United States v. Deshun Wells

Opinion

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 26a0371n.06

No. 25-3652

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Sep 09, 2026 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ON APPEAL FROM THE )

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE v. ) NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ) OHIO

DESHUN WELLS, )

Defendant-Appellant. ) OPINION )

)

Before: GRIFFIN, READLER and RITZ, Circuit Judges.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

A jury convicted Deshun Wells of crimes he committed in 2000, and he ultimately received a sentence of 200 months of imprisonment and eight years of supervised release. After completing his term of imprisonment, Wells began supervised release, the terms of which he has repeatedly violated.

Wells’s first violation resulted in an eight-month term of imprisonment. So did his second violation. And when he violated supervised release a third time, the district court sentenced him to 18 months of imprisonment.

This brings us to Wells’s most recent violation. After admitting to the violation, the district court calculated a Guidelines sentencing range of 51–60 months. Wells argued that the applicable version of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) imposed a maximum aggregate limit of 60 months for all

No. 25-3652, United States v. Wells

supervised release violations based on the same underlying class A felony; and, because he had been imprisoned for 34 months for his prior violations, he could be sentenced now only to 26 months or less. The district court, however, sentenced him to 60 months. Wells appeals, arguing that this sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Because Wells’s underlying offense occurred in 2000, we apply the supervised-release statute in effect then. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701–02 (2000). And, at that time, § 3583(e)(3) “allow[ed] defendants to ‘accumulate’ prison time served for multiple revocations of supervised release based on the same underlying offense, and to credit this time toward the maximum term of imprisonment authorized by the statute.” United States v. Epstein, 620 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (noting that every court of appeals to address the question reached the same conclusion); cf. United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2022) (“However, since the statute was amended in 2003, every court of appeals to consider this issue has determined that the amendment eliminated the credit for terms of imprisonment resulting from prior revocations. . . . We join our sister circuits.” (citation modified)).

Thus, as even the government concedes, the district court should have credited the 34 months that Wells served for his three prior violations toward the 60-month maximum sentence authorized by § 3583(e)(3) for class A felonies. Instead, the district court sentenced him to 60 months on his fourth violation alone, thereby exceeding the statutory maximum by 34 months.

Accordingly, we vacate Wells’s sentence and remand for resentencing, with instructions that only a sentence of 26 months or less is permissible.