Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
10-18-2006
USA v. El Amin Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4989
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
Recommended Citation "USA v. El Amin" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 316. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/316
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 05-4989 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MOHAMMED EL AMIN,
Appellant. ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 05-cr-00067-1) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) September 25, 2006
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 18, 2006) ____________
OPINION OF THE COURT ____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Mohammed El Amin pleaded guilty to
possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In the agreement and in open
court prior to sentencing, El Amin acknowledged that he faced at least fifteen years imprisonment. Nonetheless, he now argues that he should be re-sentenced to a maximum
of ten years incarceration because the District Court applied 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which
the plea agreement does not explicitly mention. Because El Amin understood the
sentencing range before consenting to the agreement at the plea hearing, we will affirm.
I.
El Amin was arrested and later charged in an indictment with (1) possession of a
firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (2)
possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (4) possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and (5) possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g). On May 25, 2005, the Government filed an information charging El Amin with
prior felony convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Appendix (“A”) 27. On the same day,
he entered into a plea agreement with the Government. El Amin agreed to plead guilty to
the section 922(g) charge, and in exchange the Government agreed to move for the
dismissal of “any remaining counts.” A29–30. The plea agreement did not mention the
prior felony convictions, but it twice stated that El Amin faced a mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years. A30–31.
On June 1, 2005, the District Court held a plea hearing. El Amin was instructed
that his assent to the agreement amounted to an admission that he “had three prior serious
crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses pursuant to Title 18, Section 924(e).”
2 A45–46. Later in the proceeding, El Amin asked, “Am I under the right understanding
that once I plead guilty to this 922(g)(1), that I don’t have to worry about none of them
other charges?,” and the Court responded in the affirmative. A58. The Assistant U.S.
Attorney handling the matter explained to El Amin that the dismissal applied to the four
counts in the indictment, but that El Amin was “going to be admitting that at the time that
[he] possessed this firearm, that [he] had three predicate offenses. . ., which is a 15-year
mandatory sentence.” A60. El Amin said that his attorney told him that his sentencing
offense level would be a 34, giving him a sentencing range of about fifteen to twenty
years, but El Amin expressed concern that he might be facing life in prison, and indicated
that he had not read the plea agreement. A61, A63.
The Court gave El Amin a 30-minute recess to read the agreement and confer with
his attorney. A64. El Amin then read the agreement and consented to it. A64–65. The
Court and counsel told El Amin that he would have an offense level of 34 (minus three
levels for acceptance of responsibility) and a criminal history category of VI, giving him
an advisory sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. A68. El Amin indicated that he
understood this range. Id. The Court indicated that it could calculate the range
differently, and that whatever the advisory range it would have the discretion to impose a
sentence of up to life in prison. A69, A72. Nonetheless, El Amin affirmed the plea
agreement. A78.
On September 16, 2005, El Amin sought relief from the 15-year minimum. He
admitted that he knowingly agreed to it, but complained that he thought the minimum
3 came from section 922(g) alone rather than section 924(e). A97. He claimed that if he
had known he was pleading under both sections he would not have pleaded guilty.
A112–114. The Court then gave El Amin the opportunity to request withdrawal from the
plea agreement, but El Amin refused and moved for enforcement of the agreement by
means of a sentence that disregarded section 924(e). A130. After reviewing the
transcript and arguments, and after El Amin obtained another attorney, the Court denied
his motion. A129.
At sentencing on October 31, 2005, the Court used the range previously explained
to El Amin. A139. Specifically, because El Amin had admitted to having three
convictions qualifying him for a minimum 15-year sentence under section 924(e)(1), the
Court calculated an offense level of 34 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). PSR at
15. After a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, El Amin’s
total offense level of 31 and his category VI criminal history produced the 188 to 235
month range. Id. The Court considered this advisory range and sentenced El Amin to
220 months. A10.
II.
We exercise plenary review over the interpretation and enforcement of a plea
agreement, United States. v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544–45 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989)), and principles of contract
law guide our analysis. United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2005). “A
contract is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.” United
4 States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir.
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Opinions of the United 2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
10-18-2006
USA v. El Amin Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-4989
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006
Recommended Citation "USA v. El Amin" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 316. http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2006/316
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2006 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu. NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ____________
No. 05-4989 ____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
MOHAMMED EL AMIN,
Appellant. ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 05-cr-00067-1) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) September 25, 2006
Before: RENDELL, CHAGARES and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 18, 2006) ____________
OPINION OF THE COURT ____________
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant Mohammed El Amin pleaded guilty to
possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In the agreement and in open
court prior to sentencing, El Amin acknowledged that he faced at least fifteen years imprisonment. Nonetheless, he now argues that he should be re-sentenced to a maximum
of ten years incarceration because the District Court applied 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which
the plea agreement does not explicitly mention. Because El Amin understood the
sentencing range before consenting to the agreement at the plea hearing, we will affirm.
I.
El Amin was arrested and later charged in an indictment with (1) possession of a
firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); (2)
possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (3) possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); (4) possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and (5) possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g). On May 25, 2005, the Government filed an information charging El Amin with
prior felony convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Appendix (“A”) 27. On the same day,
he entered into a plea agreement with the Government. El Amin agreed to plead guilty to
the section 922(g) charge, and in exchange the Government agreed to move for the
dismissal of “any remaining counts.” A29–30. The plea agreement did not mention the
prior felony convictions, but it twice stated that El Amin faced a mandatory minimum
sentence of fifteen years. A30–31.
On June 1, 2005, the District Court held a plea hearing. El Amin was instructed
that his assent to the agreement amounted to an admission that he “had three prior serious
crimes of violence or drug trafficking offenses pursuant to Title 18, Section 924(e).”
2 A45–46. Later in the proceeding, El Amin asked, “Am I under the right understanding
that once I plead guilty to this 922(g)(1), that I don’t have to worry about none of them
other charges?,” and the Court responded in the affirmative. A58. The Assistant U.S.
Attorney handling the matter explained to El Amin that the dismissal applied to the four
counts in the indictment, but that El Amin was “going to be admitting that at the time that
[he] possessed this firearm, that [he] had three predicate offenses. . ., which is a 15-year
mandatory sentence.” A60. El Amin said that his attorney told him that his sentencing
offense level would be a 34, giving him a sentencing range of about fifteen to twenty
years, but El Amin expressed concern that he might be facing life in prison, and indicated
that he had not read the plea agreement. A61, A63.
The Court gave El Amin a 30-minute recess to read the agreement and confer with
his attorney. A64. El Amin then read the agreement and consented to it. A64–65. The
Court and counsel told El Amin that he would have an offense level of 34 (minus three
levels for acceptance of responsibility) and a criminal history category of VI, giving him
an advisory sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. A68. El Amin indicated that he
understood this range. Id. The Court indicated that it could calculate the range
differently, and that whatever the advisory range it would have the discretion to impose a
sentence of up to life in prison. A69, A72. Nonetheless, El Amin affirmed the plea
agreement. A78.
On September 16, 2005, El Amin sought relief from the 15-year minimum. He
admitted that he knowingly agreed to it, but complained that he thought the minimum
3 came from section 922(g) alone rather than section 924(e). A97. He claimed that if he
had known he was pleading under both sections he would not have pleaded guilty.
A112–114. The Court then gave El Amin the opportunity to request withdrawal from the
plea agreement, but El Amin refused and moved for enforcement of the agreement by
means of a sentence that disregarded section 924(e). A130. After reviewing the
transcript and arguments, and after El Amin obtained another attorney, the Court denied
his motion. A129.
At sentencing on October 31, 2005, the Court used the range previously explained
to El Amin. A139. Specifically, because El Amin had admitted to having three
convictions qualifying him for a minimum 15-year sentence under section 924(e)(1), the
Court calculated an offense level of 34 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). PSR at
15. After a three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, El Amin’s
total offense level of 31 and his category VI criminal history produced the 188 to 235
month range. Id. The Court considered this advisory range and sentenced El Amin to
220 months. A10.
II.
We exercise plenary review over the interpretation and enforcement of a plea
agreement, United States. v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 544–45 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir. 1989)), and principles of contract
law guide our analysis. United States v. Hodge, 412 F.3d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 2005). “A
contract is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation.” United
4 States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 551 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d
766, 773 (3d Cir. 1999)). When an ambiguity exists, “we must look to extrinsic evidence
that may evince the parties’ intent.” Id. Useful indicia of this intent may include the
circumstances surrounding the agreement’s formation, “general principles of the
interpretation of contracts,” and “the applicable federal statute and related Sentencing
Guidelines.” United States v. Huang, 178 F.3d 184, 188 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
El Amin contends that he is entitled to a sentence without a section 924(e)
enhancement. We disagree. “If a defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment
within the maximum set out in the plea agreement, it is difficult to see the grounds on
which a defendant can rest a complaint; the defendant got what he bargained for.” United
States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 869 (3d Cir. 1997). El Amin’s plea agreement
unambiguously states that the mandatory minimum sentence for his crime is 15 years.
Even though the agreement does not explicitly mention section 924(e), the circumstances
surrounding the agreement’s formation confirm that the parties agreed to its application.
See Huang, 178 F.3d at188. Section 924(e) provides the only possible basis in law for the
minimum, and the government filed an information alleging the prior felonies under
section 924(e) on the same day the parties entered the agreement. In addition, the plea
hearing resolved any ambiguity about exactly which “counts” were to be dismissed. The
Government specifically informed El Amin that by entering into the agreement he would
be conceding the existence of three prior convictions under section 924(e). The
Government also stated that it would move to dismiss the four counts in the initial
5 indictment. The Court and El Amin’s attorney further explained the exact sentencing
calculation and range that the Court eventually imposed: 188 to 235 months. El Amin
received a sentence of 220 months. He got exactly what he bargained for.
El Amin also claims that he mistakenly believed the 15-year minimum came from
section 922(g) itself, and he claims that had he known the minimum applied by way of
section 924(e), he would have bargained differently and only pleaded guilty to section
922(g) without the 15-year minimum. A mistake of one party to a contract may, in rare
cases, cause the contract to be voidable. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 153 (1981).
But “the appropriate relief for mistake takes the form of avoidance of the contract.” Id. at
ch. 6 intro. Reformation is appropriate only where the mistake is mutual and the contract
“fails to express the agreement.” Id. § 155.
El Amin’s mistake about section 924(e) does not entitle him to enforce his own
interpretation of the agreement. Further, even assuming arguendo that the doctrine of
unilateral mistake applies, that doctrine would not allow for specific performance of a
bargain to which the Government never agreed. See id. ch. 6, intro. El Amin’s mistake
can be used as a shield but not a sword, and he expressly rejected the District Court’s
invitation to withdraw his guilty plea. A130.1
1 El Amin also argues that section 924(e), which is part of the Armed Career Criminal Act, is a separate offense rather than merely a sentencing provision, and therefore that the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for the only crime to which he pleaded guilty, section 922(g). We have held to the contrary, United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 220 (3d Cir. 1987), and the Supreme Court’s sentencing jurisprudence continues to distinguish facts of prior conviction from other facts that enhance a sentence.
6 III.
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of conviction.
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005). Moreover, the plea agreement encompasses section 924(e) and includes an admission by El Amin of his prior convictions.