at 905. However, Lueck’s holding must be read and understood in light of the fact that the airplane in question had been spotted first flying over the Bahamas. The record evidence in Lueck supported the finding of importation upon the airplane’s entry into domestic airspace. Id. at 897. In stark contrast to Lueck, we do not have here any evidence supporting such a finding, rather, all we have is evidence that the illegal substance was brought from a place within the United States. United States v. Goggin, 853 F.2d 843, 845 (11th Cir.1988), another case from the Eleventh Circuit, which relies on Lueck, also concerns a flight from the Bahamas, id. at 844, 847, and is therefore different from the present appeal.
In United States v. Doyal, 437 F.2d 271 (5th Cir.1971) (involving the predecessor statute to § 952), the defendant contended that although he was caught entering the U.S. from Mexico with illegal drugs, he had in fact acquired the drugs in the U.S., taken them into Mexico, and brought them back; therefore, argued the defendant, he was not guilty of importation. Id. at 274-75. Although the drugs in question had originated in the United States, the fact is that they were brought into Mexico, and it was from there that they entered the domestic territory of the United States. Id. at 272. Such an entry from a. foreign country (i.ea “place outside” the United States) is not what we have before us. United States v. Friedman, 501 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.1974), also cited by the government, involved another entry from a place outside the United States — Mexico as in Doyal.
Reliance on the language used by our Circuit in United States v. Nueva, 979 F.2d 880, 884 (1st Cir.1992), is equally unhelpful in the present situation. In Nueva, law enforce[1141]*1141ment authorities spotted a suspect aircraft traveling from South America to Puerto Rico; the authorities tracked the plane to a point above the ocean off the coast of Puerto Rico, where it dropped bales of illegal drugs at a rendezvous point for a boat. Id. at 881-83. Picking up contraband by going into international waters, id., stands on the same footing as going into a foreign country to do so (i.e., Friedman, Doyal, Goggin, Lueck, Phillips, Peabody). We do not question that such a place from which the defendant gains possession of the contraband, is “outside [the United States],” and thus, that the entry from such a place, into the United States, meets that element of the importation charge in § 952(a).
We thus come to United States v. Pérez, 776 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.1985). This is the only case which factually approximates the present one.10 There, an illegal load of marihuana was transported by boat from the Mariana Islands (a United States Trust Territory in the Pacific), through international waters to Guam, another U.S. domestic area. The court squarely holds that the transit through international waters is sufficient to sustain an importation charge under § 952(a). It would perhaps have been helpful for present purposes, had the deciding court discussed the issue with some original analysis or some enlightening reasoning in support of its ephemeral conclusion, but such was not to be. The court merely “rounded up the usual suspects,” by citing its Friedman ease (importation from Mexico), and Peabody and its progeny (Lueck and Phillips), as being “instructive,” id. at 801, without providing much more to support the resolution of an issue which it had admittedly “never [before] addressed.” Id.11
Thus, the “precedent” cited amounts to bald assertions without analysis.
D. Historical Application of the Statute
Actions speak louder than words. In this case this old adage is not simply poetic expression, for the interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) promoted by the government is most certainly at odds with the government’s past enforcement practices under this statute throughout its long life.
It is difficult to accept that Congress intended the government’s reading of § 952(a), considering that this reading of the statute has somehow lain lifeless for 25 years until given breath in this case by the prosecution. The government would have us believe that throughout the life of this statute, which has been on the books in practically the same form since 1970, in every direct flight, commercial or private, between, say, the Mainland and Puerto Rico, or the Mainland and Hawaii or Alaska, or vice versa, or even between Miami and New York, or Nantucket, Massachusetts and Boston, etc., all of whom at some point (or, in fact, throughout most of their passage) fly within international airspace before returning to domestic territory, the occupants have always been subject to being charged under this hitherto overlooked definition of “importation.” The government’s novelty seems all the more striking in this Circuit, where notwithstanding the hundreds (perhaps thousands) of such daily flights, the government has somehow throughout these many years never pressed such a theory of importation. Is this attributable to prosecutorial benevolence or incompetence? Certainly not. What we have is the tacit recognition that such acts could not reasonably be considered “importation” within § 952(a). “Whatever other statutes defendants may have violated, they did not violate this one.” Maravilla, 907 F.2d at 223 (Breyer, C.J.) (holding that custom agents who murdered a Dominican citizen who was temporarily in the United States did not violate [1142]*1142civil rights statute because the victim was not an “inhabitant”).
We have a similar situation with waterborne traffic. There are literally thousands of vessels of all sizes and with all kinds of purposes that daily pass through international waters as they move between domestic areas which, without picking up contraband in international waters or visiting foreign jurisdictions, would be subject to this expanded interpretation of § 952(a). Not only is there the obvious marine traffic between the Mainland and its outlying domestic areas (Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, etc.), and the considerable coastwise traffic in the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf and Great Lakes waters which as a matter of course continuously exits and reenters international waters. There are also hundreds of thousands of commercial fishermen, as well as those who fish for sport, who on a daily basis leave domestic waters, enter international waters, and return to domestic waters, again without acquiring contraband in international waters or entering foreign jurisdictions, who would be subject to the contested interpretation of § 952(a). However, contrary to the government’s assertions at oral argument, it does not stop here. For example, a passenger on a commercial whale-watching vessel who left Provincetown, Massachusetts, went thirteen miles offshore into international waters to watch these behemoths, and then reentered domestic waters would be subject to a charge of importation if he or she had drugs when he or she originally left Prov-incetown. A maritime worker traveling to and from an oil rig on international waters in the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana, or on George’s Bank off New England, would be equally exposed. A sailboat tacking up the coast would engage in an act of “importation” every time it reentered domestic territory, if it had contraband aboard when it tacked out of domestic territory. The height of absurdity,12 however, is that according to the government’s interpretation as expressed at oral argument, the act of leaving domestic territory would in turn also be considered an illegal exportation subject to charge under § 952(a)’s companion provision, § 953(a), even though there was no intention or act of visiting a foreign territory or off-loading the exported contraband onto a vessel in international waters. Thus, under this scenario, a sailboat tacking twenty times up the East Coast of the United States from Miami to New York, which had aboard illegal substances acquired in Miami, would be subject to being charged with twenty violations of exportation under § 953(a), and twenty violations of importation under § 952(a), one for each time it tacked out to and from international waters.
As if the above scenarios were not ludicrous enough, at oral argument, the government also informed us that in the above situations, since international borders were crossed, border crossing rules are applicable, with all of the consequent diminished Fourth Amendment implications such circumstances bring into play. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1978-80, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1976) (holding that government’s right to search all persons and their belongings who cross its borders is plenary and is “reasonable” per se within the Fourth Amendment); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) (stating that border searches require no probable cause); see also United States v. Montoya de Hernández, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 3308-09, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1986) (“Routine searches of persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant ... ”).13 Clearly, the implications of the government’s proposed interpretation go far beyond the mere crossing of a stretch of water between two points in the same municipality in Puerto Rico. Cf. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 2431, 61 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978) (concluding no international [1143]*1143border exists between Puerto Rico and eonti-nental United States). A passenger and his or her belongings on a Boston to Nantucket flight, which is partially over international waters and airspace, can be subjected hereafter to a border search upon arrival in Nantucket, as well as to another such intrusion upon returning to Boston. In light of these possibilities and in light of the fact that drug possession statutes already exist to address domestic conduct,14 we cannot accept the government’s reading of § 952(a). By its interpretation of § 952(a), the government has chosen to ignore a basic rule of statutory interpretation, one firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of this Circuit: “[UJnreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations óf a statute is [a valid] reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result'.” United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 522 (1st Cir.1985) (quoting Sutherland, Statutory Construction, ¶ 45.12 (4th Ed.1984)).
Furthermore, the undeniable fact is that section 952(a) has not been used at all in the fashion now promoted by the prosecution. On this point, there should be no need to engage in speculation regarding whether or not there are other uncited or unreported prosecutions demonstrative of the government’s view of § 952(a). At oral argument, the government was specifically asked to produce evidence of such a prosecution. Nevertheless, the government has failed to cite even one case in this circuit, at any level, reported or otherwise, in which a defendant was even charged, much less convicted, in the manner now claimed, nor has our own search revealed the existence of such a case.
Considering the possibility that the government may not have prosecuted “small quantities” of drugs transported over international space from a prior United States connection as importation under § 952(a), but that similarly transported large amounts have been considered violations of that provision, we conducted our own search of reported cases. The inquiry revealed that such a distinction simply does not exist. See, e.g., United States v. Marcel, 1995 WL 732747, *1 (2d Cir.1995) (discussing convictions of two co-conspirators who participated in the transportation of I¡,8 kilograms of cocaine from Puerto Rico to New York, but who apparently faced no charge or conviction for importation); United States v. Pérez, 1994 WL 702058, *1-2 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (discussing suppression motion of two co-conspirators arrested with approximately 30 kilograms of cocaine shortly after arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport aboard a flight from San Juan; the two defendants faced a two-count indictment that did not include an importation charge). This court can take judicial notice of the substantial traffic in narcotics between Puerto Rico and the mainland United States involving large amounts of contraband. See Pérez, at *4 (describing San Juan, Puerto Rico as “a location known to [Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force] agents to be an active departure point for narcotics smuggling activities into New York”). Yet, we are unaware of any case in which the government has in fact charged that transporting the contraband from Puerto Rico to the mainland (or vice versa) constituted an importation violation under § 952(a).
Nor is the possibility of such forbearance by the government from prosecuting such cases in the future very reassuring. Cf. Donovan v. United States, — U.S. —, 114 S.Ct. 873, 127 L.Ed.2d 70 (1994) (in light of Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994), vacating and remanding First Circuit case that tried to uphold the prosecution of defendant pursuant to the money laundering statute even though defendant’s structuring was merely an attempt to hide money from his wife in a divorce proceeding), vacating United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir.1993). Al[1144]*1144though prosecutors should perhaps not be faulted for seeking to expand the limits of the law, courts cannot allow themselves to be caught up in this euphoria. Rather, they are duty bound to contain the government within established limits. The government’s actions in not prosecuting such cases up to now are powerful evidence that Congress did not intend the interpretation now promoted by the government. Such lengthy non-action should not be glibly overlooked.
The government also claims that the interpretation set forth here would inordinately burden prosecutors by adding to their burden the obligation of identifying and proving the point of origin of drugs in smuggling operations. However, when a drug-laden ship coming from an unknown point of origin is shown to have traversed international waters and brought drugs into the United States, a jury could presume, without more, that importation from a place outside the United States has occurred — although the precise place from which the drugs emanated is not established. Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416, 90 S.Ct. 642, 652, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970) (approving statutory permissive inference that a person in possession of heroin is in knowing possession of an imported narcotic because of the “high probability” that the heroin originated in a foreign country); see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-57, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-26, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46-47, 89 S.Ct. 1532, 1553-54, 23 L.Ed.2d 57 (1969). In other words, the government can make out a prima facie case of importation, within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), merely by showing that a ship carrying drugs from parts unknown has cruised international waters before entering the United States. Similar inferences would apply to the case of drugs off-loaded into this country from a mother ship located within international waters. We therefore hold only that a defendant can defeat an importation charge by demonstrating affirmatively by competent evidence that the drugs came into the United States directly from another place that is also within the United States. That is the case before us. The charge in the present case, and the undisputed evidence presented by the government is that the drugs were picked up in Mona Island (i.e., domestic U.S. ■territory) and brought to another place within U.S. domestic territory. The government never made out a prima facie case that the drugs came from a place outside the United States, as the statutory language requires.
CONCLUSION
We affirm defendants’ convictions on the possession counts. We also remand the issues surrounding the firearms convictions to the original panel for further proceedings in light of this opinion.
This en banc decision determines, as a matter of statutory interpretation, that the importation statute does not apply to the shipment in this case from one part of the United States and its customs territory (Mona Island, Puerto Rico) to another (the main island of Puerto Rico). We thus reverse the importation convictions of all three defendants.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, remanded in part, and reversed in part.