United States v. Eldred Eady

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: August 7, 2024
• Docket: 24-11723
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-11723 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2024 Page: 1 of 4

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-11723 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus ELDRED DONELL EADY,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cr-00086-MHC-1 ____________________ USCA11 Case: 24-11723 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2024 Page: 2 of 4

2 Opinion of the Court 24-11723

Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Appellant Eldred Donell Eady appeals his sentence of 90 days’ imprisonment and 4 years’ supervised release imposed by the district court upon revocation of his original term of supervised re- lease. Eady argues that his sentence was substantively unreasona- ble because the district court failed to properly balance the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Having read the parties’ briefs and re- viewed the record, we affirm Eady’s sentence. I. “We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, including a sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised re- lease, under a deferential abuse of discretion standard considering the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of establishing that it is unreasonable considering the facts and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1337-38. II. A district court may, upon finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant has violated a condition of their super- vised release, revoke that supervised release and impose a new term of imprisonment after considering certain § 3553(a) factors. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Those factors include “the nature and cir- cumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the USCA11 Case: 24-11723 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2024 Page: 3 of 4

24-11723 Opinion of the Court 3

defendant;” the need for the sentence to deter criminal conduct and protect the public from further crimes; the kinds of sentences avail- able; and the guidelines. See id. §§ 3583(e), 3553(a). The district court “abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant fac- tor, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation omitted). “A district court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need only be a reasonable one.” Id. at 1191. Further, while “[a] district court’s unjustified reliance on a single § 3553(a) factor may be a ‘symptom’ of an un- reasonable sentence,” the weight accorded to any given factor “is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008) (quo- tations omitted). Finally, we will reverse only if we are left with a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court imposed a sub- stantively unreasonable sentence. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted). III. The record here demonstrates that Eady’s sentence is sub- stantively reasonable because the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors, as well as numerous facts relevant to several of those factors. Specifically, the district court considered Eady’s prior performance on supervised release, the time he had spent in cus- tody, and his remorse and desire to seek help. We conclude that USCA11 Case: 24-11723 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 08/07/2024 Page: 4 of 4

4 Opinion of the Court 24-11723

the district court acted within its discretion in balancing those con- siderations and, as such, did not abuse its discretion in imposing the new sentence. Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm Eady’s sentence. 1 AFFIRMED.

1 Additionally, we grant Eady’s motion for leave to file his reply brief out of

time to address the government’s argument that his appeal is moot. We note that Eady’s substantive reasonableness challenge is not moot, even if he served his 90-day sentence, because his new sentence included a new term of super- vised release that involves some restrictions upon his liberty. See Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884, 886 n.2 (11th Cir. 1995).