NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0384n.06
No. 24-5692
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Aug 01, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE WESTERN ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE FARES ABDELLATIF, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION ) )
Before: BATCHELDER, CLAY, and BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judges.
CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant Fares Abdellatif pleaded guilty to illegally possessing
an unregistered short-barreled rifle in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), pursuant to a written plea
agreement. The district court accepted Abdellatif’s plea at a thorough change-of-plea hearing,
determining that Abdellatif was competent to plead guilty and voluntarily, knowingly, and
willingly pleaded guilty. Abdellatif now challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea and the
district court’s determination of his competency. For the following reasons, we find no error in
the district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea and AFFIRM the district court in all respects.
I. BACKGROUND
In January and February 2022, agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (“ATF”) developed information that Fares Abdellatif was selling firearms without
proper ATF permits. ATF agents confirmed these suspicions by using confidential informants to
conduct controlled purchases of firearms from Abdellatif in February and March 2022. In June No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
2022, Abdellatif was stopped for a traffic violation. In a search of Abdellatif’s vehicle conducted
after the stop, local law enforcement officers seized silencers, ammunition, and firearms, including
a short-barreled rifle. When questioned, Abdellatif admitted to owning several firearms and
purchasing silencers, but denied selling firearms. He further acknowledged that he had not
completed the requisite ATF application for legally purchasing a silencer. ATF agents subsequently
executed federal search warrants on Abdellatif’s home and a business owned by Abdellatif’s
family, recovering additional silencer parts and firearms, including machineguns and a second
short-barreled rifle. When questioned again, Abdellatif admitted to shooting guns with silencers
and stated that he sold guns to his cousin.
Abdellatif was federally indicted on eight charges: (1) two counts of possessing
unregistered silencers in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Counts 1 and 3); (2) two counts of
possessing an unregistered short-barreled rifle in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (Counts 2 and
4); (3) one count of making a false statement in connection with the purchase of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2) (Count 5); and (4) three counts of unlawful
possession of a machinegun in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o) and 924(a)(2) (Counts 6, 7, and
8).
Abdellatif pleaded guilty to Count 4 of the superseding indictment against him—
possessing an unregistered short-barreled rifle—pursuant to a written plea agreement. In signing
the plea agreement, Abdellatif “agree[d] that he [was] entering a voluntary plea of guilty to Count
4 because he [was], in fact, guilty of the offense charged in Count 4.” Plea Agreement, R. 111,
Page ID #343. He further “acknowledge[ed] that he . . . read [the] agreement, . . . discussed it with
his attorney and [understood] it.” Id. at Page ID #346. And he “acknowledge[d] that he [was]
satisfied with his attorney’s representation.” Id. “In exchange for the concessions . . . set forth in
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[the] agreement,” Abdellatif agreed to waive his right to directly appeal his sentence, and to waive
his right to appeal his conviction and the sentence imposed by collateral attack. Id. at Page ID
#345.
The district court conducted a change-of-plea hearing on April 5, 2024. Toward the
beginning of the hearing, the district court questioned Abdellatif about whether he had been treated
for any mental illness. Abdellatif stated that he had “[n]ot lately” received treatment for mental
illness. Plea Hr’g Tr., R. 148, Page ID #713. In response, the court acknowledged that “there was
a little bit of time when [Abdellatif] did receive some treatment,”1 to which Abdellatif stated he
was in treatment “[a] couple of months ago.” Id. The district court then asked if Abdellatif was on
medication for mental illness, and Abdellatif responded that he took medication “for, like, two
weeks,” then “stopped it.” Id. He “forgot the name of the medication” that he was taking. Id.
The court asked Abdellatif if he “[felt] okay today,” and Abdellatif responded “[y]es,” stating that
he was “doing better.” Id. at PageID #713–14. The court also asked if Abdellatif was “under the
influence of anything at all,” including “drugs, pills, alcohol, [or] medication.” Id. at Page ID
#714–15. Abdellatif answered “[n]o.” Id. The court then engaged Abdellatif in a conversation
about his health, and Abdellatif stated that was “getting much better” and “taking care of himself”
after a recent surgery. Id. at Page ID #715.
The district court also questioned Abdellatif about the voluntariness of his plea. The court
first asked Abdellatif if “anyone threatened [him] in any way in order to persuade [him] to accept
the plea agreement,” to which Abdellatif answered “[n]o.” Id. at Page ID #719. The court also
asked Abdellatif if “anyone has attempted in any way to force you to plead guilty[,] . . . otherwise
1 The court discussed Abdellatif’s mental health issues, particularly his anxiety, with counsel at pretrial hearings throughout the case. See, e.g., Hr’g Tr., R. 145, Page ID #660–64.
3 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
threatened you in this case[, or] . . . made any promise to you or given you any assurance of any
kind to get you to plead guilty in this case” other than the assurances “contained in the plea
agreement” Id. at Page ID #731. Abdellatif again answered “[n]o” to all questions. Id.
In addition, the district court verified that Abdellatif (1) understood the charge to which he
was pleading guilty and the government’s burden of proof on the charge; (2) was pleading guilty
because he was, in fact, guilty; (3) understood the consequences of his guilty plea, including his
sentence exposure; (4) read and understood the plea agreement and indictment against him;
(5) agreed with the stipulated factual basis for his guilty plea and the government’s statement of
facts; (6) understood that the court would make its own independent determination as to sentencing
notwithstanding sentencing recommendations in the plea agreement; (7) understood sentencing
procedures; (8) understood his waiver of his appellate rights; and (9) understood that his guilty
plea waived his constitutional rights to plead not guilty, have a trial by jury, and testify in his own
defense.
The district court also asked if Abdellatif was “fully satisfied with” his attorney’s
“counsel, . . . representation, and . . . advice,” to which Adbdellatif unequivocally answered
“[y]es.” Plea Hr’g Tr., R. 148, Page ID #712. Upon further questioning, Abdellatif stated that his
counsel “did a good job,” and volunteered that “[s]ince day one, [counsel] helped [him] out,” and
“helped [him] understand everything more.” Id. at Page ID #713. Abdellatif acknowledged that
he had discussed the indictment with counsel, acknowledged that he signed the factual stipulation
“after consultation with counsel,” and stated that he discussed the plea agreement with his counsel
“three times” before signing it. Id. at Page ID #718, 730. Abdellatif further acknowledged that he
had seen all prior plea agreements proffered by the government, and made an “independent
determination” not to accept them. Id. at Page ID #727–28.
4 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
At the end of the court’s plea colloquy, Abdellatif affirmed that he wished to plead guilty.
Id. at Page ID #743. The district court accepted Abdellatif’s plea, finding that:
[T]he defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea. He is aware of the nature of the charges and the consequences of the plea, and the plea of guilty is a knowing and [voluntary] plea supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of the offense.
Id. at Page ID #743–44. Neither party objected to the district court’s findings of competence and
voluntariness.
Following the change-of-plea hearing, the United States Probation Office (“Probation”)
filed a draft presentence report (“PSR”). In his objections to the draft PSR, Abdellatif requested
to supplement a paragraph in the PSR with the following information:
In late 2023, Mr. Abdellatif was seen at a clinic in Germantown for anxiety issues. Further, Abdellatif’s issues with his gall bladder . . . , have occasionally manifested as mental health-related symptoms due to issues with his kidney function, which is a side effect of the issues with his gall bladder.
Objections to PSR, R. 116, Page ID #376. The final draft of the PSR retained the statement from
the initial draft reflecting that Abdellatif had never received treatment for mental health issues, but
also included Abdellatif’s supplement in an addendum reflecting the parties’ objections to the draft
report.
The district court held a sentencing hearing on August 1, 2024. At the hearing, the court
acknowledged Abdellatif’s mental health issues, recommending that Abdellatif receive mental
health treatment while incarcerated. The district court stated that it was making that
recommendation because Abdellatif “ha[d] shown a fair amount of anxiety” throughout the
proceedings. Sent’g Hr’g, R. 149, Page ID #755. The court further stated that “Abdellatif ha[d]
5 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
never seemed mentally incompetent in any way.” Id. Abdellatif’s counsel also brought up
Abdellatif’s “issues with depression and anxiety,” but did not suggest that Abdellatif had
competency issues. Id. at Page ID #780–81.
After considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors in detail, the district court
decided to impose a sentence of 33 months’ incarceration, at the low end of Abdellatif’s advisory
guidelines range. After the district court stated its intended sentence, Abdellatif spoke on his own
behalf and raised the issue of the voluntariness of his plea for the first time. He stated “I can’t do
this. I can’t. It’s killing me. I can’t. He made me say it. He made me plead. I didn’t do nothing
wrong. I can’t. I can’t.” Id. at Page ID #800. The district court acknowledged that it “may have
to deal with” Abdellatif’s statement “later,” and encouraged Abdellatif to talk to his wife and
counsel about his plea. Id. It then went on to impose the sentence, preserving a general objection
to the sentence of incarceration on Abdellatif’s behalf.
Abdellatif’s counsel did not respond to Abdellatif’s apparent allegation of coercion at the
sentencing hearing. Instead, the day after the hearing, on August 2, 2024, counsel filed a notice of
appeal of the judgment on Abdellatif’s behalf. The same day, counsel filed a motion in this Court
to withdraw as Abdellatif’s attorney, stating that during Abdellatif’s sentencing hearing, “events
transpired that led . . . counsel to believe that the attorney-client relationship had become
irreparably broken and a serious conflict of interest had arisen.” Mot. to Withdraw, ECF No. 4, 2.
The Court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and Abdellatif was appointed new counsel for his
timely appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Abdellatif argues that his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently given
because “[t]he record . . . suggests that Abdellatif was not mentally stable at the time of his plea
6 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
and could have been influenced by his attorney.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 39, 4. We therefore
understand Abdellatif to be making two distinct arguments: that he was mentally incompetent to
enter a plea, and that he did not voluntarily enter his plea because he was coerced by his attorney.
We address Abdellatif’s competency first, because “[i]f a defendant is not competent to enter a
guilty plea, it makes no sense to inquire into whether he knowingly entered the same.” United
States v. Pitts, 997 F.3d 688, 697 (6th Cir. 2021).
Though Abdellatif waived his appeal rights in his plea agreement, we remain able to review
challenges to his plea that go to the “validity of his waiver,” In re Acosta, 480 F.3d 421, 422 (6th
Cir. 2007). The issues of Abdellatif’s competency and the voluntariness of his plea clearly impact
validity.
1. Competency
Abdellatif suggests that he was “mentally unstable” when he pleaded guilty, and therefore
that the district court erroneously accepted his plea. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 39, 4. At the time
of the change-of-plea hearing, the district court was well aware that Abdellatif had mental health
issues, primarily anxiety, but ruled Abdellatif competent to plead guilty based on his demonstrated
understanding of the nature of the charges against him and the consequences of the plea.
We review Abdellatif’s argument as a challenge to his competency to render a plea. Abdellatif
failed to raise the issue of his competency in the district court, so we review his challenge for plain
error. See Pitts, 997 F.3d at 700. To prevail under a plain error standard, Abdellatif “must identify
an (1) error (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected [his] substantial rights and (4) that
affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Hobbs, 953 F.3d 853, 857 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
7 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
“A criminal defendant may not plead guilty unless he does so competently and
intelligently.” United States v. Alfadhilli, 762 F. App’x 264, 266 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Godinez v.
Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)). “A competency challenge implicates the district court’s
statutory obligation to order a competency determination ‘if there is reasonable cause to believe
that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent.’” Pitts, 997 F.3d at 699–700 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a)). The test for a
represented defendant’s competency to enter a guilty plea is whether the “defendant has ‘sufficient
ability to consult with his lawyers and a reasonable degree of rational and factual understanding
of the proceedings against him.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Denkins, 367 F.3d 537, 547–48 (6th
Cir. 2004)).
“A history of mental illness is naturally relevant to the question” of whether the district
court is obligated to “conduct further inquiry into competency.” Alfadhilli, 762 F. App’x at 267.
“But such a history is not dispositive.” Id. In this case, the district court was aware that Abdellatif
had received treatment for anxiety. And Abdellatif informed the court that he had briefly taken
medication for this condition, but was unmedicated at the change-of-plea hearing. However,
Abdellatif does not specifically explain how his mental health issues rendered him unstable.
Without “[tying] his ailments” to a “breakdown in cognition” that caused an inability “to consult
with counsel, assist in his own defense, or understand the proceedings against him,” Abdellatif
fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in not holding a competency hearing. United States
v. Hutchinson, 831 F. App’x 195, 198 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead,
the record supports that the district court fully discharged its obligation to confirm that Abdellatif
was competent to proceed. The district court asked about Abdellatif’s mental health treatment,
learned that he had only taken medication for anxiety for a short period of time before stopping,
8 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
and then inquired further about his current mental health status. See id.; United States v. Sawasky,
578 F. App’x 475, 480 (6th Cir. 2014). Abdellatif’s answers to the district court regarding his
mental health status presented no indications that Abdellatif lacked competency to proceed;
nothing Abdellatif said suggested that he did not understand the proceedings or that he was unable
to consult with his attorney.
Abdellatif’s engagement in the change-of-plea hearing further confirms that the court did
not err in finding Abdellatif competent to enter a guilty plea without conducting a competency
hearing. The proceedings did not provide the district court with reasonable cause to believe
Abdellatif was incompetent. Pitts, 997 F.3d at 700. During the plea colloquy, Abdellatif repeatedly
affirmed his understanding of the charges against him, the factual basis for his guilty plea, and the
consequences of his guilty plea. He volunteered information about the helpfulness of his attorney
and his review of the plea agreement. He was able to independently describe the offense conduct
and respond to the government’s statement of facts. The defendant’s “ability to participate in court
proceedings by giving coherent responses to questions from the court” is “perhaps the most
frequently cited factor” in our cases reviewing whether a defendant was competent to proceed.
Alfadhilli, 762 F. App’x at 267. Where a defendant is engaged in proceedings and able to respond
to the court’s inquiries, we have declined to hold that the district court erred in finding competence.
See Pitts, 997 F.3d at 700–01.
Abdellatif suggests that he made contradictory statements about receiving mental health
treatment during the change-of-plea hearing and during his PSR interview, which he contends
indicate that he was mentally unstable. But we find no evidence that this was the case. If anything,
Abdellatif’s later efforts to supplement the PSR further suggests competency. The supplement
indicates that Abdellatif was involved in the preparation of objections to the PSR and the provision
9 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
of updated information on his mental health history, additional evidence that he was engaged in
his own defense. See Pitts, 997 F.3d at 701 (stating that the defendant’s participation in preparing
objections to his PSR, among other evidence of engagement, gave reason for the district court to
find the defendant competent to plead guilty).
Thus, Abdellatif has not shown that the district court erred, let alone plainly erred, in ruling
him competent to plead guilty.
2. Voluntariness
Abdellatif claims his guilty plea was “not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently given”
and is therefore invalid. Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 39, 5. Because Abdellatif failed to
contemporaneously object to his plea in the district court, we review his challenge to the
voluntariness of his plea for plain error. Pitts, 997 F.3d at 701; Hobbs, 958 F.3d at 857 (6th Cir.
2020).
“The Due Process Clause prohibits defendants from pleading guilty . . . unless they do so
in a ‘knowing and voluntary’ manner.” United States v. Ellis, 115 F.4th 497, 501 (6th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28–29 (1992)). A defendant’s plea is knowing and voluntary
if he enters it with “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences,”
and does so free from coercion. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 750 (1970). Under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b), the district court must verify “that the defendant’s plea
is voluntary and that the defendant understands his or her applicable constitutional rights, the
nature of the crime charged, the consequences of the guilty plea, and the factual basis for
concluding that the defendant committed the crime charged.” United States v. Dixon, 479 F.3d
431, 434 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the district court verifies this information
in “a well-conducted plea-hearing,” the transcript of the hearing presents the defendant with “a
10 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
‘formidable barrier’ for” a challenge to voluntariness of his plea. United States v. Otis, No. 24-
5791, 2025 WL 1897869, at *2 (6th Cir. July 9, 2025) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63,
74 (1977)).
In Abdellatif’s case, the district court conducted such a hearing. The transcript of the
change-of-plea hearing shows that the district court asked Abdellatif thorough and extensive
questions regarding the voluntariness of his guilty plea. Abdellatif verbally confirmed that he was
not being forced, threatened, or otherwise coerced to accept his guilty plea. He made clear that he
understood the charges against him and the consequences of his guilty plea. Specifically, the
district court obtained verbal confirmation that Abdelatiff understood his maximum sentence
exposure and that his conviction of a felony would lead to the loss of certain civil rights, like the
right to vote or serve on a jury. Abdellatif also confirmed his understanding that his guilty plea
entailed the waiver of his appeal rights and the waiver of his constitutional rights to plead not
guilty, have a trial by jury, and testify in his own defense. After the district court verified
Abdellatif’s understanding of those consequences, Abdellatif affirmed his guilty plea, stating “I’m
guilty.” Plea Hr’g Tr., R. 148, Page ID #743. The district court fulfilled its obligations under Rule
11(b), and “[a] criminal defendant is bound by the answers he gives when ‘the court has
scrupulously followed the required procedure’ for a properly conducted plea colloquy.” Pitts, 997
F.3d at 701 (quoting Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986)). Abdellatif’s plea
agreement and plea colloquy make clear that he understood the charges against him and the plea’s
consequences. For this reason, he has not shown that the district court plainly erred in concluding
that his plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Abdellatif argues against this conclusion, asserting that his commentary at sentencing
shows that he was “mentally unstable at the time of his plea and could have been influenced by his
11 No. 24-5692, United States v. Abdellatif
attorney.” Appellant’s Br., ECF No. 39, 4. But he provides no evidence of coercive influence or
his susceptibility to it. As discussed above, Abdellatif displayed the requisite competency to render
a voluntary guilty plea.
The record on the change-of-plea hearing further belies Abdellatif’s claim that his attorney
unduly influenced or coerced him to plead guilty. Crucially, Abdellatif twice denied that anyone
had coerced him into pleading guilty. And Abdellatif’s answers to the court’s questions about his
representation reflect his ability to engage in reasoned consultation with his counsel. In response
to the court’s questioning, Abdellatif unequivocally indicated that he was “fully satisfied with” his
attorney’s “counsel, . . . representation, and . . . advice.” Plea Hr’g Tr., R. 148, Page ID #712.
Abdellatif said that his attorney had done a “good job,” and volunteered that his counsel had been
helpful “[s]ince day one” by “help[ing] [him] understand everything more.” Id. at Page ID #713.
This assessment was also reflected in the plea agreement, wherein Abdellatif “acknowledge[d] that
he [was] satisfied with his attorney’s representation.” Plea Agreement, R. 111, Page ID #346.
Abdellatif stated that he had discussed the plea agreement with his counsel “three times” before
signing it. Plea Hr’g Tr., R. 148, Page ID #718, 730. As the district court confirmed, this record
suggests that Abdellatif made an independent determination to plead guilty, aided by counsel, and
was not coerced by counsel. Buttressing this understanding is the fact that Abdellatif reviewed
multiple plea agreements with prior counsel and made the determination not to accept those
agreements, showing that he was capable of making an uncoerced decision on whether to plead
guilty. We therefore see no error in the district court’s acceptance of the guilty plea and its
conclusion that the plea entered was knowing and voluntary.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.