United States v. Eileen McGrew

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: March 27, 2018
• Docket: 17-55393
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 27 2018 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 17-55393

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02647-R-AS

v. MEMORANDUM* EILEEN McGREW,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

CALIFORNIA FRANCHISE TAX BOARD; PHH MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

Defendants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Manuel L. Real, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 13, 2018**

Before: LEAVY, M. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Eileen McGrew appeals from the district court’s order denying her post-

judgment motion for reconsideration in the government’s action to foreclose

federal tax liens on real property. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review for an abuse of discretion. Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v.

ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McGrew’s motion

for relief from judgment because the motion was filed more than one year after

entry of judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Nevitt v. United States, 886 F.2d

1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1989) (“A motion for relief from judgment based on

[Rule 60(b)(1), (2), or (3)] shall be made not more than one year after the

judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.” (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted)).

We reject as meritless McGrew’s contention that the district court should

have construed her motion for reconsideration as seeking relief under Rule

60(b)(6).

AFFIRMED.

2 17-55393