UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, v. No. 98-2120 ROQUE DIAZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER Filed October 15, 1999
Before BRORBY, EBEL and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
Appellant’s petition for rehearing is denied.
The suggestion for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all of the judges of
the court who are in regular active service as required by Fed. R. App. P. 35. As
no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court
requested that the court be polled, the suggestion is also denied.
Appellant’s motion to file a reply to the response to the petition for
rehearing is denied.
Footnote number three of the slip opinion filed on August 27, 1999, is
deleted. A corrected opinion is attached to this order. Entered for the Court PATRICK FISHER, Clerk of Court
By: Keith Nelson Deputy Clerk
-2- F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit
AUG 27 1999 PUBLISH PATRICK FISHER UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Clerk
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico (Cr. No. 97-227 JP)
Lissa J. Gardner, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Ann Steinmetz, Federal Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Las Cruces, New Mexico, for Defendant- Appellant.
Jason Bowles and Fred Joseph Federici, III, Assistant United States Attorneys (John J. Kelly, United States Attorney, Renee L. Camacho, Assistant United States Attorney on the briefs), Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
HENRY , Circuit Judge. Mr. Roque Diaz appeals his conviction following a jury trial for attempt to
possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine, a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846. He argues that: (1) his due process rights were violated by the
procedures of the District of New Mexico that resulted in five judges hearing
various portions of his case; (2) the district court should have dismissed his
charges based upon “outrageous government conduct”; (3) the court abused its
discretion by excluding the testimony of his expert witness; and (4) the court
improperly failed to grant a downward departure. We affirm the judgment of the
district court, holding that no due process violation, outrageous government
conduct, or abuse of discretion in the exclusion of testimony has been shown, and
that we have no jurisdiction to review the denial of downward departure.
FACTS
Defendant-appellant Mr. Roque Diaz was arrested on March 6, 1997,
following a “reverse sting” operation, in which law enforcement officers working
undercover portray themselves as drug dealers. A videotape recorded Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) Special Agents Steve Woodson and Kurt
Nelson, along with New Mexico State Police Agent Clifford Frisk consummating
the “sale” of cocaine to Mr. Diaz in a motel room.
The agents had become aware of Mr. Diaz's involvement in a drug
distribution scheme after the arrest of Jose Antonio Legon, who informed the -2- agents that he had supplied marijuana to Mr. Diaz on two earlier occasions. Mr.
Legon pled guilty to charges filed against him and agreed to cooperate with the
government. In January of 1997, Mr. Legon informed Agent Woodson that
“Lorenzo Roque” was interested in purchasing at least five kilograms of cocaine;
he further provided a telephone and pager number for “Roque.” The DEA issued
an administrative subpoena for the pager number and learned that it was
subscribed to by Mr. Roque Diaz. Utilizing Mr. Diaz’s social security number,
the DEA determined that he had a 1991 conviction in Oregon on two counts of
distribution of cocaine. See Rec. vol. V, at 34-37.
On January 15, 1997, Agent Nelson called the pager number provided by
Mr. Legon for “Lorenzo Roque,” and Mr. Diaz answered. They discussed the
price of a kilogram of cocaine. Mr. Diaz then called Agent Nelson on January 16,
1997 to say that he wanted Agent Nelson to take five kilograms of cocaine to
Portland. On January 21, 1997, Mr. Diaz asked Agent Nelson to “front” him two
kilograms of cocaine, i.e., to provide the cocaine while allowing Mr. Diaz to pay
later. They had two more conversations, and Mr. Diaz paged Agent Nelson three
times.
On February 8, 1997, Mr. Diaz told Agent Nelson he had no money and that
he would contact him later, when the situation changed. On Feb. 20, 1997, Agent
Nelson called Mr. Diaz again, but Mr. Diaz repeated that he had no money. On
February 25, Mr. Diaz asked Agent Nelson if he could exchange jewelry for -3- cocaine. Agent Nelson suggested Mr. Diaz come to El Paso, assuring Mr. Diaz
that they could work something out, and that Agent Nelson would help Mr. Diaz
get the drugs back to Portland. They had six additional conversations. Mr. Diaz
arrived in El Paso on March 6, having purchased a ticket at his own expense.
Agent Woodson met Mr. Diaz at the airport and drove him to Las Cruces. They
discussed how to get the cocaine to Portland, and Mr. Diaz asked if someone
could mail it.
After Mr. Diaz arrived in the motel room, Agent Frisk brought the cocaine.
Mr. Diaz inspected it with a knife provided by Agent Frisk. Mr. Diaz never gave
the agents any money: the agents stated that they would mail the $100,000 worth
of cocaine, and Mr. Diaz agreed that he would pay for it in eight days. Mr. Diaz
instructed Agent Nelson to send the cocaine to his uncle, so the Agent re-
packaged it, and left the motel room with the cocaine. Other law enforcement
officers then arrested Mr. Diaz.
Mr. Diaz was arraigned in the United States District Court in Las Cruces,
New Mexico, on April 7, 1997. He was represented by the Federal Public
Defender's office in Las Cruces. On May 7, 1997, the district court adopted a
new policy of handling cases, under which a different district judge from
Albuquerque sits in Las Cruces each month. Because of this rotating assignment
system, four different judges from the District of New Mexico ruled on Mr. Diaz's
pretrial motions. The trial was conducted by the Honorable Adrian Duplantier, a -4- visiting judge from the Southern District of Louisiana. Judge Martha Vazquez
from the District of New Mexico conducted the sentencing proceedings.
During the trial, Judge Duplantier excluded expert testimony offered by Mr.
Diaz as to Mr. Diaz's subnormal mental functioning. He reasoned that Mr. Diaz
had provided insufficient notice, the district court could not compel the
government to agree to a telephonic witness, and the report was irrelevant.
At sentencing, Judge Vazquez ruled that the court did not have authority to
depart downward based on sentencing entrapment, diminished mental capacity, or
a combination of those factors when there was a statutory minimum in place.
Thus, she sentenced Mr. Diaz to 120 months imprisonment, followed by an eight-
year period of supervisory release.
DISCUSSION
I. DUE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL ASSIGNMENT
Mr. Diaz first argues that the assignment of five district judges to handle
various portions of his case violated his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. The alleged violation of Mr. Diaz’s due process rights is a legal
question that we examine with de novo review. See United States v. Nichols , 169
F.3d 1255, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999).
Mr. Diaz argues that the assignment procedure is not authorized by rule or
order, and that, even if the district court had the authority to adopt the procedure, -5- judicial efficiency is an improper purpose to justify rotating judicial assignments.
We are persuaded by neither argument.
Mr. Diaz's challenge to the district court's authority to adopt the procedure
is undermined by 28 U.S.C. § 137, which vests the district court with broad
discretion in assigning court business to individual judges. It provides that “[t]he
business of a court having more than one judge shall be divided among the judges
as provided by the rules and orders of the court.” Further, Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b)
provides that when there is no controlling law, “[a] judge may regulate practice in
any manner consistent with federal law, these rules, and local rules of the
district.”
In light of this discretion in managing court business, we agree with the
Fifth Circuit that: “[d]istrict judges may by rule , order or consent transfer cases
between themselves . . . . Each judge of a multi-district court has the same power
and authority as each other judge. . . . Moreover, the District Judges have the
inherent power to transfer cases from one to another for the expeditious
administration of justice.” United States v. Martinez , 686 F.2d 334, 338 (5th Cir.
1982) (quoting United States v. Stone , 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969))
(emphasis added).
We are not persuaded by Mr. Diaz's suggestion that the absence of a written
policy or order renders the rotating assignment system invalid. It is obvious that
the judges of the district in question regularly show up for work, and they seem to -6- balance their assignments systematically, in all likelihood so that their more
voluminous regular dockets in their resident chambers can proceed as efficiently
as possible, given the necessity of traveling to other courthouses. In supplemental
briefing, the government provided a letter from the Chief Deputy Clerk for the
District of New Mexico confirming the rotation policy. The letter states that:
“[w]e have no order or formal document setting forth the monthly rotation of
District Judges in Las Cruces,” but that the rotation “was discussed and agreed to
by all the Judges at a Judges' Meeting,” and that “[c]alendar coordination is
worked out among Judges and case managers.” Aple Supp. Br., Ex. 2. The
government also provided an order from the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court appointing Judge Duplantier to perform judicial duties in the
District of New Mexico during the period of March 31, 1997 to December 31,
1997, which includes the time period of Mr. Diaz's trial. As transfers may occur
both by order and by consent, the District of New Mexico was authorized to adopt
the rotating assignment system through an agreement at a judges' meeting. 1
We are similarly unpersuaded by Mr. Diaz's contention that it is improper
to justify the use of a rotating assignment system on the grounds of judicial
efficiency. This argument fails as courts have long considered judicial efficiency
a proper justification for transferring cases between judges. See Martinez , 686
According to Judge Vazquez, the Federal Public Defender's office 1
suggested this rotation system to the judges. See Rec. vol. VII, at 8. -7- F.2d at 338 (approving judicial transfer to promote “the expeditious
administration of justice”); cf. Cruz v. Abbate , 812 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1987).
Mr. Diaz also apparently argues with the district judges as to whether their system
is actually efficient. With all respect, the judges need to be the ones that make
that call.
Finally, Mr. Diaz contends that because Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 25 addresses
judicial reassignment only in cases of death, sickness, or other disability, these
are the only permissible reasons to authorize a transfer from the judge initially
assigned to a case. This argument also fails because it ignores the broad grant of
power to courts under 28 U.S.C. § 137 to devise a system for dividing court
business among judges. The provision of Rule 25 for reassignment in instances
of judicial incapacity in no way circumscribes the scope of that broad
administrative authority.
Thus, we hold that the goal of judicial efficiency and convenience is not an
improper basis for a system of judicial assignment, and Mr. Diaz has not shown
that the assignment procedure utilized by the District of New Mexico is
constitutionally impermissible. 2 Nor has he shown (as discussed further below
At oral argument, the court advised counsel for Mr. Diaz that the Judicial 2
Council for the Tenth Circuit has the power to order that a district judge reside and conduct court in a particular town, and that counsel might petition the Judicial Council to do so. See 28 U.S.C. § 134 (“If the public interest and the nature of the business of a district court require that a district judge should (continued...) -8- with respect to Mr. Diaz's substantive claims) that this system of judicial selection
affected the fairness of the proceeding in any way. Therefore, we find no due
process violation.
II. OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT
Mr. Diaz also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the indictment based upon outrageous government conduct. After
reviewing the parties' motions, the district court denied Mr. Diaz’s motion tersely,
stating, “I find the motion and memorandum to be more entertaining than most
but also find that it is without merit and will be denied.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 19.
“Defendants have the burden of proving outrageous government
conduct, . . . and we review this issue de novo,” United States v. Pedraza , 27 F.
3d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), with factual findings
reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Bonanno , 852
F. 2d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1988). The terseness of the district court order, and the
lack of citation by either party to the record, will assist us in making sure that our
review is de novo.
(...continued) 2
maintain his abode at or near a particular place for holding court in the district or within a particular part of the district the judicial council of the circuit may so declare and may make an appropriate order.”). -9- The defendants have a very high hurdle to clear: “The outrageous conduct
defense . . . is an extraordinary defense that will only be applied in the most
egregious circumstances. In order to prevail, the defendant must show that the
challenged conduct violated notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ and is ‘shocking to
the universal sense of justice.’” Pedraza , 27 F.3d at 1521 (quoting United States
v. Harris , 997 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 1993)) (citations omitted). The Pedraza
court goes on to note in a footnote that “we have never issued an opinion
overturning a criminal conviction on the ground of outrageous government
conduct.” Id. at n.3.
Indeed, our circuit is not alone in its non-utilization of this doctrine. As
the Sixth Circuit noted in United States v. Tucker , 28 F.3d 1420, 1426 (6th Cir.
1994):
In sum, there is no binding Supreme Court authority recognizing a defense based solely upon an objective assessment of the government’s conduct in inducing the commission of crimes. Non-binding dicta of the Court, indicating that there may be such a defense, has been recanted by its author based upon reasoning later adopted by a majority of the Court in United States v. Payner , 447 U.S. 727, 737 n. 9 (further citation omitted). Moreover, this court has recognized the availability of this defense only in dicta because, in every case in which the issue has been raised, the government’s conduct has been held not to have been “outrageous.” The only case squarely holding that an objective assessment of the government's conduct in a particular case may bar prosecution without regard for the defendant’s predisposition [ United States v. Twigg , 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978) , cited extensively by Mr. Diaz] has been greatly criticized, often distinguished and, recently, disavowed in its own circuit.
- 10 - In considering this argument, we are not as sanguine as the government, nor
even as literary or mythical. See Rec. vol. I, doc. 16, at 23 (“this court should
similarly reject the outrageous government conduct defense as a chimera or
unicorn – often hunted but never taken into captivity”). We note that the
disaffection with the doctrine does not yet indicate its total impossibility. Rather,
as Justice Powell noted in Hampton v. United States , 425 U.S. 484 (1976), while
rejecting the plurality’s conclusion that neither due process principles nor
supervisory powers could support a bar to conviction in any case where the
Government is able to prove predisposition:
I emphasize that the cases, if any, in which proof of predisposition is not dispositive will be rare. Police overinvolvment in crime would have to reach a demonstrable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction.
Hampton , 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
In the present case, the evidence indicates that Mr. Diaz contacted the
informant, that the agents confirmed his previous drug involvement, that Mr. Diaz
made numerous calls to the agents, and that he decided to fly to El Paso at his
own expense to obtain the drugs. He examined the cocaine, tasted it, and cut it
into bricks. He directed the shipping.
Although Mr. Diaz argues that the agents “fronted” the cocaine to him, the
evidence reveals that he requested that accommodation. See Rec. vol. V, at 82-
83. Numerous cases stand for the proposition that supplying drugs or money or
- 11 - equipment or even all of these does not give rise to outrageous conduct violative
of due process. See United States v. Mosley , 965 F.2d 906, 913 (10th Cir. 1992)
(no outrageous conduct although defendant alleged price was coercively low,
agent suggested buying cocaine instead of marijuana and offered to front four
additional ounces, when defendant approached agents, indicated he had dealt
before, and accepted offer to buy) ; United States v. Asibor , 109 F.3d 1023, 1039
(5th Cir. 1997) (no outrageous conduct “even if the government agents both
supplied the drugs to defendants and then bought them back with government
funds”) (internal quotation omitted); United States v. Evans , 941 F. 2d 267, 270
(5th Cir. 1991) (no outrageous conduct although defendant alleged “DEA agents
approached him and offered to help him manufacture drugs, phoned him to pursue
the arrangement, supplied the expertise, sold [him] the equipment, and supplied
the laboratory site”); United States v. Cannon , 88 F.3d 1495, 1506 (8th Cir. 1996)
(no outrageous conduct when defendants accused government agents of “selling
them a machine gun when they had not specifically asked for one”).
Mr. Diaz argues that he broke off conversation with the agents because he
had insufficient funds, yet the testimony revealed that he tried to pay for drugs
with jewelry, and again, that he utilized his own funds to fly to El Paso to meet
with the agents to buy drugs. See Rec. vol. V, at 66; id. at vol. I, doc. 84, exhibit
4A, at 12-14. In fact, Mr. Diaz initiated the conversation in which he offered to
- 12 - put up jewelry as collateral for the drugs by paging the agent. See Rec. vol. V, at
66.
In conclusion, the evidence in this case clearly shows that Mr. Diaz was
predisposed to commit this crime. The government actions taken in the reverse
sting operation do not establish the rarely available defense of outrageous
government conduct.
III. EXCLUSION OF DR. THOMPSON’S TESTIMONY
Mr. Diaz argues that the district court erred in failing to allow him to
present expert testimony on his entrapment defense. Judge Duplantier granted the
government's motion to exclude the telephonic testimony of Dr. Thomas
Thompson, Ph.D., a neuropsychologist who was unable to attend the scheduled
trial, because: (1) Mr. Diaz did not provide timely notice, (2) telephonic
testimony was not appropriate, and (3) the proffered testimony was irrelevant.
See Rec. vol. VI, at 7-8. Judge Duplantier also denied Mr. Diaz’s motion for a
continuance in order to produce Dr. Thompson in person at trial. We consider
these rulings in turn.
First, we review Judge Duplantier's exclusion of expert testimony for an
abuse of discretion. Compton v. Subaru of America, Inc. , 82 F.3d 1513, 1517-18
(10th Cir. 1996). Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12.2(b) requires:
- 13 - If a defendant intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt, the defendant shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may direct, notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk.
The rule further provides: “[i]f there is a failure to give notice when required by
subdivision (b) of this rule . . . , the court may exclude the testimony of any
expert witness offered by the defendant on the issue of the defendant's guilt.”
Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 12.2(d).
Here, Mr. Diaz did not provide timely notice: his counsel gave written
notice of her intent to introduce expert testimony on October 27, 1997,
approximately five months after the time for filing motions had expired.
Although counsel for Mr. Diaz argues she was not aware of the need to have Mr.
Diaz evaluated by an expert until August of 1997, she points to no evidence in the
record to support her assertion. Thus, Judge Duplantier did not abuse his “broad
discretion” in excluding the testimony because it was untimely. United States v.
McLernon , 746 F.2d 1098, 1115 (6th Cir. 1984) (“district judge has wide
discretion to excuse appellants' failure to grant timely notice of their expert's
testimony, but also has broad discretion to exclude such testimony”). Because we
decide it was not an abuse of discretion to exclude the testimony based on
untimely notice alone, we need not address the second and third stated grounds
for excluding Dr. Thompson's testimony.
- 14 - Alternatively, Mr. Diaz argues that even if his notice was untimely, under
the circumstances of this case the court should have granted what would have
been the fourth continuance so that he could properly prepare and actually
produce his expert witness. The court denied his renewed motion for a
continuance on the grounds that the motion was made too late in the course of the
trial without justification.
We review the denial of a motion for continuance of trial for abuse of
discretion and “will find error only if the district court's decision was arbitrary or
unreasonable and materially prejudiced the defendant." United States v. Simpson ,
152 F.3d 1241, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998). In determining whether a denial of a
motion for continuance is arbitrary or unreasonable, we consider various factors,
including:
(1) the diligence of the party requesting the continuance; (2) the likelihood that the continuance, if granted, would accomplish the purpose underlying the party’s expressed need for the continuance; (3) the inconvenience to the opposing party, its witnesses, and the court resulting from the continuance; (4) the need asserted for the continuance and the harm that appellant might suffer as a result of the district court’s denial of the continuance.
United States v. Wynne , 993 F.2d 760, 767 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United
States v. West , 828 F.2d 1468, 1469 (10th Cir. 1987)).
An evaluation of these factors supports our conclusion that the district
court did not abuse its discretion. First, Mr. Diaz's counsel was neither diligent in
seeking the examination of Mr. Diaz nor in providing notice of her intent to call
- 15 - Dr. Thompson. Counsel was appointed for Mr. Diaz on March 7, 1997, but she
did not seek a continuance related to mental condition as an element of his
defense until October 27, 1997. Although counsel states she was not aware of the
need for having Mr. Diaz evaluated until August of 1997 and suggests that the
reasons for not requesting the evaluation until then were contained in a motion
that had been granted by Judge Parker, that motion is not included in the record,
and she does not provide other cites to the record to substantiate her claim. Thus,
we are unable to evaluate her statement upon this record. Further, while Mr.
Diaz's counsel had requested a prior continuance in August to have Mr. Diaz
evaluated, that unopposed request was based on her “serious concerns regarding
Mr. Diaz's competency to proceed to trial,” Rec. vol. I, doc. 32, at 2 (emphasis
added), not in order to introduce a defense to his guilt.
The second Wynne factor (the likelihood that the continuance, if granted,
would accomplish the purpose underlying the party’s expressed need for the
continuance) also presents problems for Mr. Diaz. Although the continuance was
sought to allow Dr. Thompson to testify as to Mr. Diaz's susceptibility to
entrapment, Dr. Thompson's proffered testimony did not speak clearly to Mr.
Diaz's susceptibility:
The overall pattern in the testing is one which is consistent with an individual who shows a moderate degree of cognitive compromise. The pattern is not one that suggests that this has been acquired. Rather, I would suggest that he has always had these difficulties. These difficulties are of the type which tend to produce a rather inadequate or faulty reasoning and - 16 - which more than likely have been the source of much of his inability to perform adequately, i.e., his judgment appears to be poor, he does not learn well utilizing feedback from the environment and he has problems in both organizing and planning. His verbal skills are higher and I would suspect this creates difficulty for him in the sense that his ambitions and perceptions of himself are probably much greater than he is actually able to accomplish in a genuine, day-to-day problem-solving type of situation and, based upon his history, this would certainly seem to be the case.
He is an individual who is quite immature and relatively simplistic in many ways. His difficulty in gestaltic integration and nonverbal functions would make him an extremely poor judge of people and someone who would be quite a poor judge of interpersonal situations and not likely to take into account the type of details that one would need to take into account to be successful in the majority of life's more complex endeavors.
Rec. vol. I, doc. 82, Ex. 3, at 5-6. This evidence, though arguably relevant, is not
strong or conclusive of culpability-negating mental capacity. Thus, a continuance
would not necessarily have materially aided Mr. Diaz.
The third Wynne factor (inconvenience) also weighs against Mr. Diaz. The
court had already granted one pre-trial continuance and two continuances during
trial, and a jury had been selected.
As to the fourth factor (the need for the continuance and the harm resulting
from its denial), we note that before Mr. Diaz moved for the fourth continuance,
the judge had already properly ruled the testimony excludable based on the lack of
timely notice. Accordingly, Mr. Diaz would not have been able to introduce the
testimony in any case, so that there was no prejudice. Thus, this factor also cuts
against Mr. Diaz.
- 17 - Therefore, we hold that Mr. Diaz has not shown an abuse of discretion in
the district court’s failure to admit evidence as untimely under Fed. R. Crim. P.
12(d); further, Mr. Diaz has not shown an abuse of discretion in the district
court's refusal to grant a fourth continuance.
IV. REFUSAL TO CONSIDER A DOWNWARD DEPARTURE
We move now to Mr. Diaz's last argument – that the court erred in refusing
a downward departure. First, Mr. Diaz argues that the district court had not
adequately familiarized itself with the transcript. He states:
Judge Vazquez had not presided over most of Mr. Diaz's pretrial proceedings and she did not preside over his trial. The record of the sentencing hearing clearly shows she was not familiar with the complete record of the case, but rather had reviewed only parts of it before proceeding to sentencing. If Mr. Diaz had been sentenced by a judge who was fully familiar with all aspects off his case, he would have received a lesser sentence because the judge would have recognized he was predisposed, at worst, to deal in only ounces – rather than kilograms – of cocaine.
Aplt's Br. at 25.
The record, however, tells a different story, reflecting a judge frustrated
with last minute submissions by both parties, but who had read the relevant
transcript, in both English and Spanish, and further read all of the materials
presented to her:
THE COURT: I have a preliminary matter for counsel. This is a huge case. I got a bunch of stuff at the last minute. This case has been scheduled for sentencing since November, and then it has been rescheduled month after month. It was scheduled last week and then it was rescheduled for this - 18 - week. I think it is inexcusable, all of the late filings there have been in this case. I do not appreciate it. I should like to indicate to counsel that if you want a judge to fully consider your brief, then please provide that to the judge with the sentencing briefs and all of the transcripts way in advance. I was not the trial judge in this case originally, so I had to read all of the transcripts that were submitted. That was a significant amount of reading. If you want me to take my time and give it thought, then it is inexcusable for me to have received such big stacks of pleadings in this case at the last minute. I have reviewed every piece of paper that you have given me, but I was not the [trial] judge, as you recall. So I was not there when the Government presented evidence that there was an issue in dispute with regard to the amount. That is a critical issue with regard to sentencing, and I think that your late filings are just inexcusable. This should not happen again.
....
I have reviewed, in addition to [the presentence report, Mr. Diaz's objections and motion for downward departure, and the government's objections], something else that I need to continue and make sure Mr. Diaz has had a chance to review this. There was an addendum to the Presentence Report. Have you reviewed that with your attorney?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma’am.
THE COURT: Actually, is there just one addendum? OK. Mr. Diaz, in addition to that, I was provided with a videotape, and I don’t know who provided it to me, but it was left in chambers, and I have reviewed a pretty long videotape that was of the hotel scene, or motel, whatever it was. I have looked at all of that. I did find it very hard to decipher the words, but I did watch and listen to the entire thing. I have reviewed all the transcripts in this case that you all have provided to me. I have read them in Spanish, just to make sure that I am totally understanding the exchange; and I recognize as we proceed here that we have a number of issues.
This is the type of case that requires reliance on the evidence that was introduced at the trial. The key issues in this case are whether Mr. Diaz should be sentenced on the five k., five kilograms, or whether he should be sentenced pursuant to two kilograms. I have done some independent research on that issue, but mostly find that this is a factual issue. Because of that the transcripts were extremely important, and I must - 19 - say that I would have reviewed the transcripts again, even had I been the trial judge, to make sure that my recollection was accurate with regard to what amounts were being discussed and what amount was ultimately agreed upon. There are other issues in this case, but basically the key one, the one that affects Mr. Diaz the most, is the determination as to the amount in issue.
As a result of the objection, the enhancement because of the prior drug offense was not addressed or imposed by Probation in the PSR, so there is a question as to the effect of that, and that, of course, depends on the amount that we decide.
There is also the question of whether, in the motion for downward departure, the Court should depart downward, based upon a number of factors, and they are diminished capacity, sentencing entrapment, and acceptance of responsibility. I think those are all the issues that you raised. Is that right, Ms. Gardner?
MS. GARDNER: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct.
Rec. vol. VII, at 3, 11-12.
Mr. Diaz’s contention that the court was not familiar with the complete
record is disingenuous, to be charitable. Moreover, Mr. Diaz cites no case
requiring a sentencing judge to read parts of the record that were not relevant to
sentencing and not provided by the parties, nor any rule requiring a sentencing
judge to certify her familiarity with the record. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(b)
(indicating that – unlike Fed. R. Crim. P. 25(a) – no explicit certification of
familiarity with the record is required after a verdict or finding of guilt has been
rendered: “If by reason of absence . . . the judge before whom the defendant has
been tried is unable to perform the duties to be performed by the court after a
- 20 - verdict or finding of guilt, any other judge regularly sitting in or assigned to the
court may perform those duties. . . .”).
Indeed, this record shows that the sentencing judge carefully reviewed the
materials before the court, in fact partially agreeing with Mr. Diaz and rejecting
the government’s argument the proper sentencing amount was five kilograms,
instead adopting his argument that the proper amount was only two kilograms.
See Rec. vol. VII, at 41-44. Thus, quite to the contrary of Mr. Diaz's position,
this hearing reflected assiduous efforts on the part of the court to prepare for
sentencing. We see no error.
Second, Mr. Diaz argues that the district court misunderstood its ability to
downwardly depart based upon his entrapment defense. “[A] discretionary
decision not to depart downward is not reviewable unless the record shows that
the district court erroneously believed that the Guidelines did not permit a
departure.” United States v. Banta , 127 F.3d 982, 983 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997). We
review legal conclusions de novo, while factual determinations are reviewed for
clear error. See United States v. Bolden , 132 F.3d 1353, 1355 (10th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied , 118 S. Ct. 1686 (1998).
We agree with the government that we do not have jurisdiction to review
the judge’s discretionary decision. Judge Vazquez made very clear findings that
Mr. Diaz was responsible for the two kilograms for which he was sentenced,
rejecting the government’s argument that he should have been sentenced for five - 21 - kilograms. She stated:
I do not believe that there was any sentencing entrapment with regard to the two kilograms that were involved here, and I think that the language that has been provided in the exhibits expresses by the defendant a willingness. He is urging, he is attempting to persuade, using prior dealing, to persuade the Government agents that he knows what he’s doing, that he has been involved in this kind of thing before, that he has contacts and he moves drugs, drugs that he got from Oregon, from Las Vegas, Nevada, and I don’t remember where else, but he identified the places from which he has received drugs, in an effort to persuade them that he knows what he’s doing, he can be trusted. He even offers for the agents to go to Portland, Oregon with him. All of theses factual issues I think point to the opposite direction, rather than sentencing entrapment.
Rec. vol. VII, at 46.
Mr. Diaz argues that the court erroneously concluded that it did not have
the authority to depart based upon sentencing entrapment or upon diminished
mental capacity. But the court clearly found that there was no sentencing
entrapment with regard to the two kilogram amount, and it therefore could not
sentence Mr. Diaz below the minimum sentence mandated by 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B). Thus the court's decision not to depart downward was based on a
proper assessment of the evidence in the record rather than on a misapprehension
of its authority.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment and sentence of the
district court. - 22 -