United States v. Fairchild

943 F. Supp. 1174, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468, 1996 WL 596295
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedOctober 10, 1996
Docket96-00058-01-CR-W-2
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 943 F. Supp. 1174 (United States v. Fairchild) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Fairchild, 943 F. Supp. 1174, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468, 1996 WL 596295 (W.D. Mo. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER

GAITAN, District Judge.

Before this Court is defendant Russell D. Fairchild’s motion to suppress statements, filed May 24,1996.

On August 28, 1996, Magistrate Judge Robert E. Larsen entered a report and recommendation addressing defendant’s motion to suppress statements. That report recommended the denial of the motion. No objections were filed to the report and recommendation.

The Court, after independent review of the record and applicable law, adopts and incorporates by reference herein, the magistrate’s findings and conclusions in the report and recommendation. Therefore, the Court finds that defendant’s motion to suppress statements must be denied.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the magistrate’s proposed findings and conclusions are hereby adopted and incorporated herein by reference.. It is further

*1176 ORDERED that the defendant’s motion to suppress statements, filed May 24, 1996, is denied.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS STATEMENTS

LARSEN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Before the court is defendant’s motion to suppress statements made by defendant while in his residence, while being transported to the police station, and while at the police station on the ground that he was questioned while in custody and without having been advised of his Miranda rights. I find that (1) the statement made following Detective Seever’s question about the ownership of the house and whether any heat sources were operating falls within the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, (2) defendant’s comments about going to Corpus Christi and dumping the chemicals were statements volunteered by defendant, (3) defendant’s statement in response to Detective Seever’s question regarding the identity of the chemical Seever stepped in falls within the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, and (4) defendant’s statement given at the police station was voluntarily made after knowingly and voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights and was not a fruit of an earlier unlawful admission. Therefore, defendant’s motion should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

On May 2, 1996, a three-count indictment was returned charging defendant with one count of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(A), and two counts of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B).

On May 24, 1996, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements (document number 28). In support of his motion, defendant argues that he was in custody and was questioned without having been advised of his Miranda rights on two occasions, and that his statement made at the police station was the product of the earlier unlawful admissions.

On June 14, 1996, the government filed a response in opposition to defendant’s motion (document number 40) arguing that the statements made by defendant at his residence fall within the public safety exception to the Miranda requirement, the statements about leaving for Corpus Christi were not the result of express questioning or its functional equivalent, the statements made after being asked the identity of the chemical Detective Seever had stepped in falls within the public safety exception, and the statements made at the police station were voluntarily made after a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. A hearing was held on June 24, 1996, on this motion and defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. Defendant was' present, represented by Brian Gepford. The government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Michael Green. The government called Detective Jeffrey Seever of the Independence, Missouri, Police Department and assigned to the Jackson County Drug Task Force, as a witness. The defendant called John Lawson, a private investigator, as a witness. The following exhibits were admitted:

P.Ex. 1-A Certified copy of affidavit and application for search warrant for 2440 S. Norwood, Independence, Missouri dated March 9,1996;
P.Ex. 1-B Certified copy of search warrant dated March 9,1996;
P.Ex. 1-C Certified copy of search warrant return made on March 18, 1996;
P.Ex. 2-B Picture of basement window adjacent to front porch at 2440 S. Nor-wood;
P.Ex. 2-0 Picture of front of house at 2440 S. Norwood showing basement window in relation'to front porch — the arrow indicates where the window is and the “X” indicates where Detective Seever was standing when he looked through the window;
P.Ex. 2-D Photograph of kitchen table containing a fish bowl and a glass jar with white substance inside;
*1177 P.Ex. 2-G Photograph of breakfast bar with glassware containing white residue;
P.Ex. 2-H Photograph of the side of defendant’s residence;
P.Ex. 2-1 Photograph of the rear of defendant’s residence;
P.Ex. 3-A Miranda rights form with defendant’s response handwritten by Detective Seever;
P.Ex. 3-B Interview questions and answers written by Detective Seever and signed by defendant;
P.Ex. 4 Drawing of floor plan of defendant’s residence made by Detective Seever during evidentiary hearing— green circle indicates window Seever looked through from front lawn;
D.Ex. 1 Photograph of basement window adjacent to front porch at 2440 S. Nor-wood;
D.Ex. 2 Photograph of basement window adjacent to front porch at 2440 S. Nor-wood;
D.Ex. 3 Photograph of basement window adjacent to front porch at 2440 S. Nor-wood; and
D.Ex. 4 Photograph of front of defendant’s residence, “X” indicating where Detective Seever was standing when he smelled the chemical odor.

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, I submit the following findings of fact:

1.In the early morning hours of March 9, 1996, .the Independence, Missouri, Police Department received a complaint of a strong chemical odor coming from the residence at 2440 South Norwood (ITr. at 10-11). 1 Detective Sweeney sent Officer Smith to the residence (ITr. at 11). Officer Smith confirmed that there was indeed a strong odor emitting from that residence (ITr. at 11).

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
943 F. Supp. 1174, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15468, 1996 WL 596295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-fairchild-mowd-1996.