United States v. Dustin Truett

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: February 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-5162
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0114n.06

Case No. 24-5162

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

FILED Feb 27, 2025 ) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) ON APPEAL FROM THE v. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DUSTIN L. TRUETT, ) DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE Defendant-Appellant. ) ) OPINION

Before: COLE, WHITE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

DAVIS, Circuit Judge. In December 2020, law enforcement officers executed two search

warrants at Dustin Truett’s residence. While executing the first warrant, which permitted them to

look for evidence tied to a nearby suspected burglary, officers observed firearms and suspected

illicit drugs in plain view. Based on this evidence and the officers’ knowledge that Truett had a

prior felony conviction, the officers obtained the second search warrant. During the second search,

officers seized a large amount of cash, several firearms and related accessories, ammunition, a

variety of drugs, and assorted other items. A grand jury charged Truett with drug trafficking and

firearms-related offenses. Truett moved to suppress evidence seized during the execution of both

search warrants and requested a Franks hearing as to the first warrant, pursuant to Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). The district court denied each of these requests, and Truett

subsequently pleaded guilty to all three counts of the indictment. In his guilty plea, Truett reserved No. 24-5162, United States v. Truett

the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress and request for a Franks hearing. Truett

filed this timely appeal. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.

I.

A. Factual Background

On December 10, 2020, law enforcement officers from the Hickman County Sheriff’s

Office (“Sheriff’s Office”) executed a search warrant (“the first search warrant”) at Truett’s home

based on information they had received and evidentiary leads they had developed during their

investigation of a nearby suspected burglary. The day before, Hickman County resident P.P. had

recognized an antique oil lamp on Facebook Marketplace that was “identical” to a lamp in her

deceased parents’ home. A person named Travis Hutchinson had posted the lamp for sale for

$300. P.P., who had inherited her parents’ house after they died, feared that someone had broken

into the now-unoccupied home and stolen the lamp.

The next morning, P.P. contacted the Sheriff’s Office, explained her suspicions, and asked

for someone to accompany her to her deceased parents’ house. Sergeant Jonathan Aydelott met

P.P. at the house, where P.P. found the “rare” antique oil lamp abandoned in the front yard, with

an angel figurine missing. P.P. identified the lamp as the same antique lamp she knew from her

parents’ home and the one she saw on Facebook Marketplace. As P.P. and Aydelott entered the

parents’ house, they discovered a broken window, and P.P. identified additional items missing

from the house. Aydelott also noted a severed cord where the antique lamp once hung. Outside

the home, Aydelott noticed a trail leading from the broken window and “through the woods that

led in the direction of” Truett’s home, which was about 150 yards away.1

1 Truett resided at 7419 Highway 230 East Lyles, Hickman County, Tennessee, 37098.

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Aydelott contacted Detective Scott Jones, who began investigating the suspected burglary.

Jones and others from the Sheriff’s Office had executed warrants at Truett’s home in February and

June 2020, during which they captured body camera footage of the home’s interior. When Jones

viewed Hutchinson’s Facebook Marketplace photo of the lamp, he noticed that the background in

the photo looked like Truett’s living room, where he had executed the previous warrants. Jones

then reviewed body camera footage from the June search and confirmed the resemblance between

the Facebook Marketplace photo and the footage of Truett’s living room; he noted that the door,

the flooring, a grey stool, and a brown coat in the Facebook photo matched the same items in the

body camera footage. Detective Daniel Roberts, who was also present during the June 2020

search, agreed.

The Sheriff’s Office knew that Hutchinson was an associate of Truett’s who was at Truett’s

house during the June 2020 search. Jones viewed Hutchinson’s profile picture linked to the

Facebook Marketplace posting and identified him as the same Travis Hutchinson he had

encountered at Truett’s home the preceding June.

The First Search Warrant. Detective Jones described his search of P.P.’s property and the

details discussed above in an affidavit accompanying a warrant request. Jones sought the warrant

to search Truett’s home “to confirm the origin of the photograph, as well as to find evidence linking

Travis Hutchinson to the Truett residence and any evidence of ownership or control over the

premises.” (R. 21-1, PageID 79). That same day, a magistrate judge granted the warrant, allowing

officers to search Truett’s house for “any evidence of identity or ownership of the premises,”

“visual corroboration” of the Facebook photo’s background, “any evidence that links Travis

Hutchinson to the premises,” and “any evidence or items which would be used to conceal the

forgoing or prevent its discovery.” (R. 21-1, PageID 75). When the detectives arrived at Truett’s

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house to execute the warrant, they saw firearms in a truck parked behind the house. Inside the

house, they took additional photos to confirm that the living room matched the Facebook photo.

The detectives also observed drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearms in plain view.

The Second Search Warrant. Detective Brady Cartwright sought another search warrant

that same night (“the second search warrant”) to recover the firearms and drugs seen in plain view

at Truett’s home, as well as items still missing from P.P.’s property.2 Relevant here, during the

second search, detectives seized the following evidence: a loaded AR-15 pistol, a 12-gauge

shotgun, two .22 caliber bolt action rifles, a 20-gauge bolt action shotgun, a loaded .17 caliber rifle

with a scope, various ammunition, over 300 grams of methamphetamine, over 1,600 grams of

marijuana, oxycodone pills, drug paraphernalia, and around $34,000 in U.S. currency.

B. Procedural Background

In September 2021, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Truett with:

possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing a

detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a); possession of a firearm

in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); and possession of a

firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1).3 Truett moved to suppress

evidence seized from both search warrants and requested a Franks hearing on the first warrant.

The district court denied Truett’s motions in full. Truett subsequently pleaded guilty to all three

counts of the indictment, and the district court sentenced him to 180 months’ imprisonment. Truett

2 The second search warrant noted that P.P.’s parents’ residence was also missing an antique cedarwood chest of drawers, glass ceiling fixtures, the porcelain figurine from the lamp, two metal antique milk cans, a radio flyer wagon, and a recliner chair, valued in total at around $1,600. 3 A Superseding Indictment followed in August 2022, but the charges remained the same.

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reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motions to suppress. He filed this

timely appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review the district court’s legal conclusions for denying a motion to suppress de novo

and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Marsh, 95 F.4th 464, 468 (6th Cir. 2024)

(citing United States v. May-Shaw, 955 F.3d 563, 566 (6th Cir. 2020)). And we evaluate a district

court’s denial of a Franks hearing under the same standard. United States v. Bateman, 945 F.3d

997, 1007–08 (6th Cir. 2019).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Franks Hearing

Truett argues that the district court erred by denying him a Franks hearing. But Truett

makes no effort to develop this argument on appeal, rendering it forfeited. See, e.g., Buetenmiller

v. Macomb Cnty. Jail, 53 F.4th 939, 946 (6th Cir. 2022). And even if not forfeited, the argument

has no merit.

In a Franks hearing, a court determines whether a law enforcement officer made any

deliberately false statement(s) or statement(s) in reckless disregard of the truth to support a warrant

request, and if so, whether the warrant still contained sufficient information to support a finding

of probable cause without the offending statement(s). United States v. Crawford, 943 F.3d 297,

309 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Franks, 438 U.S. at 171). The decision to grant an evidentiary hearing

is within the “sound discretion of the district court.” Bateman, 945 F.3d at 1008 (quoting United

States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 348 (6th Cir. 2017)). A defendant requesting a Franks hearing

must: “‘1) make[] a substantial preliminary showing that the affiant knowingly and intentionally,

or with reckless disregard for the truth, included a false statement or material omission in the

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affidavit; and 2) prove[] that the false statement or material omission [was] necessary to the

probable cause finding in the affidavit.’” Id. (quoting Young, 847 F.3d at 348–49) (first two

alterations in original). A defendant’s assertions of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for

the truth must be “accompanied by an offer of proof” that points to “the portion of the warrant

affidavit that is claimed to be false,” and the allegations “should be accompanied by a statement

of supporting reasons.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Acceptable offers of proof typically come in the

form of “[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements of witnesses.” Id.

Truett generally asserts that Jones’s “affidavit contained false statements and/or statements

made with a reckless disregard for the truth” and that “[a]bsent those [false] statements, the

affidavit fails to establish probable cause.” (ECF 11, Appellant Br., Page 4–5). But, in his opening

brief, Truett does not identify which statements from the affidavit were purportedly false. He also

points to no offer of proof that he made in the district court from which we might discern whether

the district court improperly denied him a Franks hearing. Instead, Truett merges his Franks-

hearing argument with his argument that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

evidence resulting from the first search warrant. In doing so, he has woefully underdeveloped any

argument that he deserves a Franks hearing. It is insufficient “‘for a party to mention a possible

argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to . . . put flesh on its bones.’” Buetenmiller,

53 F.4th at 946 (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997)). And we

consider arguments forfeited where “‘[i]ssues [are] adverted to in a perfunctory manner,

unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.’” Id. That is the case here with

respect to Truett’s appeal of the district court’s denial of a Franks hearing.

Even if Truett had not forfeited this argument, his challenge to the district court’s denial of

a Franks hearing still fails. In the district court, Truett specified that Jones’s affidavit statement

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“alleging that a certain photograph was taken in the premises to be searched is false and amounts

to a reckless disregard of the truth.” (R. 19, PageID 43). But the record reveals that Truett made

no offer of proof in the district court to support this assertion. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. Nor did

Truett explain why Jones’s purported false statement was necessary to the probable cause

finding—or stated differently, why the remaining information in the affidavit was insufficient to

support a finding of probable cause. For these reasons, we find no fault in the district court’s

decision to deny a Franks hearing.

B. Motions to Suppress

We, likewise, see no reason to set aside the district court’s denial of Truett’s motions to

suppress.

The Fourth Amendment provides that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Probable cause exists where “the facts

and circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person would be warranted in believing that

an offense had been committed and that evidence thereof would be found on the premises to be

searched.” Peffer v. Stephens, 880 F.3d 256, 263 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Greene v. Reeves, 80

F.3d 1101, 1106 (6th Cir. 1996)). Probable cause does not require certainty or a finding by the

preponderance of the evidence. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235, 238 (1983). Rather, the

issuing magistrate must “simply [] make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all

the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him . . . there is a fair probability that [] evidence

of a crime will be found in a particular place.” Id. at 238. To uphold the adequacy of the search-

warrant affidavit, “[t]here must be a fair probability that the specific place that officers want to

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search will contain the specific things that they are looking for.” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d

441, 447 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV).

While we review the district court’s decision de novo, our review of the initial probable

cause finding is more deferential. See United States v. Tagg, 886 F.3d 579, 586 (6th Cir. 2018).

That is, a judicial officer who issues a warrant “‘should be paid great deference.’” Id. (quoting

Gates, 462 U.S. at 236). Here, we are tasked only with ensuring that the issuing magistrate had a

“substantial basis for . . . concluding that probable cause existed” based on the “totality of the

circumstances.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238–39 (cleaned up). And we will uphold the denial of a

motion to suppress “if the district court’s conclusion can be justified for any reason.” United States

v. Moorehead, 912 F.3d 963, 966 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Pasquarille, 20 F.3d

682, 685 (6th Cir. 1994)).

Truett argues that there was no probable cause to justify the first search warrant, so the

evidence seized from its execution should have been suppressed. And the second search warrant

was unlawful because it relied on evidence obtained from the first warrant. In short, because the

first search was unlawful, evidence seized during the second one should have been suppressed as

fruit of the poisonous tree. Neither of these arguments has merit.

1. First Search Warrant

We agree with the district court that the totality of the circumstances set forth in the

affidavit sufficiently established probable cause. In particular, “P.P.’s positive identification of

the lamp from her parents’ home as the one depicted in Hutchinson’s Facebook post; the trail from

the broken window [through the woods leading in the direction of] Truett’s residence 150 yards

away; and Hutchinson’s known affiliation with Dustin Truett” provided sufficient grounds to

believe that evidence of Tennessee theft of property might be found at Truett’s house. (R. 22,

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PageID 103). These facts provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to find probable cause

and grant the first search warrant.

Resisting this conclusion, Truett argues that the first search warrant affidavit was

inadequate to demonstrate that the searched-for items would “be found in the place to be searched.”

(ECF 11, Appellant Br., Page 6–7). For support, Truett points out that the Sheriff’s Office had

already found and taken possession of the oil lamp before obtaining the warrant. And “[t]here

exist[e]d no information that any other allegedly stolen items” would be at his residence. (ECF

11, Appellant Br., Page 7). Truett also faults the affidavit for failing to include information about

when the Facebook marketplace photo was taken. And he insists that the Facebook Marketplace

listing “was not associated” with Truett or his residence, since it was Hutchinson who made the

posting. (ECF 11, Appellant Br., Page 7).

None of Truett’s arguments undermine the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit. First, the

Sheriff’s Office did not seek the first search warrant to recover the oil lamp itself; Aydelott and

P.P. recovered the lamp in the front yard of her parents’ house. Instead, Jones sought a warrant to

search Truett’s home for:

Visual corroboration of the background depicted in a photograph of a stolen oil lamp posted on Facebook Marketplace, said oil lamp stolen from a residence on Hwy 230 between Coke Circle and Lick Creek Trail4; and any evidence of identity or ownership of the premises to be searched; and any evidence that links Travis Hutchinson to the premises to be searched; and any evidence or items which would be used to conceal the foregoing or prevent its discovery.

(R. 21-1, PageID 77). The officers therefore sought evidence of the oil lamp’s theft, not

the oil lamp itself. And the magistrate granted the warrant on those grounds.

4 Where the language in the warrant specifies “said oil lamp stolen from a residence on Hwy 230 between Coke Circle and Lick Creek Trail,” this phrase appears to modify the language directly preceding it that states “[v]isual corroboration of the background depicted in a photograph of a stolen oil lamp posted on Facebook Marketplace,” rather than describe a distinct item to be seized. (R. 21-1, PageID 79).

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Second, Hutchinson’s Facebook post soliciting buyers for the stolen lamp provided the

officers with a promising lead and established a nexus between Truett’s residence and the evidence

of theft that the officers sought. Jones was able to link the Facebook photograph to Truett’s home

because he recognized the background in the photo from his prior search of the house. See e.g.,

United States v. Rodriguez-Suazo, 346 F.3d 637, 644 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The issuing judge or

magistrate may give considerable weight to the conclusion of experienced law enforcement

officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found [].”) (internal citations omitted);

see also United States v. Couch, 367 F.3d 557, 561 (6th Cir. 2004). Officers were also able to

infer that Hutchinson had access to Truett’s home because they had seen him there during one of

two searches of the residence earlier in the year. Moreover, the broken window, the trail, and the

proximity between Truett’s home and P.P.’s parents’ home strengthened the link between the

property theft and Truett’s home. As such, the warrant established a “connection between the

residence to be searched and the facts of criminal activity that the officer set out in his affidavit.”

C.f., United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744, 747 (6th Cir. 2005).

Third, Truett’s indirect concession that his “known associate” made the Facebook posting

supports rather than detracts from the finding of probable cause in that it corroborates Jones’s

memory of seeing Hutchinson inside Truett’s home. In turn, Hutchinson’s prior access to Truett’s

house made his posting of the antique lamp inside the house more likely. Lastly, Truett does not

explain why the lack of a timeline for the Facebook photo negates probable cause. And any attempt

to invalidate the warrant on staleness grounds would be undermined by the visible trail from the

broken window at P.P.’s parents’ house suggesting that the suspected burglary was relatively

recent. Therefore, the totality of the circumstances provided the magistrate with a substantial basis

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to conclude there was probable cause to believe that Truett’s home would contain evidence of the

burglary.

Good-Faith Exception. Even without a finding of probable cause, the evidence from the

first search warrant would still be admissible under the good-faith exception established in United

States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). Leon’s good-faith exception extends where there is a

“minimally sufficient nexus” “‘between the criminal activity at issue and the place to be

searched.’” United States v. Reed, 993 F.3d 441, 450–51 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.

McCoy, 905 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2018)). That minimally sufficient nexus is evident here, where

P.P. positively identified the stolen lamp; officers independently recognized the photo’s

background as the interior of Truett’s home; and Aydelott observed a trail leading from the site of

the suspected burglary in the direction of Truett’s house. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter,

360 F.3d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (finding sufficient nexus where affidavit described a

“road connecting” marijuana field to nearby home to be searched). Thus, the evidence from the

first search warrant falls under the good-faith exception, and the district court rightly dismissed

Truett’s motion to dismiss.

2. Second Search Warrant

Truett does not challenge the second search warrant on any grounds other than the

purported deficiency of the first warrant. Since the first search warrant was supported by probable

cause, the police officers lawfully observed the contraband at Truett’s house that justified the

second search warrant. As Truett does not challenge the second warrant on any other grounds, the

district court did not err in denying Truett’s motion to suppress.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Truett’s motions to suppress

and request for a Franks hearing.

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