United States v. Dimitre Hadjiev

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: September 24, 2024
• Docket: 23-3271
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _______________

No. 23-3271 _______________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DIMITRE HADJIEV, Appellant _______________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 2:19-cr-00548-001) District Judge: Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe _______________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on September 24, 2024

Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 24, 2024) _______________

OPINION* _______________

BIBAS, Circuit Judge.

Dimitre Hadjiev ran a Philadelphia jewelry store and ran afoul of the law. He knowingly

bought stolen watches to resell, dealt in fake Rolexes, and structured cash transactions to

evade federal reporting requirements. A federal jury convicted him of failing to file a

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. financial record, structuring financial transactions to evade reporting, and trafficking in

counterfeit goods. On appeal, he raises half a dozen claims, but all fail.

First, Hadjiev argues that the District Court should have instructed the jury to consider

evidence of his good character. But it did not have to because his lawyer never put on that

evidence and never asked for that instruction. See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137,

156 (3d Cir. 2008). Relatedly, he says his lawyer should have taken those steps. By failing

to do so, he claims, the lawyer was constitutionally ineffective. But we almost always wait

until habeas to consider ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, where we can develop a

record to understand why counsel chose not to put on that evidence and whether it would

have affected the outcome. United States v. McLaughlin, 386 F.3d 547, 555–56 (3d Cir.

2004). We follow that prudent course here.

Second, Hadjiev claims that the District Court should have questioned him more about

whether he wanted to testify in his own defense. Yet trial courts have no duty to make such

inquiries. United States v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 246 (3d Cir. 1998). And having observed

Hadjiev throughout the trial and heard his recorded conversations, the court properly found

that he understood the right that he was waiving.

Third, the indictment omitted a number 2 and added a number 0 to the model number

of one watch (listing M2228238-006, rather than M228238-0006). Hadjiev moved for a

judgment of acquittal on this ground, but the District Court held that this variance had not

prejudiced him. Reviewing de novo, we agree. United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 259

(3d Cir. 2006). The indictment was otherwise accurate and listed the right serial number.

Because the facts presented at trial were not “materially different from those alleged in the

2 indictment” and did not impair Hadjiev’s understanding or trial preparation, the court

properly found no prejudice. Id. at 261–62 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Fourth, a cooperating witness and an undercover officer sold Hadjiev Rolex watches

that they claimed were stolen. The District Court reminded the jury thrice that these

watches were “allegedly represented as stolen.” Supp. App. 30. Then it twice instructed the

jury to consider this 404(b) evidence only for limited purposes, such as “whether Dimitre

Hadjiev intended to engage in the business of buying stolen Rolex watches for cash.” Id.

at 31–32; see Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). He objects that the court should have added “allegedly”

before “stolen Rolex watches for cash” here too. We review for abuse of discretion, asking

if the instruction could have confused and misled the jury. United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d

441, 450 (3d Cir. 2018). In context, the court clarified that the jury should use the evidence

only to discern his intent, not to show that the watches were in fact stolen. So the instruction

was not confusing or misleading.

Fifth, Rolex had sued a company for counterfeiting. Hadjiev’s counsel tried to cross-

examine a Rolex executive about that suit to show that the company defined counterfeiting

too broadly. The trial court properly excluded this as “nothing but an allegation in a civil

suit” that would have “caus[ed] unfair confusion to the [j]ury” about the law. JA 75–76. It

implicitly balanced the evidence’s limited probative value against the risk that it would

confuse the jury. That balancing was reasonable under Rule 403, not an abuse of discretion.

Fed. R. Evid. 403; United States v. Greenspan, 923 F.3d 138, 151 (3d Cir. 2019).

Finally, Hadjiev challenges his sentencing enhancement for importing fake Rolex items

that infringed Rolex’s copyright. But any error was harmless. Hadjiev’s offense level was

3 driven primarily by his group of convictions for financial crimes, which resulted in an adjusted

offense level of 24. The counterfeiting conviction’s offense level (18) was 6 levels below

that, so it bumped his adjusted offense level up from 24 to 25. Without the copyright-

infringement enhancement, his offense level for counterfeiting would have been 16 rather

than 18. Under the grouping rules, that still would have bumped his adjusted offense level

up from 24 to 25, resulting in the same sentencing range: 46 to 57 months. U.S.S.G.

§ 3D1.4(b) (lumping together any second group within 5 to 8 levels of the highest offense

level). The District Court adopted these calculations and sentenced him to the bottom of

that range. Because it is “high[ly] probab[le]” that the enhancement did not affect his sen-

tence, any error was harmless. United States v. Perez-Colon, 62 F.4th 805, 817 (3d Cir.

2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will thus affirm.