NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0132n.06
Case No. 25-1049
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED Mar 12, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT v. ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ELIJAH CHAPPELL, ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION
Before: GILMAN, KETHLEDGE, and HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judges.
HERMANDORFER, Circuit Judge. On a May evening in 2023, officers responded to a
series of 911 calls reporting that a man was threatening people and shooting a gun. Upon arriving
on the scene, officers heard a series of additional shots ring out from inside a residence. A witness
identified the shooter as Elijah Chappell, a convicted felon. After a two-hour standoff, officers
breached the front door; Chappell surrendered and was arrested. Officers secured a warrant and
searched the residence. Inside, they recovered scattered parts of a disassembled semiautomatic
rifle, ammunition, and a spent shell casing. Outside, they found additional shell casings. A jury
later convicted Chappell of unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The
district court sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. Chappell now presses five challenges
to his trial proceedings, conviction, and sentence. Finding no error, we affirm. No. 25-1049, United States v. Chappell
I
A
At around 9:30 p.m. on May 20, 2023, 911 dispatchers received four separate calls
reporting a potential shooting at 9401 Hartwell Street in Detroit, Michigan. The first caller
reported that a drunk man with a gun was fighting a group of children and that the man had fired
shots. The caller repeatedly begged the dispatcher to send someone to the scene. Not a minute
later, a second caller reported that his neighbor was shooting a gun near the side of his house. And
just a few minutes after that, a group of children called to report that a 42-year-old man had
assaulted a 13-year-old girl, that he had a gun and was “shooting our house up,” and that the shooter
had fought his own brother. 911-Call Tr., R.29-4, PageID 76. Another caller reported hearing
five gunshots, stated that the shooter was beating up a woman, and further reported that a person
was lying in the street. Two of the callers identified the shooter as a light-skinned black man with
an afro.
Officers Haley Hebner and Joel Ochoa headed to the scene. Before they arrived at 9401
Hartwell Street, however, they were flagged down in a nearby parking lot by a group of children
who were screaming and waving their hands for the officers to stop. The children—between crying
and speaking over one another—confirmed that a gun had been fired. So Hebner called for backup.
The children told Hebner that the shooter’s name was Elijah and that they saw him go to the
basement of 9401 Hartwell Street. Moments later, Hebner heard gunfire coming from the vicinity
of 9401 Hartwell Street.
Meanwhile, Ochoa checked on a man who was lying in the street and bleeding from both
his arms and his face. That man turned out to be Corliss Chappell, Elijah Chappell’s brother.
Ochoa also heard the gunshots, and he was sure that they came from inside 9401 Hartwell Street.
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Backup arrived and the officers established a perimeter around the house. Several officers
observed a man with an afro-style haircut—later identified as Chappell—approach the front
doorway to 9401 Hartwell Street. Officers ordered Chappell to exit the premises, but he refused
to comply. Officers then declared a “barricaded gunman” situation. Trial Tr. Vol. 3, R.81, PageID
881-84. Specialized officers subsequently deployed a “BEAR” and a “BearCat”—armored
vehicles designed to push in doors and windows in barricaded-gunman situations—to ram open
the front door of 9401 Hartwell Street. Id. at PageID 968-69, 973-75, 989. Chappell finally
surrendered, hours after Hebner and Ochoa were first dispatched, and was taken into custody.
Another officer obtained a warrant to search 9401 Hartwell Street for firearms and
ammunition. The warrant affidavit explained that Hebner had encountered a group of children
who directed officers to 9401 Hartwell Street and informed officers that a man inside was
assaulting someone and was armed with a gun. It also stated that Hebner heard gunfire coming
from within 9401 Hartwell Street and that Chappell barricaded himself inside for hours. And the
affidavit stated that Chappell had a criminal history, including a felony conviction that disqualified
him from possessing a firearm, and multiple unprosecuted reports of domestic assault.
When officers executed the warrant, they discovered a partially disassembled assault rifle
in a bedroom closet; they found the remaining missing pieces—a dust cover, recoil spring, and
bolt carrier—in the basement. Officers also recovered shell casings in the front yard near the side
of the house as well as another shell casing inside the house next to the refrigerator. A ballistics
expert later reassembled the firearm using the component parts recovered at 9401 Hartwell Street.
After comparing the shell casings found at 9401 Hartwell Street with the casings from several test
shots from the now-assembled firearm, the expert concluded that the recovered casings must have
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come from the disassembled firearm found on the premises. And a forensic DNA analyst tested a
blood sample taken from the firearm and concluded that it matched Chappell’s DNA.
B
A grand jury indicted Chappell for possessing a firearm and ammunition after being
convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
In the lead up to his trial, Chappell made several unsuccessful motions to dismiss his
indictment, suppress evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant, and exclude
the 911 calls and body-camera footage from trial. First, Chappell filed a motion to dismiss his
indictment, arguing that § 922(g)(1) is facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment
after the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1
(2022). The district court rejected that motion based on binding Sixth Circuit precedent.
Second, Chappell filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from 9401 Hartwell Street,
alleging that the search-warrant affidavit contained false and reckless misrepresentations that were
necessary to provide probable cause for the officers’ search. The district court rejected Chappell’s
motion. It reasoned that the affidavit was “more than sufficient” to establish probable cause for
the search even without the statements that Chappell challenged. Order Den. Mot. to Suppress,
R.51, PageID 218-19.
Third, Chappell filed a motion in limine to exclude the 911 calls and officers’ body-camera
footage. Because many of the witnesses whose statements appear in the calls and footage were
not set to testify at trial, Chappell argued that the evidence contained inadmissible hearsay, was
unduly prejudicial, and violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. The district court rejected each of Chappell’s arguments. The court explained that,
even assuming the 911 callers’ statements were hearsay, they fell within the exception for present-
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sense impressions, Fed. R. Evid. 803(1). Similarly, the court concluded that the 911 callers’
statements were non-testimonial because the purpose of those calls was to obtain assistance in an
ongoing emergency, not to replace trial testimony. And the court found that Chappell’s bare
allegations of prejudice did not outweigh the evidence’s clear probative value. Finally, the district
court denied Chappell’s wholesale challenge to the body-camera footage as too vague. The district
court later admitted the 911 calls and body-camera footage at trial over Chappell’s objection.
After the government rested its case, Chappell moved for a judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. In ruling on the motion, the district court explained that
Chappell stipulated to three of the four elements of his offense, leaving only the question whether
Chappell knowingly possessed a firearm. As to that element, the district court concluded that the
government had presented more than enough evidence for a reasonable juror to find Chappell
guilty, including: that officers heard gunshots from within 9401 Hartwell Street; that officers saw
Chappell walking around inside the house and declared him a barricaded gunman; that officers
found disassembled pieces of a rifle inside the home and shell casings both in and outside the
home; and that Chappell’s DNA was on the firearm components found in the home.
The jury found Chappell guilty. Chappell then moved for a new trial, arguing that the
government presented insufficient evidence and reasserting his constitutional challenge to
§ 922(g). The district court denied the motion.
Over Chappell’s objections, the district court applied two enhancements to his Sentencing
Guidelines’ calculation. First, the district court applied a four-level enhancement to Chappell’s
base offense level for possessing a firearm “in connection with another felony offense” under
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U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (2024).1 Second, the district court applied a two-level obstruction-of-
justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. That enhancement followed from the district court’s
conclusion that Chappell had obstructed the investigation of his offense by attempting to
disassemble and hide the rifle later recovered (in pieces) at the shooting scene.
Based on those enhancements, the district court calculated a Guidelines’ range of 92-115
months, and the district court varied upward to impose a sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment,
followed by three years of supervised release. Chappell timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II
On appeal, Chappell contests the district court proceedings on five grounds. First, he
contends that the district court should have ordered a hearing to assess what Chappell sees as flaws
with the search warrant for 9401 Hartwell Street. Second, he asserts that the district court erred
by admitting the contents of the 911 calls and the officers’ bodycam recordings into evidence.
Third, he seeks acquittal as a matter of law or a new trial. Fourth, he challenges the felon-in-
possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as facially unconstitutional under Bruen. And last, he
argues that the district court erred in applying the two sentencing enhancements. We address, and
reject, each line of argument in turn.
Chappell first contests the validity of the warrant police secured prior to searching 9401
Hartwell Street and recovering the disassembled rifle and other evidence. He claims that the search
warrant affidavit, submitted by Lieutenant Tharadrous White, contained a series of false
1 In the 2025 version of the Sentencing Guidelines, this provision appears at U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B). We cite to the provision as it appeared in the 2024 Sentencing Guidelines, which were in effect at the time of Chappell’s sentencing. See United States v. Welch, 689 F.3d 529, 532-33 (6th Cir. 2012).
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allegations that White made with extreme recklessness. To give one example, Chappell targets
White’s statement that a child witness told Hebner “that their father was assaulting their mother.”
Chappell Br. 14 (quoting Warrant Aff., R.42, Page ID 157). In reality, the children’s statement that
Chappell “started putting her hands, his hands on her,” and “started fighting everybody” instead
meant to reference Chappell’s altercation with a girl named “Neveah.” Bodycam Tr., R.29-6,
PageID 81. Based on that statement and others asserted errors in White’s affidavit, Chappell
argues that the district court should have suppressed evidence obtained from 9401 Hartwell
Street—or at a minimum ordered a hearing to assess the affidavit’s validity under Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Chappell’s Franks-based argument fails. For Chappell to prevail, he must do more than
make a “substantial preliminary showing” that the warrant affidavit contains intentional or reckless
misrepresentations. United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d 997, 1008 (6th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted). He also must prove that any allegedly “false statement or material omission” was
“necessary to the probable cause finding in the affidavit.” Id. Probable cause is present when
there “is a fair probability or a common-sense inference that evidence of criminal activity will be
found.” United States v. Long, 155 F.4th 829, 838 (6th Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). That is “not a
high bar.” Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014).
Given that framework, we need not parse each of the statements that Chappell now
challenges (nor address the government’s argument that Chappell forfeited reliance on certain
statements by failing to cite them below). That is because, reviewing the district court’s probable-
cause determination de novo, see Bateman, 945 F.3d at 1007, we agree that the affidavit
established probable cause even excluding the challenged statements.
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Stepping through the affidavit’s remainder shows why. Even spotting Chappell his
objections, the affidavit still accurately recited sufficient facts to establish probable cause to search
the residence where Chappell was apprehended. Those facts include: that Officer Hebner was
flagged down by children who left the scene after shots were fired; that Chappell opened the front
door of the residence but then refused to show his hands to officers, retreated back, and barricaded
himself; that police records identified the person inside 9401 Hartwell Street as Chappell; that a
barricaded gunperson was declared; that Chappell remained inside 9401 Hartwell Street for
approximately two hours before surrendering; and that Chappell had a prior felony conviction and
was thus “disqualified” from “possessing a firearm.” Warrant Aff., R.42, PageID 157. Together,
those statements demonstrated a “fair probability,” Long, 155 F.4th at 838, that “firearms and
firearm evidence (spent casings),” Warrant Aff., R.42, PageID 157—both relevant to Chappell’s
unlawful possession of a firearm—would be found at 9401 Hartwell Street. So Chappell’s Franks
argument fails.
Chappell next contests the district court’s decision to admit, over his objection, statements
derived from four 911 calls and body-camera footage from officers at the scene. Tracking his
objections before the district court, Chappell argues on appeal that (1) the admission of the
evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights; (2) the evidence contained inadmissible
hearsay; and (3) the evidence’s probative value was substantially outweighed by the risk of
prejudice.
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This Court has not always been consistent regarding the standard of review applicable to
evidentiary rulings that implicate constitutional arguments.2 We need not resolve any ambiguity
in our caselaw here, however, because the district court did not err in admitting the contested
evidence under any standard of review.
Chappell’s argument for excluding the 911 calls and the body-camera footage stumbles out
of the gate. That is because Chappell fails to identify any specific statement that he deems
objectionable. Instead, Chappell appears to attack en masse the four 911 calls and all of the body-
camera footage—from at least nine different officers—admitted at trial. But this Court cannot
appropriately assess whether any given statement is testimonial hearsay without an indication of
the statements that we are to examine. Nor is it our responsibility to “put flesh on [the] bones” of
Chappell’s “skeletal” argument when he failed to fill it out himself. McPherson v. Kelsey, 125
F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Confronting that disconnect, the district court
construed Chappell’s motion in limine to challenge only the exhibits in the government’s
response—including the four 911 calls and the first ten minutes of Hebner’s and Ochoa’s body-
camera footage in which they interact with the children in the parking lot. Chappell does not object
to that framing on appeal. So we follow suit in limiting the scope of our review of the evidentiary
issues.
The Confrontation Clause. Chappell first contends that the 911 calls and body-camera
footage contain testimonial statements that violate his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The
Confrontation Clause guarantees that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. With a few
2 Compare United States v. Schreane, 331 F.3d 548, 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (abuse-of-discretion review), with United States v. Lloyd, 10 F.3d 1197, 1216 (6th Cir. 1993) (de novo review), and United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 666 (6th Cir. 2009) (both de novo and abuse-of-discretion review).
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exceptions, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the government from introducing testimonial
hearsay statements against criminal defendants. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
A statement is testimonial if, “in light of all the circumstances, viewed objectively, the ‘primary
purpose’ of the conversation was to ‘create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’” Ohio
v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 245 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011))
(alteration adopted). By contrast, a statement is nontestimonial if objective circumstances indicate
that “the primary purpose of the [statement] is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing
emergency.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also United States v. Lundy, 83
F.4th 615, 620-21 (6th Cir. 2023).
The statements Chappell challenges are nontestimonial. Start with the 911 calls. Those
calls were made by children, neighbors, and bystanders who reported that a man was actively
shooting near 9401 Hartwell Street. Three of those callers reported that the shooter was assaulting
people, and one caller stated that a person the shooter had beaten was “layin[g] in the street.” 911-
Call Tr., R.29-5, PageID 77. One caller reported that the shooter was drunk, and someone in the
background begged the dispatcher to “[h]urry up.” 911-Call Tr., R.29-2, PageID 70-71. Each
caller “‘was speaking about events as they were actually happening,’” rather than “describing
events ‘hours’ after they occurred.” United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 188 (6th Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 827). The callers faced “‘an ongoing emergency,’”
prompting them “to make ‘a call for help against [a] bona fide physical threat.’” Id. (quoting
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827). And several of the callers—particularly the children—were frantically
reporting from “‘an environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.’” Id. (quoting Davis, 547
U.S. at 827). Objective circumstances thus establish that the primary purpose of the 911 calls “was
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to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”—not to pin a crime on a defendant or
create a trial-testimony substitute. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.
The same goes for the body-camera footage. That footage depicts a group of children who
are visibly scared, crying, and talking over one another. The children told Hebner and Ochoa that
a drunk man started “fighting everybody,” that “he went to get the gun and started letting off
bullets,” and “started fighting his brother to death.” Bodycam Tr., R.29-6, PageID 81. They said
this man was still in the house, possibly with a woman named “Neveah,” whose location they
repeatedly and concernedly asked about. Id. at PageID 83. Confirming that “the ‘exigency of the
moment’” had not “ended,” Arnold, 486 F.3d at 189 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 827), several more
gunshots then rang out, prompting the officers to tell everyone to “get away now.” Bodycam Tr.,
R.29-6, PageID 84. The “arrival of the officers” thus, did not “end[] the emergency.” Arnold, 486
F.3d at 190. And even after their arrival, officers asked questions like, “What happened?”; “Were
any shots fired there?”; “Who has a gun?”; and “Is anybody shot?” Bodycam Tr., R.29-6, PageID
80-81. Those statements demonstrate an intent to “clarify[] the extent of the emergency and
obtain[] information necessary to resolve it.” Arnold, 486 F.3d at 191.
In short, the 911 calls and body-camera statements are nontestimonial because they
reflected a primary purpose of reporting and responding to an ongoing emergency. So the
Confrontation Clause did not bar their admission.
Hearsay. Nor did the challenged statements constitute inadmissible hearsay. The Federal
Rules of Evidence generally exclude hearsay evidence—an out-of-court statement offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted—from admission at trial. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). There are
exceptions, though, for certain hearsay statements “‘made under circumstances that tend to assure
reliability.’” Lundy, 83 F.4th at 618 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 299 (1973)).
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One such exception covers present-sense impressions—statements “describing or explaining an
event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” Fed. R. Evid.
803(1). Another covers excited utterances—statements “relating to a startling event or condition,
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(2).
The statements in the 911 calls and the body-camera footage qualify for both hearsay
exceptions. As explained, the 911 callers and the witnesses in the body-camera footage were
contemporaneously describing the startling and dangerous events that had just transpired. And
many of the speakers were scared and pleading for law-enforcement assistance. Supreme Court
precedent confirms that “911 calls that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay have often been
admitted” under the excited-utterance and present-sense-impression exceptions because “[t]hat
sort of contemporaneous report has long been treated as especially reliable.” Navarette v.
California, 572 U.S. 393, 399-400 (2014). The same goes for statements recorded in body-camera
footage during an ongoing emergency. See Lundy, 84 F.4th at 618-20. We have thus applied both
hearsay exceptions under similar circumstances. See United States v. Davis, 577 F.3d 660, 668-
70 (6th Cir. 2009). The district court did not err in denying Chappell’s hearsay challenge.
Rule 403. Finally, Chappell argues that the district court should have excluded the 911
calls and body-camera footage under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because “the prejudicial effect
far outweighed any admissible purpose.” Chappell Br. 22. “Rule 403 provides a ‘balancing test
for excluding relevant evidence.’” United States v. Baskerville, 164 F.4th 459, 491 (6th Cir. 2026)
(quoting United States v. Asher, 910 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2018)). There is a thumb on the scale
in favor of admission; evidence should be excluded “only when its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (cleaned up). What’s more, any prejudice from
the contested evidence must be unfair to warrant exclusion. “Testimony is not prejudicial under
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Rule 403 simply because it provides powerful evidence that the defendant committed the charged
crimes.” United States v. Harvel, 115 F.4th 714, 737 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Rather,
Chappell “must show that the evidence might lead the jury to convict for an inappropriate reason,”
id.—“such as a ground ‘different from proof specific to the offense charged.’” Baskerville, 164
F.4th at 492 (quoting Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997)).
The district court did not err in finding that the 911 calls and body-camera footage are not
substantially more prejudicial than probative of Chappell’s guilt. That evidence—including
contemporaneous statements that Chappell “got a gun,” and was “blowin’ the gun,” R.29-2,
PageID 71; was “shooting a gun,” R.29-3, PageID 73; was “shooting our house up and everything,”
R.29-4, PageID 76; and had fired at least five shots, R.29-5, PageID 77—is highly probative of
whether Chappell knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Chappell has offered no argument for why that evidence creates a danger of “unfair”
prejudice, let alone why that prejudice is “substantial[].” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Indeed, Chappell
provided nothing more than a conclusory statement that “the prejudicial effect” of the
“smorgasbord of anonymous statements” “far outweighed any admissible purpose,” without any
indication why. Chappell Br. 22. That does not suffice to prevail on his Rule 403 challenge.
C
Chappell next contends that the evidence entitled him to a judgment of acquittal under
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 or a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
33. The government responds that Chappell’s brief references only his motion for a new trial
under Rule 33, not his Rule 29 motion. And it appears that Chappell did “inadvertently” fail to
cite the district court’s denial of his oral motion for a new trial under Rule 29, made at the close of
the government’s case. Chappell Reply 2. But in both motions, Chappell attacked his § 922(g)(1)
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conviction by arguing that the trial evidence failed to show that he possessed the rifle. Whether
assessed under Rule 29 or Rule 33, Chappell’s claim cannot surmount the trial evidence.
As for Chappell’s Rule 29 argument, “[w]e review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Fairley, 137 F.4th 503, 511 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation
omitted). In so doing, we assess whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
When conducting that assessment, we must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the
prosecution,” Baskerville, 164 F.4th at 472 (citation omitted). Rule 33(a), for its part, permits a
district court to grant a new trial when “the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.” United States v. Robinson, 99 F.4th 344, 367 (6th Cir. 2024) (cleaned up). Neither
standard is met here.
Recall that Chappell stipulated to three of the four elements of his charged offense. As a
result, the only disputed element at trial was whether Chappell knowingly possessed a firearm or
ammunition. And on the possession issue, evidence abounded. To recap: Several of the 911
callers gave a description of the shooter that matched Chappell; the group of children said the
shooter’s name was “Elijah” and that he was inside the house at 9401 Hartwell Street, Trial Tr.
Vol. 2, R.80, PageID 759-60; Bodycam Tr., R.29-6, PageID 83; officers at the scene subsequently
heard gunshots coming from within 9401 Hartwell Street; numerous officers saw Chappell inside
the house; a disassembled firearm and expelled shell-casings were found in and around 9401
Hartwell Street; and blood found on the disassembled firearm matched Chappell’s DNA.
In response, Chappell throws a variety of other arguments at the wall. For instance,
Chappell asserts without support that officers might have planted evidence inside 9401 Hartwell
Street to frame him. But neither that charge, nor any of Chappell’s other unsupported allegations,
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can overcome the ample evidence indicating that Chappell possessed a rifle—found in pieces and
bearing his DNA—at 9401 Hartwell Street. The district court did not err in declining to grant
Chappell a new trial or an acquittal as a matter of law.
D
Chappell next asserts that his statute of conviction—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—is facially
unconstitutional under Bruen. We review that challenge de novo. See United States v. Risner, 129
F.4th 361, 364 (6th Cir. 2025). But here, Chappell acknowledges that his facial argument runs
aground on United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), “which applied Bruen and
held that § 922(g)(1) is not susceptible to a facial challenge,” United States v. Feltus, 2025 WL
3111303, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 6, 2025) (citation omitted). Chappell counters that Williams misread
Bruen. As a three-judge panel, however, we cannot accept Chappell’s invitation to “overturn” our
precedent in Williams. Chappell Br. 29. Our precedent therefore forecloses Chappell’s facial
challenge.
E
Chappell’s final set of arguments contests the district court’s 120-month sentence. At issue
is the district court’s application of two sentencing enhancements. Those enhancements followed,
respectively, from the district court’s conclusion that Chappell had possessed or used a firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense, see U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), and
obstructed the officers’ investigation into his § 922(g)(1) offense, see id. § 3C1.1.
Chappell contends that neither enhancement applies. In assessing his challenge, we review
the district court’s “legal conclusions” in the application of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and
any “fact findings” under the clear-error standard. United States v. Jackson, 154 F.4th 422, 427
(6th Cir. 2025). And though our caselaw conflicts over the applicable standard for reviewing
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application of the law to the facts for Guidelines-range purposes, see, e.g., United States v. Thomas,
933 F.3d 605, 608-09 (6th Cir. 2019), those distinctions make no difference here. Chappell’s
sentencing arguments lack merit under any arguable standard of review.
We start with the district court’s application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). That provision directs a
four-level enhancement if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with
another felony offense.” Id. The accompanying Guidelines commentary explains that this
enhancement should “apply if the firearm . . . facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another
felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A). Relevant here, the commentary in turn defines
“[a]nother felony offense” as “any federal, state, or local offense . . . punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction
obtained.” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C). To assess this enhancement’s application, the commentary
directs district courts to “consider the relationship between” the firearms offense and the other
felony offense “consistent with relevant conduct principles.” Id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(E). The
government needs to prove the requisite felony-offense connection by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Mukes, 980 F.3d 526, 533 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Seymour,
739 F.3d 923, 929 (6th Cir. 2014).
At the sentencing hearing, the government contended that § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applied
because Chappell had committed at least “two separate felonies” in connection with his firearm
possession. Sent’g Tr., R.86, PageID 1397. First, the government claimed that Chappell
committed felonious assault against the children present when he fired the rifle. See Mich. Comp.
L. § 750.82. That crime, the government explains, requires showing only that the relevant conduct
would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm. And citing Michigan caselaw, the
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government says threatening persons with a gun counts. Second, the government submitted that
Chappell’s firing of the rifle in the residence violated a felony statute prohibiting the intentional
discharge of a firearm in “a dwelling or a potentially occupied structure” with “reckless disregard
for the safety of any individual.” See id. § 750.234b(2).
The district court agreed that Chappell’s conduct warranted the four-level enhancement
under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). In explaining that conclusion, the district court stated that Chappell was
“accountable for possessing a firearm and ammunition in connection with other felony offenses,”
including “felonious assault.” Sent’g Tr., R.86, PageID 1399. Chappell’s counsel then objected
that “there was no evidence that a firearm was discharged in the home.” Id. at PageID 1400. The
district court overruled that objection, citing the trial “testimony” and “exhibits.” Id.
On appeal, Chappell does not dispute that the two cited state-law offenses were each a
“felony offense” for the purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Nor does he offer any legal argument that
the conduct the government identified—namely, firing the rifle near children and inside a home—
failed to satisfy the elements of each offense. Instead, Chappell disputes that the evidence showed
that he in fact had a “gun,” “actually fired” the gun “in the home,” and assaulted a minor. Chappell
Br. 31-32. But as the district court recited, the trial “testimony” and “exhibits” comprised evidence
that Chappell “retrieved a firearm and fired shots outside the residence,” “fire[d] the rifle while
outside,” and “had a firearm”; the officers’ account that they “heard multiple gunshots being fired
from inside a residence”; and shell casings and other physical evidence supporting that Chappell
had discharged the rifle in the home. Sent’g Tr., R.86, PageID 1382, 1400, 1424-25. Those same
materials, moreover, include 911 calls from children who (1) reported that Chappell was “shooting
a gun inside the house” and “fighting . . . kids,” (2) pleaded for immediate police assistance, and
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(3) screamed when additional shots were “fired.” 911-Call Tr., R.29-2, PageID 71; Bodycam Tr.,
R.29-6, PageID 80-81, 84.
Chappell disagrees with the district court’s reading of the evidentiary record. But “[w]here
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be
clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Given the evidence,
the district court did not err, let alone clearly, in applying § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
We now turn to the district court’s application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement
under § 3C1.1. That enhancement applies when a defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation . . .
of the instant offense of conviction,” and “the obstructive conduct related to” the defendant’s
“offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
Chappell contends that some of his conduct—like his choice not to immediately surrender
to the officers—was more akin to avoiding arrest. Continuing, he points out that avoiding arrest
typically falls outside of § 3C1.1. See id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.5(D). But Chappell’s argument, even if
accepted, would not warrant setting aside the enhancement. That is because the district court
independently cited Chappell’s attempted “destroying” of and “tampering with” the recovered rifle
as a “big part of the case” that also supported the enhancement’s application. Sent’g Tr., R.86,
PageID 1398-99. Chappell does not dispute that destroying or attempting to destroy evidence
qualifies as obstruction under § 3C1.1. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(D); United States v.
Cromity, No. 24-3066, 2025 WL 25133, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 3, 2025) (applying that “textbook”
rule to destruction of a firearm). Nor does he press any other legal argument for declining to apply
that general evidence-destruction rule to the firearm disassembly in his case.
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Chappell’s response instead boils down to challenging the district court’s factual
conclusion that Chappell indeed possessed the rifle. As noted above, the district court was entitled
to disagree given the plentiful evidence establishing that possession. Chappell’s “characterization”
of his conduct “at most amounts to a different reading of the trial record,” which cannot
demonstrate the clear error needed to set aside the district court’s factual findings. Jackson, 154
F.4th at 430. Because the district court permissibly concluded that Chappell disassembled and
then scattered the parts of the firearm that gave rise to his § 922(g)(1) offense, the obstruction
enhancement was proper.
* * *
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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