USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4597
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC JAMES CLARK, a/k/a E,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. (5:18-cr-00999-TLW-1)
Submitted: August 17, 2022 Decided: September 12, 2022
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Darren S. Haley, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. M. Rhett DeHart, Acting United States Attorney, Jane B. Taylor, Katherine Hollingsworth Flynn, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Eric James Clark of conspiracy to possess with the intent
to distribute and to distribute at least 500 grams but less than 5 kilograms of cocaine and
less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; possession
with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and
possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e). The district court imposed a total sentence of 175 months of
imprisonment. On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
for a judgment of acquittal on all three convictions because the Government failed to
present sufficient evidence as to any of them. Clark also argues that, as to the firearm
count, the Government failed to charge and prove that Clark knew his status as a felon
prohibited him from possessing the firearms. Finally, Clark challenges the district court’s
calculation of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment
of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Farrell, 921
F.3d 116, 136 (4th Cir. 2019). “A jury’s guilty verdict must be upheld if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, substantial evidence supports it.”
United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 477 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 292 (2021). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). A defendant challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction faces a “heavy burden,” as
2 USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 3 of 5
“reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s
failure is clear.” Id. (cleaned up).
To sustain a conviction for the substantive drug count, the Government had to
establish that Clark “(1) possessed the [marijuana] (2) knowingly and (3) with intent to
distribute.” United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021). To sustain a
conviction for the firearm count, the Government needed to prove that (1) Clark knowingly
possessed a firearm or ammunition, (2) Clark had previously been “convicted in any court
of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” (3) Clark knew
“that he had been convicted of such an offense when he possessed” the firearm or
ammunition, and (4) the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.
United States v. Smith, 939 F.3d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see Rehaif v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194-96 (2019). As to the conspiracy count, the Government was
required to prove: “(1) an agreement to possess cocaine [and marijuana] with intent to
distribute existed between two or more persons; (2) [Clark] knew of the conspiracy; and
(3) [Clark] knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy.” United States v.
Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
With respect to the substantive drug and firearm counts, Clark argues that the
Government failed to demonstrate his possession of the drugs and firearms. “Possession
may be actual or constructive, and it may be sole or joint.” Moody, 2 F.4th at 189 (cleaned
up). “Constructive possession requires ownership, dominion, or control over the
contraband or the premises . . . in which the contraband was concealed and knowledge of
the presence of the contraband.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States
3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 4 of 5
v. Smith, 21 F.4th 122, 140 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying same rule to possession of firearms).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient, considering the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the defendant’s arrest and his alleged possession, to establish constructive
possession.” Moody, 2 F.4th at 190 (cleaned up).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the Government presented
substantial evidence of Clark’s guilt of all three offenses of conviction. Specifically, the
Government demonstrated that Clark had dominion and control over the premises in which
the contraband was discovered and knowledge of the existence of the contraband.
Moreover, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Clark intended to distribute the
marijuana discovered on the premises.
With respect to the conspiracy count, Clark stresses his view that the Government’s
witnesses were not credible. However, in determining whether substantial evidence
supports a conviction, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses,
but assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the
Government.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 232 (4th Cir. 2021). The trial record
confirms that the Government provided substantial evidence that Clark both purchased and
sold significant amounts of cocaine and marijuana from and to several individuals over
multiple occasions. This was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Clark
knowingly conspired to distribute those drugs.
Next, Clark argues that the Government failed to charge, or prove at trial, that Clark
knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, which, in Clark’s view, the Government
was required to do pursuant to Rehaif. We recently rejected an identical challenge. See
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USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4597
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC JAMES CLARK, a/k/a E,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg. Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. (5:18-cr-00999-TLW-1)
Submitted: August 17, 2022 Decided: September 12, 2022
Before AGEE and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Darren S. Haley, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. M. Rhett DeHart, Acting United States Attorney, Jane B. Taylor, Katherine Hollingsworth Flynn, Assistant United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
A federal jury convicted Eric James Clark of conspiracy to possess with the intent
to distribute and to distribute at least 500 grams but less than 5 kilograms of cocaine and
less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846; possession
with the intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and
possession of firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e). The district court imposed a total sentence of 175 months of
imprisonment. On appeal, Clark argues that the district court erred in denying his motion
for a judgment of acquittal on all three convictions because the Government failed to
present sufficient evidence as to any of them. Clark also argues that, as to the firearm
count, the Government failed to charge and prove that Clark knew his status as a felon
prohibited him from possessing the firearms. Finally, Clark challenges the district court’s
calculation of his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for a judgment
of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Farrell, 921
F.3d 116, 136 (4th Cir. 2019). “A jury’s guilty verdict must be upheld if, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, substantial evidence supports it.”
United States v. Haas, 986 F.3d 467, 477 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied 142 S. Ct. 292 (2021). “Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). A defendant challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction faces a “heavy burden,” as
2 USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 3 of 5
“reversal for insufficient evidence is reserved for the rare case where the prosecution’s
failure is clear.” Id. (cleaned up).
To sustain a conviction for the substantive drug count, the Government had to
establish that Clark “(1) possessed the [marijuana] (2) knowingly and (3) with intent to
distribute.” United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021). To sustain a
conviction for the firearm count, the Government needed to prove that (1) Clark knowingly
possessed a firearm or ammunition, (2) Clark had previously been “convicted in any court
of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” (3) Clark knew
“that he had been convicted of such an offense when he possessed” the firearm or
ammunition, and (4) the firearm or ammunition traveled in interstate or foreign commerce.
United States v. Smith, 939 F.3d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up); see Rehaif v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194-96 (2019). As to the conspiracy count, the Government was
required to prove: “(1) an agreement to possess cocaine [and marijuana] with intent to
distribute existed between two or more persons; (2) [Clark] knew of the conspiracy; and
(3) [Clark] knowingly and voluntarily became a part of this conspiracy.” United States v.
Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
With respect to the substantive drug and firearm counts, Clark argues that the
Government failed to demonstrate his possession of the drugs and firearms. “Possession
may be actual or constructive, and it may be sole or joint.” Moody, 2 F.4th at 189 (cleaned
up). “Constructive possession requires ownership, dominion, or control over the
contraband or the premises . . . in which the contraband was concealed and knowledge of
the presence of the contraband.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States
3 USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 4 of 5
v. Smith, 21 F.4th 122, 140 (4th Cir. 2021) (applying same rule to possession of firearms).
“[C]ircumstantial evidence may be sufficient, considering the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the defendant’s arrest and his alleged possession, to establish constructive
possession.” Moody, 2 F.4th at 190 (cleaned up).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the Government presented
substantial evidence of Clark’s guilt of all three offenses of conviction. Specifically, the
Government demonstrated that Clark had dominion and control over the premises in which
the contraband was discovered and knowledge of the existence of the contraband.
Moreover, a rational trier of fact could conclude that Clark intended to distribute the
marijuana discovered on the premises.
With respect to the conspiracy count, Clark stresses his view that the Government’s
witnesses were not credible. However, in determining whether substantial evidence
supports a conviction, “[w]e do not reweigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses,
but assume that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor of the
Government.” United States v. Ziegler, 1 F.4th 219, 232 (4th Cir. 2021). The trial record
confirms that the Government provided substantial evidence that Clark both purchased and
sold significant amounts of cocaine and marijuana from and to several individuals over
multiple occasions. This was sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Clark
knowingly conspired to distribute those drugs.
Next, Clark argues that the Government failed to charge, or prove at trial, that Clark
knew he was prohibited from possessing a firearm, which, in Clark’s view, the Government
was required to do pursuant to Rehaif. We recently rejected an identical challenge. See
4 USCA4 Appeal: 20-4597 Doc: 38 Filed: 09/12/2022 Pg: 5 of 5
Moody, 2 F.4th at 196-98. In Moody, we explained that Rehaif only requires the
government to prove knowledge of felon status, not knowledge that felon status prohibits
firearm possession, as Clark argues here. Id.; see also United States v. Collins, 982 F.3d
236, 242 n.2 (4th Cir. 2020) (denying appellant’s claim that he was unaware his status
prohibited him from possessing a firearm as “a mistake of law argument, which is not a
valid defense”). Therefore, we discern no Rehaif error.
Finally, Clark contends that the district court incorrectly calculated his criminal
history category, which resulted in an improperly inflated advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range. Clark argues that the district court erred in applying the career offender
enhancement in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2021) to the conspiracy
count, which increased Clark’s criminal history category from V to VI. Clark concedes
that he did not raise this issue below and that this court must review his claim for plain
error. “Under the plain error standard, [we] will correct an unpreserved error if (1) an error
was made; (2) the error is plain; (3) the error affects substantial rights; and (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Having reviewed the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in
calculating the Guidelines range.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED