United States v. Duwanna M. Mason
Opinion
42 F.3d 1392
NOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Duwanna M. MASON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 93-3756.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 22, 1994.
Decided Nov. 23, 1994.1
Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and MANION, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Duwanna M. Mason entered a conditional plea of guilty to mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1341, preserving her right to appeal the district court's denial of her motion to suppress certain evidence seized from her home.2 Defendant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five months, followed by five months of work release, and three years of supervised release.
Defendant, who worked as a secretary at a hospital, spent several years using patients' names and personal history information to obtain fraudulent credit cards and other documents, all of which were mailed to defendant at her home. An investigation by law enforcement personnel uncovered the scheme, and the defendant was interviewed. Even after this confrontation, however, defendant continued using fraudulently obtained credit cards, and applying for additional credit cards. Subsequently, an arrest warrant and search warrant were issued. Defendant argues that the search warrant was overbroad. The warrant permits the agents to search for "Any and all documents and records relating in any way to" seven of the known victims.3
The fourth amendment "categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one 'particularly describing the ... things to be seized'." Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 1016, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987), quoting U.S. Constitution amend. IV. On review, we will reverse only for clear error. United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714 (7th Cir.1994).
The fact that the things to be seized are papers of a generic or generally inoffensive class, i.e., are not incriminating on their face, is the result of the nature of the illegal activity--not an unconstitutionally overbroad warrant. See Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir.1992). "How detailed the warrant must be follows directly from the nature of the items [for which] there is probably cause to seize...." United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1110 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 240 (1987). It is unavoidable that "some innocuous documents will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized." Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 2737, 2749 n. 11, 49 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976).4 In the present case, we conclude that the "generic description adequately define[d] the officers' authority." United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d at 1110.
Once the agents were entitled to be in the house pursuant to the valid search warrant looking for fraudulent credit-related documents or materials relating to the known victims, the doctrine of "plain view" permits the agents to seize otherwise protected documents relating to fraud. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990); Hessel v. O'Hearn, 977 F.2d at 302. Here, the officers only took materials which were clearly, on their face, false identification documents and credit forms.5
In view of the type of crime, the mass of details uncovered in investigation carried out over a three-year period, and the quantity of credit-related materials stocked in defendant's bedroom, the district court was correct in rejecting her argument that the items seized were "entirely consistent with innocent behavior." The agents clearly had "probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity." United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152, 157 (7th Cir.1987).
Defendant points out that the affidavit attached to the application for a search warrant was never attached to the actual search warrant.6 However, the affiant was the agent who executed the search warrant. Those involved, therefore, were aware of every detail in the affidavit and thus the scope of and limitations of the search. See United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112, 1116 (2d Cir.1993).
Moreover, evidence seized pursuant to a defective search warrant should not be excluded where the officers conducting the search acted in "objectively reasonable reliance" on the warrant and the warrant was issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. United States v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 987-88, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3427-28, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984).
We conclude that the requirements of the fourth amendment were met. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
42 F.3d 1392 (United States v. Duwanna M. Mason) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.