United States v. Don'tmix

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 11, 2025
Docket24-2687
StatusUnpublished

This text of United States v. Don'tmix (United States v. Don'tmix) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Don'tmix, (9th Cir. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED APR 11 2025 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-2687 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 1:22-cr-00147-SPW-1 v. MEMORANDUM* EDWIN IVAN DON'TMIX,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Montana Susan P. Watters, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 31, 2025** Portland, Oregon

Before: LEE and FORREST, Circuit Judges, and BENCIVENGO, District Judge.***

Following a two-day trial, a jury convicted Edwin Ivan Don’tMix of two

counts of abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153(a) and 2244(a).

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo, United States District Judge for the Southern District of California, sitting by designation. On appeal, Don’tMix challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting his

conviction. He also argues that his conviction should be overturned because the

government engaged in improper vouching in closing argument. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. We review sufficiency of the evidence de novo, with the objective of

determining if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Sharif, 817 F.2d 1375,

1377 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In

conducting this review, the trial evidence is viewed “in the light most favorable to

the government.” Id.

Don’tMix contends that various inconsistencies undermined the testimonies

of victim-witnesses Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. But we assume that the jury

resolved all issues of credibility and any evidentiary conflicts in favor of the

verdict. United States v. Gillock, 886 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation

omitted). Both Jane Does 1 and 2—who are sisters—testified that Don’tMix

sexually abused them. Their mother, Jane Doe 1’s therapist, and the case agent all

corroborated portions of the victim testimony. The jury could have credited this

testimony in convicting Don’tMix. See United States v. Larios, 640 F.2d 938, 940

(9th Cir. 1981) (“The testimony of one witness . . . is sufficient to uphold a

conviction.”).

2 24-2687 Central to Don’tMix’s defense and his argument on appeal is his

characterization of a brief video referred to at trial as the “sledding incident.” In

that video, Defendant Don’tMix is observed seated directly behind Jane Doe 2 on a

sled as they descend a snow-covered hill. Jane Doe 2 testified that during that sled

ride, Don’tMix touched her genitals. In closing, the defense argued that the video

conclusively showed that the incident Jane Doe 2 described never happened, which

the defense urged reflected the falsity of the accusations against Don’tMix. The

government contested that theory.

The jury was free to believe Jane Doe 2’s version of events, including the

supporting testimony from her mother and Jane Doe 1, both of whom recounted

Jane Doe 2’s disclosure of the abuse from the night of the incident. See Larios, 640

F.2d at 940. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,

there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Don’tMix on both counts of

the indictment.

2. Don’tMix also argues that his conviction should be reversed because the

government impermissibly vouched for defense witnesses in its closing argument.

“Vouching consists of placing the prestige of the government behind a witness

through personal assurances of the witness’s veracity, or suggesting that

information not presented to the jury supports the witness’s testimony.” United

States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1993).

3 24-2687 Given there was no objection at trial, we review for plain error. Id. at 1276.

“To establish eligibility for plain-error relief, a defendant must satisfy three

threshold requirements.” Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507 (2021). There

must be (1) an “error” (2) that was “plain” and (3) that “affect[s] substantial rights,

which generally means that there must be a reasonable probability that, but for the

error, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 507–08

(quotation marks omitted).

The backdrop for the challenged statement relates to the government’s

theory that Don’tMix molested Jane Doe 2 during the sledding incident. The

relevant exchange follows:

And the government absolutely disagrees with one important point on that sledding event: that it couldn’t have happened. You get to consider [Jane Doe 2’s] testimony, and the consistent statements made by her through [the case agent].

She said that [Don’tMix’s] hand cupped her vagina. [The case agent] told you, yes, that was consistent, she said [Don’tMix’s] left hand - not shown in the video - cupped her vagina. And guess what? We agree.

(emphasis added). Under our precedents, the prosecutor’s assertion that the

government agreed with the testimony of Jane Doe 2 and the case agent was

improper vouching. See United States v. Kerr, 981 F.2d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 1992)

(“A prosecutor has no business telling the jury his individual impressions of the

evidence.”).

4 24-2687 Under plain error review, we nevertheless affirm the conviction. Although

this Circuit does not recognize a “bright-line rule” about when vouching results in

reversal, several mitigating factors apply here to insulate the jury’s verdict. See

Necoechea, 986 F.2d at 1278. The vouching in question involved a single, transient

remark. It related principally to an event captured on a video that the jury could

itself weigh in evidence.

The improper vouching did not affect Don’tMix’s substantial trial rights.

Weighed against the evidence in this case, the prosecutor’s commentary could not

have altered the trial’s outcome. See United States v. Lew, 875 F.2d 219, 223–24

(9th Cir. 1989) (no plain error where there was substantial independent evidence

against the defendant). Ultimately, the vouching did not render the trial so unfair as

to result in a miscarriage of justice. See United States v.

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Related

Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (Supreme Court, 1979)
United States v. Parvez Sharif
817 F.2d 1375 (Ninth Circuit, 1987)
United States v. Bill Lew
875 F.2d 219 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Joseph William Gillock
886 F.2d 220 (Ninth Circuit, 1989)
United States v. Jay Kerr
981 F.2d 1050 (Ninth Circuit, 1992)
United States v. David Dominic Necoechea
986 F.2d 1273 (Ninth Circuit, 1993)
United States v. Dale Roy Combs
379 F.3d 564 (Ninth Circuit, 2004)
Greer v. United States
593 U.S. 503 (Supreme Court, 2021)

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United States v. Don'tmix, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-dontmix-ca9-2025.