USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4733
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ELIJAH OMARI REDFERN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00073-CCE-1)
Submitted: April 15, 2025 Decided: May 1, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Margaret M. Reece, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Elijah Omari Redfern appeals the 70-month sentence imposed following his guilty
plea, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). 1 On appeal, Redfern argues that
the district court erred in calculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by imposing
a two-level enhancement based on its determination that the offense involved three
firearms. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) (2023). Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s application of a
Guidelines enhancement for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Dennings, 922 F.3d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2019). “A finding is clearly erroneous when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Wooden, 887 F.3d 591, 602 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the
district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” United States
v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406, 417 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)(1) convictions. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The new 15-year statutory maximum set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) does not apply in this case because Redfern’s offense occurred before the June 25, 2022, amendment to the statute.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
At sentencing, Redfern conceded that he possessed two firearms but argued that the
Government failed to establish his possession of a Glock 20 handgun recovered from the
vehicle he was driving during a December 2021 traffic stop. The Government is required
to prove a disputed Guidelines enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence, United
States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 2021), which “simply requires the trier of fact
to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence,” United States
v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 435 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive. United States v. Lawing, 703
F.3d 229, 240 (4th Cir. 2012). “Constructive possession requires ownership, dominion, or
control over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband was
concealed and knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United States v. Moody,
2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “mere
proximity to the contraband” is insufficient to establish dominion and control over it,
United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2015), “circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest
and his alleged possession, to establish constructive possession,” Moody, 2 F.4th at 190
(cleaned up). Notably, “[t]here is an inference that the driver of [a] vehicle has knowledge
of the contraband within it.” Id. at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we have
further explained that “if a factfinder determines that a driver had dominion and control
over a vehicle, that is sufficient to establish constructive possession of contraband hidden
in that vehicle.” Id.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
Here, law enforcement officers stopped Redfern for driving with a revoked license.
After being pulled over, Redfern immediately exited the car—of which he was the sole
occupant—and shut the door. After a dog sniff search alerted to the presence of narcotics,
Redfern attempted to leave the scene and was detained. Officers searched the car and
recovered marijuana from the driver’s seat, a Glock 20 handgun from the glovebox, and a
backpack from the backseat containing marijuana divided into different bags, additional
sandwich bags, a digital scale, and $260 in cash. At sentencing, Redfern’s sister testified
that she owned both the car Redfern had been driving and the firearm, which she stated she
kept in her glovebox during the week because she worked early mornings.
In finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that
Redfern constructively possessed the Glock 20, the district court highlighted that law
enforcement officers had stopped Redfern twice with marijuana and loaded firearms in the
eight months prior to the December traffic stop; he was alone in the car at the time of the
stop; and he immediately exited the vehicle and closed the door, which was consistent with
prior efforts to avoid arrest and “show[ed] some knowledge that he had items in the car
that he shouldn’t have had.” (J.A. 55). 2 The court further observed, “There’s nothing to
indicate [Redfern] didn’t know the gun was there,” opining that “it just seems unlikely that
he did not know that it was there” and questioning whether someone would “let him drive
[the] car without telling him there was a gun in it.” (J.A. 55-56). The court thus concluded
that upon consideration of “the two previous events and then just sort of the totality of the
2 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties on appeal.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 5 of 5
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 1 of 5
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 23-4733
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ELIJAH OMARI REDFERN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles, Chief District Judge. (1:23-cr-00073-CCE-1)
Submitted: April 15, 2025 Decided: May 1, 2025
Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Kathleen A. Gleason, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Sandra J. Hairston, United States Attorney, Margaret M. Reece, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 2 of 5
PER CURIAM:
Elijah Omari Redfern appeals the 70-month sentence imposed following his guilty
plea, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2018). 1 On appeal, Redfern argues that
the district court erred in calculating his advisory Sentencing Guidelines range by imposing
a two-level enhancement based on its determination that the offense involved three
firearms. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A) (2023). Finding no
error, we affirm.
We review the factual findings underlying a district court’s application of a
Guidelines enhancement for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v.
Dennings, 922 F.3d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 2019). “A finding is clearly erroneous when
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
Wooden, 887 F.3d 591, 602 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the
district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been
sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” United States
v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406, 417 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1 Section 924(a)(2) was amended and no longer provides the penalty for § 922(g)(1) convictions. See Bipartisan Safer Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 117-159, § 12004(c), 136 Stat. 1313, 1329 (2022). The new 15-year statutory maximum set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) does not apply in this case because Redfern’s offense occurred before the June 25, 2022, amendment to the statute.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 3 of 5
At sentencing, Redfern conceded that he possessed two firearms but argued that the
Government failed to establish his possession of a Glock 20 handgun recovered from the
vehicle he was driving during a December 2021 traffic stop. The Government is required
to prove a disputed Guidelines enhancement by a preponderance of the evidence, United
States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 2021), which “simply requires the trier of fact
to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence,” United States
v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 435 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Possession of a firearm may be actual or constructive. United States v. Lawing, 703
F.3d 229, 240 (4th Cir. 2012). “Constructive possession requires ownership, dominion, or
control over the contraband or the premises or vehicle in which the contraband was
concealed and knowledge of the presence of the contraband.” United States v. Moody,
2 F.4th 180, 189 (4th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “mere
proximity to the contraband” is insufficient to establish dominion and control over it,
United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 2015), “circumstantial evidence may be
sufficient, considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s arrest
and his alleged possession, to establish constructive possession,” Moody, 2 F.4th at 190
(cleaned up). Notably, “[t]here is an inference that the driver of [a] vehicle has knowledge
of the contraband within it.” Id. at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). And we have
further explained that “if a factfinder determines that a driver had dominion and control
over a vehicle, that is sufficient to establish constructive possession of contraband hidden
in that vehicle.” Id.
3 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 4 of 5
Here, law enforcement officers stopped Redfern for driving with a revoked license.
After being pulled over, Redfern immediately exited the car—of which he was the sole
occupant—and shut the door. After a dog sniff search alerted to the presence of narcotics,
Redfern attempted to leave the scene and was detained. Officers searched the car and
recovered marijuana from the driver’s seat, a Glock 20 handgun from the glovebox, and a
backpack from the backseat containing marijuana divided into different bags, additional
sandwich bags, a digital scale, and $260 in cash. At sentencing, Redfern’s sister testified
that she owned both the car Redfern had been driving and the firearm, which she stated she
kept in her glovebox during the week because she worked early mornings.
In finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that
Redfern constructively possessed the Glock 20, the district court highlighted that law
enforcement officers had stopped Redfern twice with marijuana and loaded firearms in the
eight months prior to the December traffic stop; he was alone in the car at the time of the
stop; and he immediately exited the vehicle and closed the door, which was consistent with
prior efforts to avoid arrest and “show[ed] some knowledge that he had items in the car
that he shouldn’t have had.” (J.A. 55). 2 The court further observed, “There’s nothing to
indicate [Redfern] didn’t know the gun was there,” opining that “it just seems unlikely that
he did not know that it was there” and questioning whether someone would “let him drive
[the] car without telling him there was a gun in it.” (J.A. 55-56). The court thus concluded
that upon consideration of “the two previous events and then just sort of the totality of the
2 Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties on appeal.
4 USCA4 Appeal: 23-4733 Doc: 24 Filed: 05/01/2025 Pg: 5 of 5
situation” (J.A. 56), a preponderance of the evidence established that Redfern possessed
the Glock 20.
Redfern argues on appeal that there was no evidence that he knew the challenged
firearm was in the glovebox or that he intended to exercise dominion and control over it.
But circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish constructive possession, Moody,
2 F.4th at 190, and the district court’s finding that the totality of the circumstances
established Redfern’s possession need only be “plausible,” Ferebee, 957 F.3d at 417. Upon
review of the record, we discern no clear error in the district court’s finding that it was
more likely than not that Redfern constructively possessed the challenged firearm.
Accordingly, because Redfern conceded that he possessed the other two firearms,
we find that the court did not err by applying the USSG § 2K2.1(b)(1) enhancement. 3 We
therefore affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
Because we conclude that the district court did not err, we need not address the 3
Government’s alternative argument that any error in the application of the Guidelines enhancement is harmless.