United States v. Edward Cordovez

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 25-10715

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

EDWARD CORDOVEZ, Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cr-20272-RKA-1

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Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and LUCK, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM:

Edward Cordovez was sentenced to 60 years’ imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to production, distribution, and possession of child pornography. He appeals the sentence, arguing that it was

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procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After careful review, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Cordovez first came onto law enforcement’s radar in June 2023, when he attempted to send $20 in cryptocurrency to an account that sold child pornography. In March 2024, law enforcement received a tip from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that Cordovez had been sending messages on social media fantasizing about engaging in sexual conduct with his own children. Cordovez had asked another user, “[a]m I wrong to want to f—k my daughter?” Cordovez had sent direct messages about his minor daughter to eighteen other users, where he had bragged about masturbating and ejaculating on her as well as his son since they were infants. He also told other users he first had sex with his wife when she was eleven, and that “[i]t took [him] about a year to groom her.” Law enforcement investigation also revealed that Cordovez had uploaded child pornography to social media that showed real and artificially generated images of infants and toddlers being sexually exploited.

In May and June 2024, law enforcement conducted surveillance of Cordovez’s residence and obtained a warrant to search his home. Law enforcement officers arrested him and conducted an interview. Cordovez showed them a disguised application on his phone that appeared to be a calculator but instead was a file storage application containing thousands of images and videos of child pornography . A later forensic investigation revealed a dozen images

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and videos of Cordovez sexually abusing his toddler son and infant daughter by masturbating and ejaculating on them and putting his erect penis in contact with his daughter’s vagina and son’s anus.

Cordovez was indicted on four counts of producing, one count of distributing, and one count of possessing child pornography . See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2251(e), 1466A(a)(2), 2252(a)(4)(b), 2252(b)(2). He pleaded guilty to all counts.

Before sentencing, the United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report. The report calculated an offense level of forty-three and a criminal history category of one, resulting in a guideline range of life imprisonment.

At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked the parties if either objected to the report. After neither side objected, the district court heard argument on the appropriate sentence. The government argued that an eighty-year sentence was appropriate based on the vile nature of Cordovez’s conduct and the high number and extreme nature of the pornography he produced, possessed , and distributed. Cordovez, on the other hand, asked for a twenty-year sentence, pointing to a psychological assessment that said he had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and pedophilic disorder, his lack of criminal history, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. The district court also heard from members of the community that spoke on Cordovez’s behalf.

The district court explained that, after considering the presentence investigation report, the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. section 3553(a), and the parties’ arguments, sixty years’

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imprisonment was an appropriate sentence. The district court emphasized the particularly disturbing nature of the offenses, the “unfathomable violation of parental trust,” the importance of just punishment , and the need for specific deterrence. While the district court said there was some mitigating evidence—the guidelines didn’t fully account for Cordovez’s lack of prior criminal record and acceptance of responsibility—the mitigation was outweighed by the factors pointing the other way. The district court explained that child pornography offenses are “always disturbing,” but that Cordovez had committed “a particularly horrific crime.”

After the district court pronounced the sentence, Cordovez objected to the length of the sentence, repeating his argument that the district court did not account for his mental health conditions and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion the substantive and procedural reasonableness of a sentence. United States v. Touray, 151 F.4th 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262, 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023)).

DISCUSSION

Cordovez argues that his sentence was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. We use a two-step process to review a sentence. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 935 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Cubero, 754 F.3d 888, 892 (11th Cir. 2014)). First, we review whether the district court committed

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“a significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating the guideline range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, “failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. [section] 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 936. Second, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence “in light of the totality of the circumstances and the [section] 3553(a) factors.” Id.

As to procedural reasonableness, Cordovez contends that the district court did not consider the psychological evaluation he submitted. The report, according to Cordovez, linked his offense to his ADHD and his pedophilic disorder.

A district court is required to consider the section 3553(a)

factors, but it need not state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the factors or discuss each one. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). Instead, an acknowledgment by the district court that it considered the section 3553(a) factors is sufficient. See United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). And failure to discuss mitigating evidence does not indicate that the court “erroneously ignored or failed to consider this evidence.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).

Here, although the district court did not explicitly address Cordovez’s psychological evaluation, it did state that it had considered the section 3553(a) factors. And the district court analyzed how the section 3553(a) factors applied to Cordovez’s crimes by focusing on the nature and circumstances of the offense, explaining

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that “this was a particularly horrific crime and . . . an unfathomable violation of parental trust.” In addition, the district court explained the importance of providing just punishment and specifically deterring Cordovez.

The district court did everything it was required to do. It acknowledged the section 3553(a) factors and explained how the factors applied to the case. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281. While the district court did not specifically discuss the psychological evaluation as Cordovez hoped, that does not mean it “erroneously ignored or failed to consider this evidence.” Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 833. Cordovez’s sentence was therefore procedurally reasonable.

As to substantive reasonableness, Cordovez argues that the district court abused its discretion by not giving adequate weight to his mental health conditions, lack of prior criminal history, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. Section 3553(a) requires a sentencing court to impose a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offense, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and provide effective correctional treatment for the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).

A court must consider the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the kinds of sentences available and the applicable guidelines range, any pertinent policy statement, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing

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disparities between similar defendants, and the need to provide victims with restitution. Id. § 3553(a). The weight given to each factor is a matter for the sound discretion of the district court and permits affording great weight to one factor over others. See United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 (11th Cir. 2013). We ordinarily expect a within-guidelines-range sentence to be reasonable. United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331, 1342 (11th Cir. 2024). In addition, “[a] sentence imposed well below the statutory-maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).

“Child sex crimes are among the most egregious and despicable of societal and criminal offenses.” United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191, 1220 (11th Cir. 2009). We have upheld “lengthy sentences in these cases”—even those as high as 140 years—as substantively reasonable. Id. (citing United States v. Johnson, 451 F.3d 1239, 1244 (11th Cir.2006)). These offenses have “devastating and longlasting effects” on the victims, and “[w]hen child pornography is produced in conjunction with the sexual abuse of children . . . the harm to the child victims is magnified and perpetuated.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1207–08 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation modified).

Cordovez’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court considered the section 3553(a) factors, placing particular weight on the heinous nature of the offense, the need for just punishment , and the need for specific deterrence. Cordovez sexually

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abused and ejaculated on his infant daughter and toddler son, produced images of him doing so, and then bragged about it on the internet. The district court was right to describe these crimes as “particularly horrific” and “an unfathomable violation of parental trust,” and place great weight on the nature of this conduct.

Despite his “unfathomable” crimes, the district court also acknowledged there was some mitigating evidence as Cordovez had no criminal history and had accepted responsibility. The district court did not evaluate the mitigating evidence the way Cordovez would have preferred, and it did not specifically discuss his psychological evaluation, but as we’ve already said, it was not required to. And while the district court imposed a lengthy sentence, it was within the guidelines and below the statutory maximum. At bottom, Cordovez takes issue with the way the district court weighed the factors. But the district court was “free to weigh the [section] 3553(a) factors as it saw fit.” United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266, 1277 (11th Cir. 2025). In light of the record, we see no substantive unreasonableness in the district court’s conclusion.

AFFIRMED.