United States v. Downing Co.

9 Ct. Cust. 84, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 15
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedFebruary 25, 1919
DocketNo. 1919; No. 1923
StatusPublished

This text of 9 Ct. Cust. 84 (United States v. Downing Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Downing Co., 9 Ct. Cust. 84, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 15 (ccpa 1919).

Opinion

Martin, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The merchandise now in question consists of old bagging or pieces of gunny sacks, which were entered at the port of Boston. There were two importations, one of which is covered by protest 797813, the other by protest 802385.

In the one instance the appraiser described the merchandise as follows:

The merchandise subject of protest was found, upon examination, to consist of sugar bags made of twill burlap which had been damaged so that they could not be used as bags.

In the other instance the appraiser’s report stated:

The merchandise subject of protest was found, upon examination, to be cut*bags, principally twilled sugar bags. Merchandise of this character is imported to be cut up into markers and patches for cotton bales and for barrel covers.

In each instance the appraiser returned the merchandise for duty as waste not specially provided for, dutiable at 10 per cent ad valorem under paragraph 384, tariff act of 1913. And in accordance with this advisory classification the collector assessed duty upon the importations at the rate and under the description thus indicated.

The importers thereupon filed their several protests, claiming that the merchandise was entitled to free entry as rags not otherwise specially provided for under paragraph 586 of the act, or alternatively as paper stock under either paragraph 408 or paragraph 566 thereof.

The paragraphs thus referred to read as follows:

[Dutiable list.] 384. Waste, not specially provided for in this section, 10 per centum ad valorem.
[Free list.] 408. Bagging for cotton, gunny cloth, and similar fabrics, suitable for covering cotton, composed of single yarns made of jute, jute butts, seg, Russian seg, New Zealand tow, Norwegian tow, aloe, mill waste, cotton tares, or other material not bleached, dyed, colored, stained, painted, or printed, not exceeding sixteen threads to the square inch, counting the warp and filling, and weighing not less than fifteen ounces per square yard; plain woven fabrics of single jute yarns by whatever name known, not bleached, dyed, colored, stained, printed, or rendered noninflammable by any process; and waste of any of the above articles suitable for the manufacture of paper.
[86]*86S66. Paper stock, crude, o£ every description, including all grasses, fibers, rags, waste, including jute, hemp and flax waste, shavings, clippings, old paper, rope ends, waste rope, and waste bagging, and all other waste not specially provided for in this section, including old gunny cloth and old gunny bags, used chiefly for paper making.
586. Rags, not otherwise specially provided for in this section.

The protests were submitted upon exhibits and oral testimony to the Board of General Appraisers. Thereupon the board held that the merchandise was not in fact rags within the meaning of paragraph 586, supra, and this claim in the protest was accordingly overruled. The board furthermore held that the bagging in question was not paper stock- such as is described in paragraph 408, supra, since this cloth is twilled and the threads exceed 16 to the square inch. For this reason the claim of the protest under paragraph 408 was overruled. The board, however, held that the importations were of mixed character, Consisting in part of waste which was dutiable as assessed, and in part of paper stock such as is made free of duty by paragraph 566, supra. In respect to one of the protests, to wit, 797813, the board held that 50 per cent of the importation was free of duty under the latter paragraph, and in respect to the other protest, to wit, 802385, that 75 per cent was likewise free. The protests were therefore sustained'to this extent, and overruled as to the residue.

The Government and the importers have filed cross appeals .from this decision, the Government contending for the collector’s assessment whereby the entire merchandise was held to be dutiable as waste not otherwise specially provided for, the importers contending for the free entry of all the merchandise as rags not otherwise specially provided for, or as paper stock such as is provided for by paragraph 566, supra.

“It may be noted that the alternative claim made by the importers in their protests for the free entry of the merchandise as paper stock, such as is provided for by paragraph 408, supra, is abandoned in this court, since it is not included within the specifications of error presented by the importers in their petition.

The question, therefore, which now demands a decision is whether, upon the record, the imported merchandise is dutiable in whole or in part as waste under paragraph 384, supra, or is free of duty in whole or in part as rags under paragraph 586, supra, or as paper stock under paragraph 566, supra. Or, more accurately stated, the question is whether the decision of the board which divided the merchandise into fixed proportions between the several contending clasifi-cations is sufficiently sustained by the evidence.

We agree with the finding of the board that the merchandise is not classifiable as rags. The pieces of bagging composing it are of such size and character as to preclude that description. The pieces, judging from the exhibits, are of comparatively large sizes, frequently [87]*87of the size of entire bags cut open at one end or side, and the fabric in most cases is still sound. This claim of the importers, therefore, is not sustained by the samples, nor is it sustained by the oral testimony contained in the record. See T. D. 31776 and illustrated appendix thereto at end of volume 21; Treasury Decisions, and decisions therein cited.

As already stated, the board found, upon the record, that the merchandise consisted in part of dutiable, waste and in part of nondu-tiable paper stock; that these materials were capable of separation, and that the merchandise covered by protest 797813 consisted of paper stock to the extent of 50 per cent, while that covered by protest 802385 consisted of paper stock to the extent of 75 per cent.

It will be observed that paragraph 566, supra, in providing for the free admission of paper stock, limits this allowance to waste bagging, old gunny cloth, and old gunny bags, or other specified materials, such as are used chiefly for paper making. United States v. Crompton & Son (6 Ct. Cust. Appls., 197; T. D. 35442). It becomes important, therefore, to ascertain how far the record goes toward sustaining the board’s finding that 50 per cent of. the merchandise in protest 797813 and 75 per cent of that in protest 802385 are chiefly used for paper making.

Three witnesses were examined at the trial before the board. Two of these were Government examiners who severally inspected and passed the merchandise, namely, Mr. Ulrich and Mr. Hirtle; the third, namely, Mr. Broidy, was an officer of the company for whose account the merchandise had been imported.

Giving consideration first to the merchandise covered by protest 797813 we find that Mr. Hirtle, the examiner who passed it, testified in part as follows:

Q. How carefully did you examine this merchandise? — A. Carefully enough to arrive at an estimate of what the condition and quality of the importation consisted of.
Q. That sample bale was sent to the appraiser’s store here? — A.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Crompton
6 Ct. Cust. 197 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1915)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
9 Ct. Cust. 84, 1919 CCPA LEXIS 15, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-downing-co-ccpa-1919.