United States v. Diaz-Gutierrez

Fourth Circuit

United States v. Diaz-Gutierrez

354 F. App'x 774

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

DecidedDecember 7, 2009

Docket07-5147

StatusUnpublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 354 F. App'x 774 (United States v. Diaz-Gutierrez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

United States v. Diaz-Gutierrez, 354 F. App'x 774 (4th Cir. 2009).

Pincite

Opinion

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Alejandro Diaz-Gutierrez was convicted of illegal reentry following removal from the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006). The district court sentenced him to seventy-two months in prison. Diaz-Gutierrez appeals, contending that the admission of a warrant of deportation into evidence violated the Confronta *775 tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We affirm.

We review evidentiary rulings implicating the Confrontation Clause de novo. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 253 (4th Cir.2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1312, 173 L.Ed.2d 584 (2009). The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). “As Crawford and later Supreme Court cases make clear, a statement must be ‘testimonial’ to be ex-cludable under the Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir.2008) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)).

Documents “created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial ... are not testimonial.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S. -, —---, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2539-40, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). A warrant of deportation is “not made in anticipation of litigation[.] ... [I]t is simply a routine, objective cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter.” United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005). We conclude, as have all Circuits to have considered the question, that a warrant of deportation is nontestimonial and therefore “not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.” See United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir.2008) (collecting cases). Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the warrant of deportation into evidence.

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Affirmed by unpublished PER CURIAM opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Alejandro Diaz-Gutierrez was convicted of illegal reentry following removal from the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2006). The district court sentenced him to seventy-two months in prison. Diaz-Gutierrez appeals, contending that the admission of a warrant of deportation into evidence violated the Confronta *775 tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment. We affirm.

We review evidentiary rulings implicating the Confrontation Clause de novo. United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 253 (4th Cir.2008), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 1312, 173 L.Ed.2d 584 (2009). The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). “As Crawford and later Supreme Court cases make clear, a statement must be ‘testimonial’ to be ex-cludable under the Confrontation Clause.” United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 268 (4th Cir.2008) (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006)).

Documents “created for the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial ... are not testimonial.” Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, — U.S. -, —---, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2539-40, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). A warrant of deportation is “not made in anticipation of litigation[.] ... [I]t is simply a routine, objective cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter.” United States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067, 1075 (9th Cir.2005). We conclude, as have all Circuits to have considered the question, that a warrant of deportation is nontestimonial and therefore “not subject to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.” See United States v. Burgos, 539 F.3d 641, 645 (7th Cir.2008) (collecting cases). Therefore, the district court did not err in admitting the warrant of deportation into evidence.

We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

354 F. App'x 774, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-diaz-gutierrez-ca4-2009.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack