United States v. Durant

16 M.J. 712, 1983 CMR LEXIS 849
CourtUnited States Court of Military Appeals
DecidedJuly 6, 1983
DocketACM 23838
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 16 M.J. 712 (United States v. Durant) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Military Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Durant, 16 M.J. 712, 1983 CMR LEXIS 849 (cma 1983).

Opinion

DECISION

SNYDER, Judge:

Pursuant to his pleas, the accused was convicted by a military judge sitting as a general court-martial of transferring lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and marihuana, in violation of Articles 92 and 134, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 934. His sentence extends to a bad conduct discharge, confine[713]*713ment at hard labor for 18 months, total forfeitures, and reduction to airman basic. He has submitted three assignments of error for our consideration, only one of which merits comment. We affirm.

The accused avers that the convening authority disapproved his application for deferment of his sentence to confinement, Article 57d, U.C.M.J., M.C.M., 1969 (Rev.), para. 88f, without stating the reasons therefor as required by United States v. Brownd, 6 M.J. 338 (C.M.A.1979), as implemented by Air Force Manual 111-1, Military Justice Guide, para. 7-24f and g.

The record indicates that the accused, through counsel, submitted his initial request for deferment of confinement on 2 November 1982. This request was disapproved without comment on 3 November 1982. A second request was submitted on 10 November 1982. The subject of the second request was: “Request for Record, Request for Reconsideration-Application for Deferment of Sentence to Confinement, US v Durant.” This request was signed by detailed and individual defense counsel.

Although the acting staff judge advocate recommended approval of the accused’s second application, the convening authority also disapproved the second application without comment. As alleged by the accused, and properly conceded by the Government, this was error. However, as we have concluded in previous cases, there is no relief which can be granted at this time. United States v. Peck, 10 M.J. 779 (A.F.C.M.R.1981); United States v. Vasquez, 8 M.J. 775 (A.F.C.M.R.1980).

This issue has always contained the paradox of no meaningful relief for a patent error. Even Brownd, after promulgating the rule violated, concluded that no relief could be granted. However, where an Air Force directive implements a decision, the directive should be followed. Additionally, it is at the review level where this matter is best handled.

The convening authority’s second disapproval, as was the first, was forwarded to trial defense counsel. The absence of reasons was apparent on its face, but there was no further response or action by defense counsel. Had defense counsel submitted a clear request for compliance with United States v. Brownd, supra, and AFM 111-1, this matter could have been handled at the review level; also, a record for review of the issue would have been created.

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Related

United States v. Nelson
46 M.J. 764 (Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 1997)
United States v. Edwards
39 M.J. 528 (U S Air Force Court of Military Review, 1994)

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Bluebook (online)
16 M.J. 712, 1983 CMR LEXIS 849, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-durant-cma-1983.