United States v. Demetrius Wynn

365 F.3d 546, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8055, 2004 WL 868225
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
DecidedApril 23, 2004
Docket02-4354
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 365 F.3d 546 (United States v. Demetrius Wynn) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Demetrius Wynn, 365 F.3d 546, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8055, 2004 WL 868225 (6th Cir. 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

GILMAN, Circuit Judge.

In sentencing Demetrius Wynn under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1, the district court determined that a two-level enhancement was warranted because Wynn possessed a destructive device. Wynn claims that his sawed-off shotgun does not qualify as such a device. To the contrary, we conclude that because Wynn’s sawed-off shotgun is a weapon that will expel a projectile by the action of an explosive and has a barrel with a bore of more than one-half inch in diameter, it is a destructive device as defined by Application Note 4 to § 2K2.1. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Wynn pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and to possessing an unregistered sawed-off shotgun, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The weapon in question was a .20 gauge shotgun with a modified overall length of 19.5 inches and a barrel length of 12.5 inches. As part of his plea agreement, Wynn admitted that the sawed-off shotgun was a firearm as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(1) and (2).

U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1 establishes the sentencing range for Wynn’s convictions. Wynn had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence, which caused his Base Offense Level to be set at 26. The Presentence Report further determined that a two-level enhancement was warranted' because Wynn’s offense involved a destructive device as described in 26 U.S.C. 5845(a). Application Note 11 to § 2K2.1 permits what would otherwise appear to be “double counting” by expressly providing that, “a defendant whose offense involves a destructive device receives both the base offense level from the subsection applicable to a firearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) ..., and a two-level enhancement under subsection (b)(3)-.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1, cmt. n. 11 (2002).

Wynn filed a Sentencing Memorandum objecting to the two-level increase for possession of a destructive device. He argued that the definition of a destructive device in Application Note 4 to § 2K2.1 does not encompass a sawed-off shotgun. First, he suggested that Application Note 4’s language that a destructive device “is a type of firearm listed in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)” means that a destructive device is simply “one type” of firearm listed in that provision. The government, on the other hand, interprets the same phrase to mean that “all types” of firearms listed in § 5845(a) are destructive devices. Second, Wynn argued that because 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B) imposes vastly different penalties on defendants who possess a destructive device as opposed to a sawed-off shotgun while committing a violent or drug-trafficking crime, the two items should not be treated as equivalents under § 2K2.1. The government responds by questioning the relevance of the penalty scheme under § 924(c)(1)(B) to the Sentencing Guideline in question.

*548 At sentencing, the district court raised an additional point. The court found that the definition of a destructive device in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(f) was “broad enough to include a sawed-off shotgun.” Specifically, the court noted that a shotgun with a bore of more than a half inch in diameter is by definition a destructive device under § 5845(f), unless it is the kind of shotgun appropriate for sporting purposes. “And in this case,” the court stated, “the shotgun had a bore of more than a half-inch diameter.” Sawed-off shotguns, moreover, are not used for sporting purposes.

The district court ultimately applied the two-level enhancement because it agreed with the government’s interpretation that any firearm listed in § 5845(a), such as a sawed-off shotgun, is a destructive device. For further support, the court reiterated that the definition of destructive device under § 5845(f) “gives all indication that this [sawed-off shotgun] should be considered to be a destructive device.” This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of review

“In reviewing a sentence imposed under the Sentencing Guidelines, we are required by statute to ‘accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and to give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.’ ” United States v. Horn, 355 F.3d 610, 612 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)).

We “must follow the clear and unambiguous language of the Sentencing Guidelines when interpreting and applying specific provisions.” United State s v. Young, 266 F.3d 468, 484 (6th Cir.2001). The “[sentencing guidelines should be read as written,” United States v. Cobb, 250 F.3d 346, 349 (6th Cir.2001), and the “commentary ... is authoritative unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that guideline.” United States v. Lewis, 156 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir.1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

B. Interpretation of the term “destructive device”

1. Application Note 4, Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1

A defendant convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm is potentially subject to Sentencing Guidelines § 2K2.1(b)(3), which provides for a two-level enhancement to the base offense level if the offense involved a destructive device. Application Note 4 defines a “destructive device” in the following manner:

“Destructive device” is a type of firearm listed in, 26 U.S.C. § 584-5(a), and includes

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Bluebook (online)
365 F.3d 546, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 8055, 2004 WL 868225, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-demetrius-wynn-ca6-2004.