United States v. Densley

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: July 17, 2025
• Docket: 24-3056
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 24-3056 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:21-cr-00168-JAD-EJY-2 v. MEMORANDUM* GEORGE DENSLEY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Jennifer A. Dorsey, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted July 9, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: H.A. THOMAS and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF, District Judge.***

George Densley appeals his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 2113(a)

on numerous grounds. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. affirm.

1. Densley argues that there is insufficient evidence to support his

convictions. We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction de

novo. United States v. Ruiz, 462 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th Cir. 2006). After

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we must

decide if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Nevils, 598 F.3d 1158, 1163–

64 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319

(1979)). Here, Densley’s convictions are sufficiently supported by various forms

of circumstantial evidence, including messages between Densley and his

codefendants discussing ATM burglaries, photos of items related to the burglaries,

and Densley’s call and location history around the time that the burglaries took

place.

2. Densley challenges the district court’s denial of his motion under

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), based on the government’s striking of two

prospective jurors. “The Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective

juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 303

(2019). The burden of proving purposeful discrimination remains with the

opponent of the strike. United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 44 F.4th 1157, 1167

(9th Cir. 2022). Densley cannot show purposeful discrimination here because he

2 24-3056 did not present any evidence to support his claim that the government’s

“peremptory strikes were made on the basis of race.” Flowers, 588 U.S. at 301–

02. Before the district court, Densley failed to cite any example of disparate

questioning by the government or to ask the court to compare the jurors who were

struck against the jurors who were not struck. See id. The district court thus did

not clearly err in rejecting Densley’s Batson challenge. See United States v.

Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir. 2015).

3. Densley argues that the district court improperly admitted various

records after the government failed to comply with the requirements of Federal

Rule of Evidence 902(11). “[W]e review the district court’s [evidentiary] rulings

for an abuse of discretion, and uphold them unless they are ‘illogical, implausible,

or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.’”

United States v. Gadson, 763 F.3d 1189, 1199 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting United

States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). Here, the

government provided Densley with the challenged records well before trial. The

government also notified Densley of its intention to use these records before trial.

Densley does not contend that he lacked the ability to authenticate the challenged

records. Nor did he challenge the authenticity of the records before the district

court. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the

records in question.

3 24-3056 4. Densley maintains that the district court erred by allowing the

government to present evidence of a financial transaction without calling as a

witness the party involved in the transaction. “[W]e review de novo the district

court’s construction of hearsay rules, but review for abuse of discretion the court’s

determination to admit hearsay evidence.” United States v. Marguet-Pillado, 560

F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2009). Here, the financial record in question was not

testimonial because it was not made to assist in a criminal prosecution. See Davis

v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). Rather, it was a record of regularly

conducted business activity. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004);

Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324 (2009). The district court

therefore did not abuse its discretion.

AFFIRMED.

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