NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0345n.06
No. 24-3118 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jul 15, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) v. COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) EDDIE LEE POPE, OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Eddie Lee Pope of possessing 446 grams
of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. He challenges that conviction on five grounds.
We reject his arguments and affirm.
I.
One night in October 2020, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Ryan Noblet was driving
along Route 23 in Northwest Ohio when he saw a Chevy Malibu traveling well below the speed
limit and driven by a man leaning far back in his seat. Noblet began to follow the vehicle because
he thought the driver might be impaired. The driver veered out of his lane and touched the “fog
line” on the side of the road. Noblet then pulled over the vehicle. He ran the plates and learned
that they were for a GMC Yukon (rather than a Malibu). Noblet approached the car and smelled
marijuana coming from inside.
Noblet asked the driver, Eddie Lee Pope, to exit the car, and conducted a pat down for
weapons. Pope said he had a colostomy bag attached to his groin because of a recent medical No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
procedure. When Noblet reached that area, he felt a bag that contained a hard, gravel-like
substance—not what he would have expected in a colostomy bag. Noblet put Pope in the back of
his cruiser and called for backup. After other troopers arrived, Noblet removed Pope from his
cruiser to conduct a field sobriety test. Pope ran, but the troopers quickly caught up, arrested him,
and patted him down a second time. But by then the bag in his groin area was gone. The troopers
soon found a bag—containing a white substance of similar texture to what Noblet had felt earlier—
along the path Pope had run. They concluded the bag likely contained methamphetamine. The
troopers thus detained Pope and searched his car, where they found marijuana cigarettes, a scale,
and various paper records of drug trafficking.
A federal grand jury thereafter indicted Pope for possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. At Pope’s first court appearance, he told the
judge that he wanted to represent himself. The judge warned him against that decision, but Pope
insisted. Pope later filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, which the court denied.
Motions practice continued for two more years before Pope moved to dismiss his case, alleging a
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The district court granted that motion and dismissed Pope’s
indictment without prejudice. A grand jury then reindicted Pope, who continued to represent
himself—including by filing a new motion to suppress, which the district court again denied. At
trial, Pope asked the court to instruct the jury on simple possession as a lesser-included offense.
The court denied his motion, and the jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine with
intent to distribute. This appeal followed.
-2- No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
II.
A.
Pope argues that the district court’s dismissal of his case, under the Speedy Trial Act,
should have been with prejudice rather than without. We review that decision for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Moss, 217 F.3d 426, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Act requires that a criminal trial begin within 70 days of a defendant’s indictment. See
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Subject to certain exceptions, if 70 days pass and a trial has not yet started,
the court must dismiss the indictment. Id. §§ 3161(h); 3162(a)(2). Here, the district court found
that 95 days had passed before trial.
Whether to dismiss an indictment with prejudice is left to the court’s discretion. But the
court must consider “among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense;
the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution
on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.” Id. § 3162(a)(2). Here,
to that end, the court explained that “[t]he charged offense is a serious one, the passage of the non-
excludable days is not chargeable to the government, and Pope does not show he has suffered
actual prejudice as a result of the delay.” The court thus dismissed Pope’s indictment without
prejudice.
Now represented by counsel, Pope contends that the dismissal should have been with
prejudice for two reasons. First, he says his drug offense was “run of mill” rather than “serious.”
Our case law says the contrary: we have “categorically labeled drug offenses as serious.” Moss,
217 F.3d at 431. Second, Pope says the district court should not have considered whether the delay
prejudiced him because the Speedy Trial Act does not expressly mention prejudice as a relevant
factor. But whether a defendant is prejudiced bears directly on how reprosecution affects the
-3- No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
“administration of justice,” which the district court must consider. United States v. Robinson, 389
F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2004). And here the district court reasoned that the delay in Pope’s trial
would not hinder his defense, so dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. See United States
v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 339 (1988). That decision was not an abuse of discretion.
B.
Pope argues that he waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel unknowingly. We
review the validity of his waiver de novo. United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590, 601 (6th Cir.
2022). To ensure that a defendant’s waiver was knowing, a district court “must ask the defendant
a series of questions drawn from, or substantially similar to the model inquiry set forth” in the
Bench Book for United States District Judges. United States v. Heard, 762 F.3d 538, 543 (6th Cir.
2014). That means a judge should address the defendant’s familiarity with the law, the nature of
the charges against him, and the dangers of self-representation, and then should admonish the
defendant that he should not try to represent himself. See United States v. Bankston, 820 F.3d 215,
224 (6th Cir. 2016).
Here, the district court addressed all these points on at least three occasions. At Pope’s
preliminary hearing, the court discussed the seriousness of the charges (and potential penalties)
that Pope faced, the difficulties of representing himself in federal court, and the representation that
a public defender was prepared to provide to him. The court also told Pope that it had “never seen
an individual who was better off not having an attorney than having an attorney” and that
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NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0345n.06
No. 24-3118 FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Jul 15, 2025 FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ON APPEAL FROM THE ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) v. COURT FOR THE ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) EDDIE LEE POPE, OHIO ) Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )
Before: SILER, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Eddie Lee Pope of possessing 446 grams
of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it. He challenges that conviction on five grounds.
We reject his arguments and affirm.
I.
One night in October 2020, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper Ryan Noblet was driving
along Route 23 in Northwest Ohio when he saw a Chevy Malibu traveling well below the speed
limit and driven by a man leaning far back in his seat. Noblet began to follow the vehicle because
he thought the driver might be impaired. The driver veered out of his lane and touched the “fog
line” on the side of the road. Noblet then pulled over the vehicle. He ran the plates and learned
that they were for a GMC Yukon (rather than a Malibu). Noblet approached the car and smelled
marijuana coming from inside.
Noblet asked the driver, Eddie Lee Pope, to exit the car, and conducted a pat down for
weapons. Pope said he had a colostomy bag attached to his groin because of a recent medical No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
procedure. When Noblet reached that area, he felt a bag that contained a hard, gravel-like
substance—not what he would have expected in a colostomy bag. Noblet put Pope in the back of
his cruiser and called for backup. After other troopers arrived, Noblet removed Pope from his
cruiser to conduct a field sobriety test. Pope ran, but the troopers quickly caught up, arrested him,
and patted him down a second time. But by then the bag in his groin area was gone. The troopers
soon found a bag—containing a white substance of similar texture to what Noblet had felt earlier—
along the path Pope had run. They concluded the bag likely contained methamphetamine. The
troopers thus detained Pope and searched his car, where they found marijuana cigarettes, a scale,
and various paper records of drug trafficking.
A federal grand jury thereafter indicted Pope for possession of methamphetamine with
intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. At Pope’s first court appearance, he told the
judge that he wanted to represent himself. The judge warned him against that decision, but Pope
insisted. Pope later filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamine, which the court denied.
Motions practice continued for two more years before Pope moved to dismiss his case, alleging a
violation of the Speedy Trial Act. The district court granted that motion and dismissed Pope’s
indictment without prejudice. A grand jury then reindicted Pope, who continued to represent
himself—including by filing a new motion to suppress, which the district court again denied. At
trial, Pope asked the court to instruct the jury on simple possession as a lesser-included offense.
The court denied his motion, and the jury convicted him of possessing methamphetamine with
intent to distribute. This appeal followed.
-2- No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
II.
A.
Pope argues that the district court’s dismissal of his case, under the Speedy Trial Act,
should have been with prejudice rather than without. We review that decision for an abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Moss, 217 F.3d 426, 430-31 (6th Cir. 2000).
The Act requires that a criminal trial begin within 70 days of a defendant’s indictment. See
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Subject to certain exceptions, if 70 days pass and a trial has not yet started,
the court must dismiss the indictment. Id. §§ 3161(h); 3162(a)(2). Here, the district court found
that 95 days had passed before trial.
Whether to dismiss an indictment with prejudice is left to the court’s discretion. But the
court must consider “among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense;
the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution
on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.” Id. § 3162(a)(2). Here,
to that end, the court explained that “[t]he charged offense is a serious one, the passage of the non-
excludable days is not chargeable to the government, and Pope does not show he has suffered
actual prejudice as a result of the delay.” The court thus dismissed Pope’s indictment without
prejudice.
Now represented by counsel, Pope contends that the dismissal should have been with
prejudice for two reasons. First, he says his drug offense was “run of mill” rather than “serious.”
Our case law says the contrary: we have “categorically labeled drug offenses as serious.” Moss,
217 F.3d at 431. Second, Pope says the district court should not have considered whether the delay
prejudiced him because the Speedy Trial Act does not expressly mention prejudice as a relevant
factor. But whether a defendant is prejudiced bears directly on how reprosecution affects the
-3- No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
“administration of justice,” which the district court must consider. United States v. Robinson, 389
F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2004). And here the district court reasoned that the delay in Pope’s trial
would not hinder his defense, so dismissal without prejudice was appropriate. See United States
v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 339 (1988). That decision was not an abuse of discretion.
B.
Pope argues that he waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel unknowingly. We
review the validity of his waiver de novo. United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590, 601 (6th Cir.
2022). To ensure that a defendant’s waiver was knowing, a district court “must ask the defendant
a series of questions drawn from, or substantially similar to the model inquiry set forth” in the
Bench Book for United States District Judges. United States v. Heard, 762 F.3d 538, 543 (6th Cir.
2014). That means a judge should address the defendant’s familiarity with the law, the nature of
the charges against him, and the dangers of self-representation, and then should admonish the
defendant that he should not try to represent himself. See United States v. Bankston, 820 F.3d 215,
224 (6th Cir. 2016).
Here, the district court addressed all these points on at least three occasions. At Pope’s
preliminary hearing, the court discussed the seriousness of the charges (and potential penalties)
that Pope faced, the difficulties of representing himself in federal court, and the representation that
a public defender was prepared to provide to him. The court also told Pope that it had “never seen
an individual who was better off not having an attorney than having an attorney” and that
representing himself would be a “bad move.” The court repeated similar warnings at Pope’s
arraignment and again at a pretrial conference. Each time, Pope acknowledged the risks and clearly
stated that he wanted to represent himself anyway. The record makes plain that his waiver was
knowing. See Heard, 762 F.3d at 543.
-4- No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
C.
Pope argues that Noblet stopped his vehicle without probable cause under the Fourth
Amendment. An officer may stop a vehicle when its driver commits a traffic violation—no matter
how minor—in the officer’s presence. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996). The
parties agree that a driver violates Ohio law when his car crosses over a lane’s edge. See Ohio
Rev. Code § 4511.33. Pope disputes only the district court’s factual finding that his vehicle indeed
crossed the lane’s edge, which we review for clear error. See United States v. Gilbert, 952 F.3d
759, 762 (6th Cir. 2020). Here, the district court had ample evidence—including both Noblet’s
testimony and his dash-camera footage—to conclude that Pope’s car had left its lane. Noblet had
probable cause for the stop.
D.
Pope argues that insufficient evidence supported his conviction. We ask if, “after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443
U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Here, the only element at issue is whether Pope possessed the methamphetamine. As
described above, the jury heard testimony that officers had found the methamphetamine along the
path of Pope’s flight minutes after Noblet felt a bag containing a crushed, gravel-like substance in
Pope’s groin area. That was evidence enough for a rational jury to find that Pope had possessed
the bag. See United States v. Burris, 999 F.3d 973, 975 (6th Cir. 2021).
E.
Finally, Pope argues that the district court should have instructed the jury that it could have
convicted him of the lesser offense of simple possession, 21 U.S.C. § 844, rather than possession
-5- No. 24-3118, United States v. Pope
with intent to distribute. But the evidence at trial showed that Pope possessed some 446 grams of
methamphetamine—more than 2,000 doses for a typical user—along with a digital scale coated
with white residue. Moreover, Pope himself testified that he used no drugs other than marijuana.
All the evidence at trial, therefore, showed that Pope possessed the drugs for distribution, not for
his own use. Pope thus had no “countervailing evidence” that would allow a jury to find that he
lacked intent to distribute. United States v. Jordan, 100 F.4th 714, 725 (6th Cir. 2024). The district
court properly denied this instruction.
* * *
The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
-6-