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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 20-10225 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00123-TFM-B-6
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EDDIE LEE PADGETT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama ________________________
(March 25, 2021)
Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: USCA11 Case: 20-10225 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 2 of 16
After a jury trial, Eddie Padgett was convicted of drug-trafficking offenses
involving cocaine and cocaine base and sentenced to serve a total of 240 months in
prison. He challenges his convictions and sentence on appeal. As to his convictions,
he maintains that (1) the district court abused its discretion by failing to exclude
evidence of a shooting under Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid.; (2) the evidence at trial
materially varied from what was alleged in the indictment as to Count 10, one of the
substantive drug offenses; and (3) insufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding
of the quantity of drugs he was responsible for in the conspiracy. With regard to his
sentence, he contends that the court erred in failing to apply guideline reductions for
acceptance of responsibility and a mitigating role in the offense. After careful
review, we affirm in all respects.
I.
In May 2019, a federal grand jury returned a 42-count superseding indictment
charging Padgett and five others with various criminal offenses. Padgett was
charged with (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five
kilograms of cocaine and more than 280 grams of cocaine base (“crack” cocaine)
“[f]rom in or about early 2018, continuing through on or about April 23, 2019,” in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and punishable by § 841(b)(1)(A) (Count 1); and
(2) three counts of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, in violation of
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21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and punishable by § 841(b)(1)(B), on May 17, 2018, May 31,
2018, and June 7, 2018, respectively (Counts 10, 11, 12).
Padgett’s case proceeded to trial in October 2019. The trial evidence
established the following. In early 2017, not long after his release from prison on
drug charges, Kendrick Patrick began selling cocaine, crack cocaine, and other drugs
from the home he shared with his wife and children. Around the same time, Padgett
and his brother moved in with Patrick, and they helped sell drugs for Patrick and did
other work around the house. As Patrick’s “right-hand man,” Padgett sold crack
cocaine for him on a “daily basis,” occasionally accompanied him on trips to his
suppliers, and “was in charge when [Patrick] wasn’t around.” A confidential
informant conducted controlled buys of crack cocaine from Padgett on Patrick’s
behalf on May 24, May 31, and June 7 of 2018. Patrick estimated that he bought
three to four ounces of cocaine per week from his suppliers and that he cooked half
that amount into crack cocaine.
The jury also heard evidence of a shooting and murder outside Patrick’s home
on April 29, 2019. On that date, a man named Skylar Williams, who was known to
have robbed others for drugs, including Patrick, showed up at Patrick’s home
apparently intending to rob him. Padgett handed a gun to Patrick, who shot
Williams. Patrick gave the gun back to Padgett, and Padgett fired at Williams’s
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companion as she drove away. Padgett then fired multiple shots into Williams’ body
before putting the body into the trunk of a car and taking it to another location.
Both before and at trial, Padgett moved to prohibit the government from
offering evidence about the April 29 shooting incident. The district court admitted
the evidence, finding that it was probative of Padgett’s involvement in the drug
conspiracy. The court later instructed the jury that Padgett was “on trial only for the
specific crimes charged in the indictment” and that it could “only consider [the
shooting evidence] in connection with count one.”
At the close of the government’s case in chief, Padgett moved for a judgment
of acquittal on two grounds: first, that the evidence was insufficient to prove his
agreement to the conspiracy charged in Count 1; and second, that no evidence
showed that he engaged in a drug transaction on May 17, 2018, as charged in Count
10. The government responded that the evidence presented at trial showed that the
drug deal “actually occurred on or about the 24th, as opposed to the 17th,” which
was “reasonably near the date charged.”
The district court denied the acquittal motion, stating that it would “instruct
the jury about on or about” and that there was sufficient evidence of a conspiracy.
The court later instructed the jury that “[t]he government doesn’t have to prove that
the crime occurred on the exact date listed in the indictment. The government only
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has to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed on a date
reasonably close to the date alleged.”
The jury returned a guilty verdict as to each count. As to Count 1, the jury
found that Padgett had conspired to possess with intent to distribute over five
kilograms of cocaine and over 280 grams of crack cocaine.
II.
The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) recommended that Padgett was
responsible for 5.07 kilograms of powder cocaine and 5.07 kilograms of crack
cocaine, resulting in a base offense level of 34. Due to Padgett’s possession of a
firearm and his use of violence, the offense level was increased to 38. Combined
with a criminal-history category of I, this resulted in a recommended guideline range
of 235 to 293 months of imprisonment.
Padgett objected to multiple aspects of the PSR, including the failure to apply
reductions for acceptance of responsibility and for being a minimal participant in the
conspiracy. With regard to acceptance of responsibility, he contended that
exercising his right to trial did not necessarily prevent him from receiving the
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment and that his defense focused on the quantity
of drugs and extent of involvement in the conspiracy.
The district court overruled Padgett’s objections. The court found that Padgett
had not accepted responsibility because he put the government to its burden of proof
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at trial on the conspiracy count. The court also ruled that he was neither a minor nor
minimal participant as he “had substantial dealings in this organization” and had
“participated in a killing to protect the organization and an attempted coverup of the
organization’s activities.” Ultimately, the district court sentenced Padgett to a total
prison term of 240 months. Padgett now appeals.
III.
We begin with Padgett’s challenges to his convictions. Padgett asserts that
(1) the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of a violent crime
with little probative value to the drug charges, (2) the trial evidence materially varied
from what was alleged in the superseding indictment as to Count 10, and (3) the
evidence was insufficient to the support the jury’s drug-quantity findings.
A.
Padgett first argues that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence of the April 29, 2019, shooting under Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid. We review
the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Barsoum, 763 F.3d 1321, 1338 (11th Cir. 2014).
Evidence of other bad acts may be admissible as either “intrinsic” or
“extrinsic” to the charged offenses. Evidence is considered “intrinsic” “if it is (1) an
uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions
as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or
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(3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.”
United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks
omitted). Evidence of uncharged conduct that does not fall within these categories
is considered “extrinsic” and is governed by Rule 404(b), Fed. R. Evid. Id.
“All admissible evidence, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, must be weighed
against Rule 403 prejudice.” Id. “[T]he district court must find that the probative
value of the proffered evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice
and that it meets the other requirements of Rule 403.” United States v. Ford, 784
F.3d 1386, 1392–93 (11th Cir. 2015). “[U]nfair prejudice,” the Supreme Court has
advised, “speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense
charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
“Exclusion under Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which the district court
should invoke sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of admissibility.”
Troya, 733 F.3d at 1132 (quotation marks omitted). In reviewing a district court’s
Rule 403 ruling, “we look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its admission,
maximizing its probative value and minimizing its undue prejudicial impact.”
United States v. Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 897 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks
omitted). Nevertheless, there are limits “regarding the quality and quantity of
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evidence that may be introduced,” and we must balance “the degrees of probative
value that a piece of evidence has and its prejudicial effect.” Id.
We have affirmed the admission of uncharged violent conduct in drug-
conspiracy cases, over Rule 403 challenges, where the evidence was probative of the
conduct of the conspiracy and the defendant’s role in the conspiracy. In United
States v. Ross, for example, we upheld the admission of evidence of three violent
acts—a bombing, a murder, and another shooting—because “these acts were
intertwined with the drug conspiracy and probative of Appellant’s role in the
conspiracy” and were not unfairly prejudicial. 33 F.3d 1507, 1525 & n.31 (11th Cir.
1994) (noting that the violent acts “were committed to protect the [conspiracy] and
to advance its drug sales”). Likewise, in Troya, we concluded that evidence of a
shooting was admissible as intrinsic evidence of the charged drug conspiracy
because it “was done to protect the Appellants’ extensive drug operation.” 733 F.3d
at 1132. Citing our long-standing recognition that “[g]uns and violence go hand-in-
hand with illegal drug operations,” we held that the shooting’s “admissibility was
[not] outweighed by Rule 403 prejudice,” as it was probative of “the underpinnings
of the drug trafficking ring, and the lengths to which Appellants would go to protect
it.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence
of the shooting and murder of Williams at Padgett’s trial. As in Ross, the evidence
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of the shooting was “intertwined with the drug conspiracy and probative of
[Padgett’s] role in the conspiracy.” 33 F.3d at 1525 & n.31. The shooting occurred
in response to an apparent attempted drug robbery at the location where the
conspiracy operated, and the evidence showed that Padgett was armed and willing
to defend the conspiracy.1 See id.; Troya, 733 F.3d at 1132. The evidence was
therefore probative of the contested issue of his participation in the conspiracy, and
its “admissibility was [not] outweighed by Rule 403 prejudice.” Troya, 733 F.3d at
1132 (“Guns and violence go hand-in-hand with illegal drug operations.”).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s ruling on this issue.
B.
Padgett contends that there was a material variance as to Count 10 between
the allegations in the superseding indictment and the facts established as trial.
The allegations of the indictment and the proof at trial must correspond so that
a defendant is properly notified of the charges to defend against and is protected
against the possibility of prosecution for the same offense. United States v. Reed,
887 F.2d 1398, 1403 (11th Cir. 1989). An impermissible variance occurs “when the
evidence at trial establishes facts materially different from those alleged in the
indictment.” United States v. Lander, 668 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2012)
1 Because the indictment alleged that the conspiracy ended “on or about” April 23, 2019, there was some wiggle room as to the end date of the conspiracy and the jury reasonably could have concluded that the April 29, 2019, shooting was during and in relation to the conspiracy. 9 USCA11 Case: 20-10225 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 10 of 16
(quotation marks omitted). Even if a material variance happens, to obtain reversal,
the defendant must establish that he suffered “substantial prejudice as a result,”
which ordinarily means showing that “the proof at trial differed so greatly from the
charges that appellant was unfairly surprised and was unable to prepare an adequate
defense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
An allegation that an offense occurred “on or about” a certain date is sufficient
to put the defendant “on notice that the charge is not limited to the specific date or
dates set out in the indictment.” Reed, 887 F.2d at 1403. So no material variance
happens when the trial evidence establishes a date “reasonably near the specified
date.” Id.; United States v. Champion, 813 F.2d 1154, 1168 (11th Cir. 1987).
“Ordinarily, a variance between the date alleged and the date proved will not trigger
reversal as long as the date proved falls within the statute of limitations and before
the return of the indictment.” Reed, 887 F.2d at 1403.
Here, Padgett has not established a material variance or resulting substantial
prejudice. Counts 10, 11, and 12 of the superseding indictment alleged that Padgett
possessed with intent to distribute crack cocaine “on or about” May 17, May 31, and
June 7 of 2018, respectively, while the trial evidence showed that Padgett conducted
sales of crack cocaine on May 24, May 31, and June 7 of 2018. Although the
indictment and the trial evidence differed on the date of the first sale, May 24 was
still near enough to what had been alleged that little risk of unfair surprise existed.
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See Reed, 887 F.2d at 1403 (affirming despite a one-month variance between the
indictment’s allegations and the trial evidence). Nor has Padgett made any showing
that he was unable to prepare an adequate defense. As it had alleged in the
indictment, the government proved that Padgett was personally involved in three
drug sales in a period of less than one month, in furtherance of the conspiracy
charged in Count 1. Although it appears that another drug sale not involving Padgett
occurred on May 17, which defense counsel highlighted at trial, defense counsel
expressed no surprise at the evidence regarding the May 24 sale, which was relevant
to the contested issue of Padgett’s participation in the conspiracy. Because there
was no “unfair surprise” even if a variance occurred, we affirm the district court’s
denial of a judgment of acquittal on this ground.
C.
As a final challenge to his convictions, Padgett contends that the jury’s drug-
quantity findings of more than five kilograms of cocaine and more than 280 grams
of crack cocaine were not supported by sufficient evidence. Either finding was
sufficient to raise the statutory minimum to ten years and the statutory maximum to
life imprisonment for the conspiracy count. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A); United
States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1269 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Because § 841(b)(1)(A) .
. . impose[s] a mandatory minimum, the drug quantities in th[at] subsection[] are
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elements of the offense . . . and must be charged in the indictment and submitted to
a jury.”).
“Ordinarily, we review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a
conviction, viewing the evidence and taking all reasonable inferences in favor of the
jury’s verdict.” United States v. Fries, 725 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013). But
where, as here, a defendant raises specific challenges to the sufficiency of the
evidence in the district court, but not the particular challenge he tries to raise on
appeal, the defendant has a “heavier burden” as to the unpreserved challenge: “we
will reverse the conviction only where doing so is necessary to prevent a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Batson,
818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016).2 To meet that burden, the defendant must show
“that the record is devoid of evidence of an essential element of the crime or that the
evidence on a key element of the offense is so tenuous that a conviction would be
shocking.” Fries, 725 F.3d at 1291.
Here, Padgett has not met his burden with regard to the drug-quantity
sufficiency challenge, which he did not raise below. The jury heard evidence that
beginning in early 2017, Patrick began buying three ounces of cocaine per week,
2 Although we occasionally describe this review as for “plain error,” see United States v. Batson, 818 F.3d 651, 664 (11th Cir. 2016), we explained in Fries that the standard we apply to preserved sufficiency challenges “is better stated as requiring that we uphold the conviction unless to do so would work a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” 725 F.3d at 1291 n.5. 12 USCA11 Case: 20-10225 Date Filed: 03/25/2021 Page: 13 of 16
half of which he cooked into crack cocaine, and that Padgett began living with him
around the same time and sold drugs for him on a “daily basis” as his “right-hand
man” who was in charge when Patrick was not around. In addition, there was
evidence that Padgett conducted three specific drugs sales in May and June of 2018
and that he helped protect the conspiracy by force in April 2019. Given the length
and extent of Padgett’s involvement in the conspiracy, combined with the weekly
amount of cocaine Patrick received from his supplier, the evidence was not “so
tenuous” that the jury’s drug quantity finding was “shocking.” See Fries, 725 F.3d
at 1291.
Based on the trial evidence, the jury reasonably could have found that the
conspiracy in which Padgett was substantially involved lasted for more than 59
weeks and involved three ounces of cocaine per week, which would have been
enough to put the quantity of cocaine above five kilograms (three ounces per week
for 59 weeks equals 177 ounces, which is just over five kilograms). Moreover, the
jury heard from Patrick that he converted half the cocaine to crack cocaine, which
would mean an amount of crack cocaine well in excess of 280 grams. Accordingly,
Padgett has not shown that reversing the jury’s drug-quantity findings “is necessary
to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Fries, 725 F.3d at 1291.
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IV.
Finally, we consider Padgett’s sentencing challenges to the denial of
reductions for (1) acceptance of responsibility and (2) a mitigating role in the
offense. We address each in turn.
“We review a district court’s determination of a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility for clear error.” United States v. Andres, 960 F.3d 1310, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2020). To obtain the two-level guideline reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, the defendant must “clearly demonstrate[] acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a).
The commentary to § 3E1.1 explains that this reduction “is not intended to
apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by
denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits
guilt and expresses remorse.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. In “rare situations” a
defendant who proceeds to trial may clearly demonstrate acceptance of
responsibility, such as “where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues
that do not relate to factual guilt.” Id. But “[a] defendant who fails to accept
responsibility for all of the crimes he has committed and with which he has been
charged is entitled to nothing under § 3E1.1.” United States v. Thomas, 242 F.3d
1028, 1034 (11th Cir. 2001).
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Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying Padgett a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility. While Padgett conceded at trial that he was guilty of
two of the four offenses, he contested his factual guilt on the other two offenses,
including “whether he [was] a participant” in the conspiracy. Thus, this is not an
occasion where a defendant went to trial to preserve an issue aside from his factual
guilt. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. And his partial acceptance of responsibility
was insufficient to warrant this adjustment. See Thomas, 242 F.3d at 1034. The
district court did not clearly err.
We review the denial of a role reduction for clear error. United States v.
Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016). “Clear error review is
deferential, and we will not disturb a district court’s findings unless we are left with
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted). It will rarely be clear error when the court makes a “choice between
two permissible views of the evidence as to the defendant’s role in the offense.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). The defendant must prove his mitigating role in the
offense by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
A defendant who has a mitigating role in an offense may receive a decrease
in his offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The guidelines direct courts to apply a
two-level decrease for a “minor participant,” a four-level decrease for a “minimal
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participant,” and a three-level decrease for someone in between a minor and minimal
participant. Id. A minor participant is someone “who is less culpable than most
other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as
minimal,” while minimal participants are “plainly among the least culpable of those
involved in the conduct of a group.” Id., cmt. nn.4 & 5. The determination of
whether to apply a mitigating-role adjustment “is heavily dependent upon the facts
of the particular case.” Id., cmt. n.3(C).
Here, the district court’s finding that Padgett was not a minor or minimal
participant was amply supported by the record. While Patrick plainly was the leader
of the conspiracy, the trial evidence reflects that Padgett was his “right-hand man”
and in charge when Patrick was not around, that he regularly sold drugs for the
conspiracy and used violent force to protect it, and that he was more culpable than
Patrick’s wife and Padgett’s brother, two other participants in the conspiracy. In
light of these facts, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that the district
court made a mistake in concluding that Padgett’s role in the conspiracy was neither
minimal nor minor. Thus, we affirm the denial of a role reduction.
V.
In sum, we affirm Padgett’s drug convictions and his total prison sentence of
240 months.
AFFIRMED.