United States v. Duarte

• Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
• Decided: November 19, 1998
• Docket: 97-1248
• Status: Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion

                 United States Court of Appeals

                     For the First Circuit


No. 97-1248



                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,



                            Appellee,



                                v.



                         BENJAMIN DUARTE,



                      Defendant, Appellant.


APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



                FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS



            [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]


Before



                       Selya, Circuit Judge,

          Coffin and Campbell, Senior Circuit Judges.


Robert J. Iacovelli for appellant.

     Alexandra Leake, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, and Sheila W. Sawyer,

Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief for appellee.


November 19, 1998


Per Curiam.  Defendant-appellant Benjamin Duarte seeks

reversal of his criminal conviction for being a felon in possession

of a firearm and ammunition, see 18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1), based on an

alleged violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-

incrimination.  He claims that the district court improperly

admitted into evidence his responses to employment questions asked

when he was booked.  We find no error and therefore affirm.

  Duarte was arrested after the car he was driving was

stopped by police officers, initially for traffic violations.  The

officers testified that they saw two objects that turned out to be

firearms thrown from the windows of the vehicle shortly before it

stopped.  Duarte and his passenger were arrested and placed in

patrol cars to be transported to the police station.  Mirandawarnings were read to Duarte twice: once after he was placed in

the police cruiser and again at the police station before he was

asked a series of questions from a standard police booking form. 

The questions included one asking his occupation and another asking

his employer.  Duarte responded that he was unemployed.

     Duarte later sought suppression of his responses to the

booking questions about his employment status, claiming that the

booking procedure created an "inherently coercive environment" that

rendered his statements involuntary and, therefore, inadmissible. 

The district court found no Fifth Amendment violation, concluding

that the employment status questions were not designed to elicit

incriminating responses from Duarte and consequently fell within an

exception to the Miranda rule for "routine booking questions."  SeePennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-602 (1990).  The court

also ruled that the New Bedford police had fully protected Duarte's

Fifth Amendment rights by giving Miranda warnings twice following

his arrest, including once shortly before posing the challenged

questions.

     We have no difficulty in concluding that the district

court properly found no constitutional violation.  The cases on

which Duarte relies to demonstrate that standard booking questions

can trigger a Fifth Amendment claim all involve instances in which

no Miranda warnings were given.  See Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-02;

United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1550-52 (lst Cir. 1989);

United States v. Gill, 879 F. Supp. 149, 152 (D. Me. 1995).  Where,

as here, the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation is

dissipated by proper administration of the warnings, see Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966), a defendant challenging

admission of statements made subsequent to the warnings must point

to evidence tending to show that his statements nonetheless were

"coerced, compelled or involuntary." United States v. Lawrence, 889

F.2d 1187, 1189 (lst Cir. 1989); see, e.g., United States v.

Jackson, 918 F.2d 236, 241 (lst Cir. 1990) (totality of the

circumstances must be examined to determine voluntariness of an

admission).  Duarte offers no facts suggesting that the booking

procedure was other than routine or that the officers used unusual

pressure   or pressure of any sort, for that matter   to elicit

responses to the questions about his employment status.  Cf.Lawrence, 889 F.2d at 1190 (describing cases in which confessions

were found to be voluntary despite circumstances suggestive of

coercion); Bryant v. Vose, 785 F.2d 364, 368 & n.4 (lst Cir. 1986)

(noting cases in which promises of leniency or other sorts of

mental pressure were found to undermine voluntariness of a

confession).  Defendant's claim of a Fifth Amendment violation is

therefore without merit.

     Having determined that the Miranda procedures provided

full protection in this instance for Duarte's Fifth Amendment

rights, we need not decide whether the challenged evidence also was

admissible because the employment questions fell within the

exception to the Miranda rule for questioning that is designed to

obtain only routine booking information.  See Muniz, 496 U.S. at

601.  A quick review of the record and caselaw indicate, however,

that the exception would apply.  See United States v. Gotchis, 803

F.2d 74, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1986) (routine questions about employment

do not require Miranda warnings).

     The judgment of the district court is affirmed.