United States v. Duane Dixon, Jr.

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedMarch 17, 2026
Docket25-4349
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Duane Dixon, Jr. (United States v. Duane Dixon, Jr.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Duane Dixon, Jr., (4th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

USCA4 Appeal: 25-4349 Doc: 21 Filed: 03/17/2026 Pg: 1 of 5

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 25-4349

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DUANE DIXON, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. Gina M. Groh, District Judge. (3:24-cr-00037-GMG-RWT-1)

Submitted: March 12, 2026 Decided: March 17, 2026

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

ON BRIEF: Kristen M. Leddy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. Matthew L. Harvey, United States Attorney, Jarod J. Douglas, Assistant United States Attorney, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. USCA4 Appeal: 25-4349 Doc: 21 Filed: 03/17/2026 Pg: 2 of 5

PER CURIAM:

Duane Dixon, Jr., appeals his jury convictions and the 15-month sentence imposed

for conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 371, and three counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2. Dixon asserts

that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, and that the district court erred

when it increased his offense level for obstruction of justice, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual § 3C1.1 (2024). Finding no error, we affirm.

“We begin with [Dixon’s] sufficiency challenge[] . . . because any defendant who

prevails on this point is entitled to a judgment of acquittal without further proceeding.”

United States v. Huskey, 90 F.4th 651, 662 (4th Cir. 2024). In judging sufficiency, we

consider all the evidence the jury had before it, “both admissible and inadmissible,” viewed

“in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. (citation modified). In doing so, we

“assume[] the jury resolved all credibility disputes or judgment calls in the government’s

favor” and “must uphold the jury’s verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation modified).

“In order for us to review de novo a defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence,” however, “we must have before us a properly preserved motion for a judgment

of acquittal.” United States v. Watkins, 111 F.4th 300, 307 (4th Cir. 2024). When, as here,

“a defendant moves for a judgment of acquittal after the prosecution rests and then proceeds

to present evidence at trial, he must later renew the motion to preserve appellate review.

That is because, by introducing evidence, the defendant waives his objections to the denial

of his motion to acquit.” Id. (citation modified). “If so waived, appellate review is

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foreclosed unless the defendant can show a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citation

modified).

Because Dixon failed to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal after resting his

case, we conclude that Dixon has forfeited this court’s review as to the sufficiency of the

evidence supporting his convictions. We also find that Dixon has not established that a

manifest miscarriage of justice would result if we declined to review the sufficiency of the

Government’s evidence. Indeed, the Government presented substantial evidence

establishing that Dixon knowingly joined a conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and

knowingly aided and abetted wire fraud by providing another person with his bank account

information so that this person could direct the proceeds of a fraudulent real estate

transaction to the account.

Although Dixon asserts that the Government failed to establish that he was aware

of the fraudulent activity, we conclude that the Government’s evidence—which included

Dixon’s emails and audio recordings of telephone calls he had with undercover agents—

confirmed that Dixon knowingly conspired with another individual to execute the wire

transfer, misrepresented the nature of his business to justify the transaction, and pretended

to be the owner of the real estate underlying the fraudulent sale. We therefore reject

Dixon’s challenge to the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence supporting his

convictions.

We also reject Dixon’s argument that the district court erred when it enhanced his

offense level for obstruction of justice. “Where the enhancement for obstruction of justice

is based on a defendant’s perjurious testimony, trial court findings should encompass the

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factual predicates for perjury, namely that the defendant (1) gave false testimony; (2)

concerning a material matter; (3) with willful intent to deceive.” United States v. Andrews,

808 F.3d 964, 969 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation modified). The Government bears the burden

of proving that the enhancement applies by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 968.

Moreover, where “a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from

[his] trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent

findings necessary to establish [the obstruction enhancement].” United States v. Dunnigan,

507 U.S. 87, 95 (1993). While a court may satisfy this requirement by making “a finding

of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates

for a finding of perjury, . . . it is preferable for a district court to address each element of

the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding.” Id. “[A] mere statement that the

defendant committed perjury is insufficient.” United States v. Perez, 661 F.3d 189, 193

(4th Cir. 2011).

As this court has explained, “[i]f a district court does not make a specific finding as

to each element of perjury, it must provide a finding that clearly establishes each of the

three elements.” Id. For instance, for the willfulness element, “it would . . . be enough for

the court to say, ‘The defendant knew that his testimony was false when he gave it.’” Id.

We also held that even if the district court finds that a defendant’s testimony was false, the

court should also indicate that the false testimony concerned a material matter and was

willfully given. Id. at 193-94. After reviewing the district court record, we conclude that

the district court’s explanation for the obstruction enhancement adequately accounted for

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the elements of perjury and that the court did not erroneously apply the enhancement in

this case.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

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Related

United States v. Dunnigan
507 U.S. 87 (Supreme Court, 1993)
United States v. Perez
661 F.3d 189 (Fourth Circuit, 2011)
United States v. Albert Andrews, III
808 F.3d 964 (Fourth Circuit, 2015)
United States v. Dricko Huskey
90 F.4th 651 (Fourth Circuit, 2024)
United States v. Kenneth Watkins
111 F.4th 300 (Fourth Circuit, 2024)

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