United States v. Edward Buck

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: October 21, 2024
• Docket: 22-50091
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 21 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50091 22-50136 Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. v. 2:19-cr-00595-CAS-1

EDWARD BUCK, MEMORANDUM* Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 7, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

Edward Buck appeals his convictions after a jury trial for distribution of

methamphetamine resulting in two deaths, maintaining a drug-involved premises,

and inducing two individuals into interstate prostitution. He also appeals his

sentence of thirty years in prison and a $200,000 fine. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. 1. Buck raises a Fourth Amendment challenge to a deputy’s warrantless

entry into his apartment and her seizure of drug evidence. We review de novo the

denial of a motion to suppress, but we review underlying factual findings for clear

error. United States v. Iwai, 930 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2019). The district

court did not err in finding that the deputy’s warrantless entry was authorized by

implied consent because Buck had called authorities to report that one of the

victims had suffered a medical emergency. See Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915,

920-21 (9th Cir. 2002). The district court also did not clearly err in finding that the

deputy’s warrantless seizure of drug evidence visible to her in Buck’s toolchest

was authorized under the plain view doctrine, which allows seizure of “any

evidence that is in plain view during the course of [an officer’s] legitimate

emergency activities.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (citing

Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10 (1978)).

2. Buck also asserts the district court violated the Sixth Amendment’s

Confrontation Clause by restricting cross-examination of the deputy who seized

the drugs at trial. We review de novo Confrontation Clause challenges to a district

court’s limitation of cross-examination. United States v. Singh, 995 F.3d 1069,

1080 (9th Cir. 2021). In evaluating whether a restriction of cross-examination

violated the Confrontation Clause, we apply the factors addressed in Singh, 995

F.3d at 1080. Although cross-examination of the deputy on whether the drug

2 evidence was in plain view was conceivably relevant to her credibility, the district

court’s decision to avoid relitigating the suppression issue and confusing the jury

was reasonable. The jury was provided sufficient information to assess the

deputy’s credibility, and it was unlikely that the proposed cross-examination would

have provided the jury with a “significantly different” impression. See United

States v. Larson, 495 F.3d 1094, 1106 (9th Cir. 2007). Even if the restriction on

cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause, the error was likely harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 1107 (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475

U.S. 673, 684 (1986)).

3. Buck next contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the

convictions. We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence, United States v.

Boam, 69 F.4th 601, 606 (9th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 528

F.3d 1207, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008)), and find each conviction supported by sufficient

evidence. First, as to Buck’s convictions for distribution of methamphetamine

causing the deaths of two individuals, G.M. and T.D., sufficient evidence was

presented to the jury to support the conclusion that but for methamphetamine use,

the two would not have died. See Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218-19

(2014); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (2018). When presented with “competing views”

as to how G.M. and T.D. died, the jury was entitled to believe the government’s

medical experts. See Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2011).

3 Second, a conviction for maintaining a drug-involved premises may be

premised on “drug activity involving consumption or use by numbers of non-

resident individuals occur[ring] in the home.” United States v. Shetler, 665 F.3d

1150, 1163 (9th Cir. 2011); see also 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1). Ample evidence in the

record establishes that Buck regularly distributed methamphetamine to non-

residents at his apartment for use. Third, to sustain a conviction for inducement

into interstate prostitution, the defendant must have “convinced or influenced [an

individual] to actually undergo the journey, or made the possibility more

appealing.” United States v. Rashkovski, 301 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2002); see

also 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a). Evidence that Buck “offered to make and pay for the

necessary travel arrangements” is sufficient to sustain the conviction. Rashkovski,

301 F.3d at 1137.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of

other uncharged acts. Witness testimony, pictures, and videos admitted at trial

were relevant to prove motive and modus operandi as permitted under Federal

Rule of Evidence 404(b). See United States v. Cherer, 513 F.3d 1150, 1157-58

(9th Cir. 2008). The evidence was also directly relevant to the charges for

distribution of methamphetamine resulting in the deaths of G.M. and T.D. because

it showed a pattern of drug consumption at Buck’s apartment. The district court

did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the relevant

4 evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.

R. Evid. 403.

5. The government’s reference to “testimony from just a small sample of

some of the defendant’s victims” during closing argument did not deny Buck a fair

trial. Because Buck did not contemporaneously object, we review his challenge

for plain error. See United States v. Ruiz, 710 F.3d 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2013).

Under plain error review, we will reverse a conviction “only if the government’s

statements were improper and the statements resulted in substantial prejudice.” Id.

at 1084. Even assuming that the statement invited the jury’s speculation about

other victims, there is no “reasonable probability that it rendered the trial

fundamentally unfair.” Ford v. Peery, 999 F.3d 1214, 1224 (9th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Deck v. Jenkins, 814 F.3d 954, 985 (9th Cir. 2016)).

6. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a sentence of

thirty years, which was below the recommended Sentencing Guidelines range. See

United States v. Kabir, 51 F.4th 820, 829 (9th Cir. 2022) (finding that “a below-

Guidelines sentence is suggestive of its reasonableness”). Lastly, the district

court’s imposition of a $200,000 fine after considering the severity of the crime

and Buck’s ability to pay was reasonable. See United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d

1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.