United States v. Duncan

67 F.2d 356, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 4468
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit·Decided October 25, 1933·No. Nos. 5005 and 4931·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

SPARKS, Circuit Judge

(after stating the facts as above).

The only question herein involved is whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the court’s findings to the effect that each appellee during the life of his policy was affected with an impairment of nlind or body which rendered it impossible for him to follow continuously any substantially gainful occupation, and that such impairment was founded upon conditions which rendered it reasonably certain that the impairment would continue throughout the appellee’s life. 43 Stat. 608, § 5, as amended by Act July 3, 1930, § 1, 46 Stat. 991 (38 USCA § 426), and Director’s Regulation 11.

In this discussion we shall first consider the ease of John C. Duncan. He enlisted in the military service of the United States on April 30,1917, and was discharged therefrom on April 16, 1919, on account of physical disability. His policy was in force up to and including May 31, 1919. The complaint alleges that while the insurance was in force, appellee became totally and permanently disabled as a result of amoebic dysentery, stomach trouble from triehiniasis, mucous colitis, pulmonary tuberculosis, neurasthenia, extreme nervous disability, and general disability.

The evidence discloses that while in the service appellee was affected with bowel and stomach trouble for which he was treated many times in the infirmary and hospitals. It was on this account that he was sent home from overseas, and at the time of his discharge he was suffering from dysentery and was in a very weak and nervous condition and walked with considerable difficulty and was compelled to use a cane. Within a week and a half after returning to his home he was under the care of a doctor who has since died, and he remained under his care until 1920. From July 23, 1921, to the date of trial on December 27, 1932, he was admitted [357] under appellant’s order into seven different hospitals a total of fourteen times for examination, observation, and treatment. He has spent one-third to one-half of the time since his discharge from the army in hospitals in many different parts of the United States. He was examined, and in some instances treated, by forty-four government physicians and surgeons, some of whom examined and treated him many times, and he submitted to an operation for hemorrhoids. From the reports of these examinations and treatments the trial court was amply warranted in believing that appellee was affected with all the infirmities mentioned in the complaint, and many more, although of course that evidence does not show that he was so affected during the life of the policy.

Appellee’s physician who examined and treated him in February, 1922, had known him during most of his life, and he stated that his diagnosis showed angina pectoris, pyloric ulcer, and chronic diarrhea. He thought appellee was permanently and totally disabled when he treated him; that he might be able to do a little work at times, but not continuously ; that he had seen him a few times when he thought he was reasonably well except for his myocarditis, that is, he was able to be around and do some work but not continuously, and that his disability was reasonably likely to continue; that he might work for a few hours, or for a day or a week, but he believed that he could not follow a substantially gainful occupation at any time continuously. Another physician on behalf of appellee testified that he examined him in 1919, and found ulcer of the stomach, and advised hospitalization, and he afterwards heard that he was taken to the hospital at Cleveland, Ohio; that he had seen him at irregular intervals during seven or eight years immediately preceding the trial, and his stomach trouble remained about the same, and witness thought it was reasonably likely to continue throughout life; and that he was permanently and totally disabled from following a substantially gainful occupation. This witness was confronted with his own affidavit made in September, 1930, in which he stated that he had treated appellee from time to time since February, 1928, and he was then asked when he first examined him, to which he replied that he first examined and treated him when he advised him to go to the hospital, and he was not sure when that was, but thought it was earlier than 1928. The record discloses that he was first taken to the hospital in Cleveland on July 23, 1921. He was there several times, and his last admission was February 23, 1927, and he was not discharged from there until March 12,1929.

The evidence discloses that appellee attempted to work at various times after his discharge from the service, but it certainly cannot be contended that he worked with any marked degree of continuity, although he was at all times willing and anxious to do so. It is true that a large part of the evidence aside from the medical testimony and the hospital record is furnished by appellee and his family and friends, but this fact would not preclude the trial court from believing them if it deemed their testimony worthy of credit. A perusal of their testimony together with all the other evidence convinces us that there is substantial evidence in support of the court’s findings that on the date of his discharge he was permanently and totally disabled. We are in accord with appellant’s contention that liability on the policy must be for disability existing within the life of the policy, and not for disability arising after its expiration. It is true that appellant’s medical testimony and the reports from its medical officers covering a period beginning July 23, 1921, show a large number of disabilities from which appellee was suffering, and it is not unlikely that some or perhaps many of them arose after the expiration of the policy. However, even if this be conceded, the fact remains that according to substantial testimony appellee was a very sick man from the date of his discharge and has been unable to work at all for any appreciable length of time. Appellee’s claims as to the character of his disabilities at the time of his discharge are sufficiently broad to cover about all the diagnoses that were made. From the reports of those many diagnoses it is hardly probable that any one physician or surgeon who has examined him would say that he is now, or has been, afflicted with all the diseases which the reports show, and in view of this diversity of opinion appellee ought not to be expected to describe his disability with exactness.

The judgment rendered in behalf of appellee John C. Duncan is therefore affirmed.

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United States v. Duncan, 67 F.2d 356, 1933 U.S. App. LEXIS 4468 (7th Cir. 1933).

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