United States v. Diego Castillo-Pedraza

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 25-1048
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 25-1048

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DIEGO CASTILLO-PEDRAZA, Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court No. 5:23-cr-00169-001) District Judge: Honorable Joseph F. Leeson, Jr.

Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) January 12, 2026

Before: MATEY, CHUNG, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: January 14, 2026)

___________ OPINION * ___________

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. AMBRO, Circuit Judge

Diego Castillo-Pedraza, convicted on one count of possession and aiding and

abetting possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute it, challenges the

admission of testimony from cooperating witnesses at trial and his below-Guidelines

sentence. For the reasons below, we affirm his conviction and sentence.

I

In 2019, the FBI launched an investigation of methamphetamine trafficking that

led to the interception of a methamphetamine shipment and the arrest of Mario Ceballos.

Ceballos pled guilty and entered into a cooperation agreement with the Government. He

told the Government that Defendant Diego Castillo-Pedraza orchestrated the shipment

and directed him to pick up the parcel, that they intended to divide and sell the

methamphetamine, and that Castillo-Pedraza regularly sold drugs to the owner of the

house where the parcel was to be delivered.

In March 2021, local law enforcement searched that house. Its owner, Donald

Schwambach, told police he had drugs in a safe, some of which he was holding for

someone else. Police seized packages of methamphetamine from the safe. On one

package, forensic analysis revealed a fingerprint from Castillo-Pedraza.

Schwambach was arrested by local authorities. After the federal Government

adopted the local case against him, Schwambach proffered that Castillo-Pedraza stored

methamphetamine in Schwambach’s safe pending distribution; that Castillo-Pedraza

intended to pick up the 2019 shipment from his house but was arrested before it arrived;

and that, while Schwambach was released on bail, Castillo-Pedraza visited him to request

2 money for the methamphetamine seized by the police in 2021. Schwambach entered into

a cooperation agreement and pled guilty.

Based on the package of methamphetamine seized from Schwambach’s safe, the

Government indicted Castillo-Pedraza for possession and aiding and abetting possession

with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Before trial, the District Court granted the

Government’s motion in limine to admit the testimony of Ceballos and Schwambach

regarding their relationships with Castillo-Pedraza, Castillo-Pedraza’s connection to

Schwambach’s house, and Castillo-Pedraza’s connection to the 2019 and 2021 drug

seizures. At trial, the Government offered the testimony, and the District Court instructed

the jury that they may consider evidence of Castillo-Pedraza’s prior trafficking at

Schwambach’s house and his relationships with Ceballos and Schwambach only for the

purpose of deciding whether he had the knowledge and intent necessary for the charged

offense. Castillo-Pedraza testified in his own defense that he would go to Schwambach’s

house to buy marijuana and that Schwambach would toss bags of methamphetamine to

him and encourage him to try it. The jury returned a guilty verdict.

At sentencing, the District Court included the drug weight from the 2019 shipment

in its calculation of Castillo-Pedraza’s offense level under the United States Sentencing

Guidelines, yielding a sentencing range of 324 to 405 months. It granted the parties’

joint motion for a downward variance and imposed a sentence of 240 months.

Castillo-Pedraza appealed his conviction and sentence. The District Court had

jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction over his appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).

3 II

First, Castillo-Pedraza challenges the District Court’s admission of the

cooperators’ testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), a decision we review for

abuse of discretion. See United States v. Garner, 961 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2020).

Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act . . .

to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person

acted in accordance with the character.” However, such evidence “may be admissible for

another purpose.” Id. Accordingly, Rule 404(b) allows evidence that is “(1) offered for a

proper non-propensity purpose that is at issue in the case; (2) relevant to that identified

purpose; (3) sufficiently probative under Rule 403 such that its probative value is not

outweighed by any inherent danger of unfair prejudice; and (4) accompanied by a

limiting instruction, if requested.” United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d 267, 277–78 (3d

Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 441 (3d Cir. 2013)). A district

court’s reasoning in admitting evidence under Rule 404(b) “should be detailed and on the

record.” Id. at 277 (quoting Davis, 726 F.3d at 442).

As the District Court’s written opinion explained in detail, each requirement is met

here. The District Court admitted the cooperators’ testimony for the non-propensity

purposes of establishing knowledge and intent, which involved explaining Castillo-

Pedraza’s relationship with Ceballos and Schwambach, his connection to Schwambach’s

house, why he stored methamphetamine there, and his intent for the methamphetamine so

stored. And as the District Court observed, that testimony was relevant because “whether

Castillo-Pedraza had pre-existing relationships, arrangements, and/or illicit drug-dealings

4 with the cooperating witnesses at [Schwambach’s house] is of consequence and tends to

make it more or less probable that Castillo-Pedraza stored the methamphetamine at the

[h]ouse with [Schwambach’s] consent and with the plan to distribute or sell the drugs.”

J.A. at 19–20. This evidence is highly probative for connecting Castillo-Pedraza to drugs

discovered in another person’s house and showing his intent to distribute them, and its

probative value is not outweighed by risk of undue prejudice. See United States v. Butch,

256 F.3d 171, 175, 177 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2001) (admitting testimony regarding witness’s

prior criminal relationship with defendant); Garner, 961 F.3d at 274 (admitting prior drug

trafficking conviction to show knowledge and intent to distribute). Finally, the jury

received a limiting instruction consistent with our model instruction on evidence of a

defendant’s prior bad acts or crimes. Therefore, the District Court properly admitted the

cooperators’ testimony under Rule 404(b).

III

Castillo-Pedraza also challenges the District Court’s inclusion of the drug weight

from the 2019 shipment in his offense level calculation. At sentencing, the Government

bears the burden of proving drug quantities by a preponderance of the evidence. United

States v. Self, 681 F.3d 190, 201 (3d Cir. 2012). We review the District Court's factual

findings for clear error. United States v. Yeung, 241 F.3d 321, 322 (3d Cir. 2001).

The Court included the 2019 shipment as “relevant conduct” under § 1B1.3 of the

Sentencing Guidelines, which instructs sentencing judges to consider offenses “that were

part of . . . [a] common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction” if § 3D1.2(d) would

have required grouping of counts. Section 3D1.2(d), in turn, requires grouping of drug-

5 trafficking counts. Therefore, as drug-trafficking conduct, the 2019 shipment would

group under § 3D1.2(d). The critical question is whether the shipment was part of the

charged offense’s common scheme or plan.

Characteristics of a common scheme or plan include common locations,

accomplices, criminal methods, or purposes. See United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163,

178 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, the District Court noted that the 2019 offense “occurred at the

same address” and was connected to the offense of conviction “by common accomplices,

similar modus operandi, and a common purpose.” J.A. at 193–94. And although twenty

months elapsed between the 2019 shipment and the 2021 seizure, Castillo-Pedraza was

incarcerated for twelve of those months. Accordingly, the District Court did not clearly

err by concluding that both offenses were part of a common scheme “whereby [he] relied

on the same accomplice to receive and store methamphetamine for him.” J.A. at 194.

In the alternative, Castillo-Pedraza contends the Government failed to prove his

involvement in the 2019 shipment by a preponderance of the evidence. But two

witnesses directly involved in the 2019 shipment testified to his participation, and

Castillo-Pedraza does not explain why the District Court clearly erred by crediting their

testimony over his. See United States v. Brothers, 75 F.3d 845, 853 (3d Cir. 1996)

(“[A]ssessments of credibility by the trial court are entitled to great deference at the

appellate level.”). Accordingly, this argument is unconvincing as well.

6 IV

Finally, Castillo-Pedraza challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness

of his sentence. We review both under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

Castillo-Pedraza’s procedural reasonableness argument restates his “related

conduct” argument and fails for the same reasons. His substantive unreasonableness

argument comprises only a single paragraph in which he notes certain personal

circumstances. He does not explain why those circumstances suggest that his sentence

does not “fall[] within the broad range of possible sentences that can be considered

reasonable,” especially in light of the District Court’s downward variance and discussion

of his personal characteristics during the sentencing hearing. See United States v. Wise,

515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008). “‘[A] district court’s failure to give mitigating factors

the weight a defendant contends they deserve’ does not make a sentence substantively

unreasonable.” United States v. Seibert, 971 F.3d 396, 402 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting

United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007)). Accordingly, we see neither

procedural nor substantive error in Castillo-Pedraza’s sentence.

* * * * *

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Castillo-Pedraza’s conviction and sentence.