United States v. Denjen

258 F. Supp. 2d 194, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6967, 2003 WL 1956306
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedApril 24, 2003
Docket02 CR 155(NG)
StatusPublished

This text of 258 F. Supp. 2d 194 (United States v. Denjen) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Denjen, 258 F. Supp. 2d 194, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6967, 2003 WL 1956306 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).

Opinion

ORDER

GERSHON, District Judge.

On October 17, 2002, defendant, Randy Denjen, a lieutenant at the Metropolitan Detention Center (“MDC”) in Brooklyn, New York, pleaded guilty to Counts Two and Seven of a seven count indictment, that is, to causing the victim to engage in sexual contact by threatening and placing her in fear, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1) 1 , and to making a false statement to the FBI regarding the sexual contact, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001.

With regard to the sexual offense charge, Denjen allocuted to causing the victim to engage in sexual contact by placing her in fear that, if she did not comply with his sexual advances, she would receive sanctions, such as more time in disciplinary segregation. The sexual offense carries a base level of 27 under the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1. The Second Addendum to the Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) recommends: a two level enhancement because the victim was a person in a correctional facility, § 2A3.1(b)(3)(B); a two level enhancement for obstruction of justice under application note 8 to § 3C1.1; a base level offense of 6 *196 for the false statement count, which is grouped with the above count, and; an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility of -3, §§ 8El.l(a) and (b)(2). The PSR also recommends a four level enhancement for the use of force under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(l) which states, “If the offense was committed by the means set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) or (b), increase by 4 levels.” Section 2241(a) provides in pertinent part:

(a) By force or threat. Whoever, ... in a Federal prison, knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act-
(1) by using force against that other person; or
(2) by threatening or placing that other person in'fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both.

Defendant has sought an evidentiary hearing as to the use of force enhancement. The government’s position is that the enhancement is applicable.

On February 27, 2003, this court held an evidentiary hearing solely to address the dispute as to the applicability of the use of force enhancement. The parties agreed that the entire conduct of defendant was to be considered relevant conduct in making this determination. The government must prove the use of force by a preponderance of the evidence.

The Meaning of “Force”

“Force” is not defined in Section 2241(a) or in the Sentencing Guidelines. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, relying on the legislative history, held that “[t]he statute requires only the use of ‘force,’ not of ‘significantly violent action or threats.’ The legislative history indicates that a specific intent of Congress was to reduce the necessity of demonstrating the use of excessive force in order to provide greater protection for the victim.” United States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 18 (2d Cir.1990). The Court also held that “the requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of ... the use of such physical force as is sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person.” Id. at 17.

The ‘force’ that the statute condemns is ... force that, by being used against the other person, results in a sexual contact. The force does not have to be part of the sexual contact itself, but must be used only in order to make the contact. If ... the sexual contact resulted from a restraint upon the other person that was sufficient that the other person could not escape the sexual contact, that is sufficient ....

Id. at 18. It is immaterial that the defendant did not use a weapon, did not threaten or harm the victim, and did not inflict pain on her. Id. The force required by the statute has been described as including the use of a threat of harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim. United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir.1990). A finding of force has also been based upon the disparity in size and coercive power between the defendant and his victim, for example, when the defendant is an adult male and the victim is a child. United States v. Bordeaux, 997 F.2d 419, 421 (8th Cir.1993). And in United States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir.1998), the court found force based upon the disparity in power between a jail warden and an inmate, combined with physical restraint.

The Hearing

The sole witness at the hearing was the victim. She was entirely honest and candid, equally so on cross examination as on direct. Even defense counsel acknowledged, “certainly on one point I agree wholeheartedly with [government counsel], *197 this witness was a very credible witness.” The evidence at the hearing established the following facts.

The victim, twenty-four years old at the time of the hearing, and the mother of two young children, is from London. She was arrested at John F. Kennedy airport on July 8, 2001 for importing ecstasy into the United States.

On the night of November 24, 2001, the victim was in solitary confinement, on a suicide watch, at the MDC awaiting sentencing on her plea of guilty to the importation charge. She was in a tiny cell containing a mattress on a cinder block or cement platform that was situated lengthwise along the wall. Based upon the pictures submitted into evidence and her testimony, the distance between the door to her cell and the bed was only a few feet. The victim thought that the cell was underground, like a “dungeon.” The cell was isolated from the rest of the prison, and there were no guards or inmates anywhere near it, with the exception of the lieutenant’s office down the corridor. Lieutenants have more authority than corrections officers, and they are responsible for discipline and punishment. Denjen was a lieutenant and occupied the office down the corridor from the victim’s cell on November 24, 2001. At time of the attacks, Den-jen was 6'5" tall and weighed 285 pounds, and the victim was 5'7" tall and weighed 108 pounds.

At approximately midnight, Denjen began talking to the victim, through the window in her cell door, about her sexuality. He then unlocked the victim’s cell door, entered her cell and asked her, “what about me and you?” She told him that “I don’t see you like that,” meaning that he was not her type and that she wouldn’t think of sleeping with someone like him.

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Related

United States v. Lucas
157 F.3d 998 (Fifth Circuit, 1998)
United States v. James Lauck
905 F.2d 15 (Second Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Benjamin Jasper Fire Thunder
908 F.2d 272 (Eighth Circuit, 1990)
United States v. Bruce Bordeaux
997 F.2d 419 (Eighth Circuit, 1993)

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Bluebook (online)
258 F. Supp. 2d 194, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6967, 2003 WL 1956306, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-denjen-nyed-2003.