United States v. Earl Gregg

803 F.2d 568, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 32131
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
DecidedOctober 14, 1986
Docket85-2877
StatusPublished
Cited by65 cases

This text of 803 F.2d 568 (United States v. Earl Gregg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Earl Gregg, 803 F.2d 568, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 32131 (10th Cir. 1986).

Opinion

WESLEY E. BROWN, Senior District Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Gregg was convicted of robbing the First National Bank of Tuttle, Oklahoma, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2113(a) and (b), and possession of a firearm, previously shipped in interstate commerce, after he had been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Appendix, Sec. 1202(a). Gregg was sentenced to a 25 year term and the assessment of $10,050 in fines on Count I, the bank robbery, and to a term of 15 years and a $25,000 fine on the firearm conviction. The sentence on the firearm possession was specially imposed upon the defendant as one who had had three previous felony convictions, so that he is not eligible for parole on that count. Defendant was further ordered to make restitution in the sum of $133,000, to cover the loss of the money stolen from the bank.

In this appeal, the defendant claims that the government improperly amended the indictment by unilaterally filing a separate document alleging that defendant had three prior felony convictions, that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the firearm count because the evidence on that count was insufficient, and that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to sever Counts I and II for trial.

For the reasons hereinafter set out, we affirm the convictions.

in this case, Count I of the Indictment, which was filed on August 21, 1985, charged that on May 20, 1985, at Tuttle, Oklahoma, the defendant did by force, violence and intimidation, take from Richard Dibler and Janie Book, a sum of money belonging to the First National Bank of Tuttle, Oklahoma, a federally insured bank, and that in so doing, defendant put the lives of Dibler and Book in jeopardy by the use of a dangerous weapon, that is, a revolver, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2113(a) and 2113(d).

Count II of the Indictment charged that on May 20, 1985, at Tuttle, Oklahoma, defendant Gregg, having been previously convicted of a felony, possessed a firearm, a revolver, which had previously been shipped in interstate commerce, all in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1202(a)(1) Appendix.

After the Indictment was filed, and on September 24, 1985, the government filed an “Information Charging Prior Offenses” which related to the prior conviction of a felony, as alleged in Count II, above. In this document, the government alleged that defendant, on June 19, 1978, in the District of Kansas, was convicted of three bank robberies, to-wit: robbery of the Farmers’ State Bank of Blue Mound, Kansas, on October 17, 1977; robbery of the State Bank of Leon, Kansas on December 16, 1977; and robbery of the First National Bank of Attica, Kansas, on January 26, 1978. The government then noted the sentencing provisions of Sec. 1202(a):

“Wherefore, the plaintiff gives notice under Title 18, United States Code, Section 1202(a) Appendix that the defendant has three (3) prior felony convictions for robbery and the maximum penalty for said offense is therefore not more than *570 Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,-000.00) and imprisoned not less than fifteen (15) years, and such sentence shall not be suspended nor shall the defendant be eligible for parole.”

Defendant contends that the “Information Charging Prior Offenses” constituted an unlawful amendment of the indictment, since Count II only alleged that he possessed a firearm after being convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, a charge carrying a maximum sentence of two years. Defendant claims that the alleged “amendment” of the indictment charged a different crime which was punishable by a minimum prison term of 15 years, without parole.

In 1984 Congress amended the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Section 1202(a) Appendix, Pub.L. 98-473, Sec. 1802, the “Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984” by adding to that section, the following provision:

“In the case of a person who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce ... any firearm and who has three previous convictions by any court ... for robbery or burglary, or both, such person shall be fined not more than $25,000 and imprisoned not less than fifteen years, and, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court shall not suspend the sentence of, or grant a probationary sentence to, such person with respect to the conviction under this subsection, and such person shall not be eligible for parole with respect to the sentence imposed under this subsection.”

This enhanced penalty is designed to designate additional punishment for armed, repeating, criminals. This provision did not create any new federal crime — it only increased the penalty for an already existing federal offense described in Sec. 1202— that crime being the possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony. Since the new provisions do not prescribe any specific method of alleging the prior convictions in order to pursue the enhanced penalty, the Department of Justice has proceeded in the manner used in the case of dangerous special drug offenders, where the statute does set out the specific means for establishing the prior convictions. Thus, Title 21 U.S.C. Sec. 851 provides:

“Sec. 851. Proceedings to establish pri- or convictions.
Information filed by United States Attorney
(a)(1) No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States Attorney files an information with the court ... stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. Upon a showing by the United States Attorney that facts regarding prior convictions could not with due diligence be obtained prior to trial or before entry of plea of guilty, the court may postpone the trial or the taking of the plea of guilty for a reasonable period for the purpose of obtaining such facts. Clerical mistakes in the information may be amended at any time prior to the pronouncement of sentence.”

The Information filed in this case merely gave notice to the defendant and the court that the government was seeking the enhanced penalty provided by the statute. The defendant did not deny the fact of the three prior convictions for bank robbery, and the question of these convictions was only an issue for the court at the time of sentencing. Indeed, if all of defendant’s prior convictions had been set out in the indictment, this would have been prejudicial to the defendant.

The procedure used by government in this instance in seeking the enhanced penalty was appropriate and without error. The defendant’s claim that he is entitled to remand for resentencing is without merit.

Defendant next complains that the evidence of defendant’s possession of a firearm which had been transported in interstate commerce was insufficient to support his conviction on Count II of the indictment.

*571 The only elements necessary to prove the violation set out in Section 1202(a) Appendix, are the possession of a firearm by the defendant; proof that the firearm had moved in or affected interstate commerce; and proof of the fact that defendant had a prior felony conviction.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
803 F.2d 568, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 32131, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-earl-gregg-ca10-1986.