United States v. Desean Williams

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: March 18, 2026
• Docket: 25-11059
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-11059 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/18/2026 Page: 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-11059 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus

DESEAN WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 5:24-cr-00058-TPB-PRL-1 ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: This appeal concerns a claim whose factual predicate is no- where in the record. Desean Williams, for the first time, argues that USCA11 Case: 25-11059 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/18/2026 Page: 2 of 6

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he and his trial counsel had a clear conflict of interest, so his con- viction must be automatically reversed. Because accepting his ar- gument would require us to take on the impermissible role of fact- finder, we affirm his conviction. I. Williams was indicted on one count of possession with in- tent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in viola- tion of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A). He originally pleaded not guilty but then later pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. As part of the agreement, he waived his right to appeal his sentence on any ground except for three enumerated grounds: (1) the sentence exceeded his applicable guidelines range as deter- mined by the Court; (2) the sentence exceeds the statutory maxi- mum penalty; and (3) the sentence violates the Eighth Amend- ment. The agreement also stated that Williams would be released from his appeal waiver if the Government appealed the sentence imposed. At his change of plea hearing, Williams made no mention of a conflict of interest with his trial counsel and confirmed that he understood the appellate waiver of his agreement, as well as the other consequences of pleading guilty. The Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation (R&R) to the District Judge to accept Williams’s guilty plea and adjudicate him guilty. Williams did not object to the R&R, and the District Court accepted it. The District Court accepted Williams’s guilty plea and adjudicated Williams USCA11 Case: 25-11059 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/18/2026 Page: 3 of 6

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guilty. The Court later sentenced Williams to 168 months’ impris- onment, followed by 5 years’ supervised release. 1 Williams timely appeals. II. Williams argues for the first time on direct appeal that the appellate waiver in his plea agreement created an obvious conflict of interest between him and his counsel because it included a waiver of the right to appeal his sentence on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds. He maintains that this triggered the Court’s duty to inquire into the conflict, so, because the Court did not in- quire, the conviction must be automatically reversed. The Government responds that there was no conflict of in- terest, and, regardless, Williams’s argument is barred by our prec- edent. The Eleventh Circuit does not automatically reverse a con- viction on conflict of interest grounds unless defense counsel rep- resented codefendants and objected to the joint representation, and the trial court failed to inquire into the conflict. Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1303 (11th Cir. 2020). For any other failure by the District Court to investigate a conflict it knew or reasonably should have known about, reversal is not automatic. Id. It is only war- ranted if the petitioner shows that “an actual conflict of interest ad-

1 Williams’s total offense level was 33, his criminal history category was III,

and his Guidelines’ imprisonment range was 168 to 210 months’ imprison- ment. USCA11 Case: 25-11059 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/18/2026 Page: 4 of 6

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versely affected defense counsel’s performance.” Id. Because Wil- liams made no showing of an adverse effect, the Government maintains that his conviction should be affirmed. While we agree that our precedent requires a showing of adverse effect, id., and that Williams does not argue that he was adversely affected, the problem with his appeal is even more basic than that: Williams’s argument depends entirely on facts that were not argued to or decided by the District Court. Indeed, Williams is asking us to find that he and his counsel had a conflict of interest despite not giving the District Court the opportunity to consider it. 2 “This Court has repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the district court and raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this [C]ourt.” Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). The reason for this is obvious: [A]s a court of appeals, we review claims of judicial error in the trial courts. If we were to regularly ad- dress questions—particularly fact-bound issues—that district[] court[s] never had a chance to examine, we would not only waste our resources, but also deviate

2 The District Court did hold a hearing at the Government’s request to deter-

mine if Williams and his counsel had a conflict of interest related to his coun- sel’s communication with a witness. The Court determined that there was no conflict and, even if there was, Williams waived any issue with it. This is un- related to Williams’s present argument that there was a conflict of interest as a result of the appellate waiver. USCA11 Case: 25-11059 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/18/2026 Page: 5 of 6

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from the essential nature, purpose, and competence of an appellate court. Id. “[F]actfinding is the basic responsibility of district courts, rather than appellate courts, and . . . the Court of Appeals should not . . . resolve[] in the first instance [a] factual dispute which had not been considered by the District Court.” DeMarco v. United States, 415 U.S. 449, 450 n., 94 S. Ct. 1185, 1186 n. (1964). Williams argues, for the first time on direct appeal, that he and his trial counsel had a conflict of interest because of the appel- late waiver. To entertain his argument, we would have to find facts not in the record. We cannot do that. We pause to note that Williams can still file a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 3 A conflict of interest argument is akin to an ineffective assistance of counsel one, so it is appropriate for a § 2255 collateral attack. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (providing every criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel); see also United States v. Jones, 52 F.3d 924, 925 (11th Cir. 1995) (providing that an attorney’s conflict of interest may deprive

3 Under § 2255, “[a] prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established

by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” or seek relief from his conviction. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); Fernandez v. United States, 114 F.4th 1170, 1173–74 (11th Cir. 2024) (explaining that a defendant moved for relief from his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). USCA11 Case: 25-11059 Document: 31-1 Date Filed: 03/18/2026 Page: 6 of 6

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a criminal defendant of his constitutional right to the effective as- sistance of counsel). The District Court will then hear his argu- ment, and, should he appeal its decision to us, we will have a proper record on which to base our review. 4 III. With no record to examine for the issue now, we reject Wil- liams’s conflict of interest argument on direct appeal. Seeing no other argument for why his conviction should be reversed, we af- firm. AFFIRMED.

4 The parties maintain that Williams cannot attack his sentence via § 2255.

They cite Williams v. United States, 396 F.3d 1340 (11th Cir. 2005) in support. We disagree that Williams stands for that conclusion. Indeed, that case con- cerned a sentence appeal waiver that specifically stated that the defendant could not appeal his sentence “directly or collaterally.” Id. at 1341. The waiver here does not include that language. Regardless, Williams is seeking reversal of his conviction, not his sentence.