Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11528 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:07-cr-60242-KMW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEMETRIUS LIGHTFOOT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 17, 2018)
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 2 of 6
In May 2008, the district court sentenced Demetrius Lightfoot to a term of
imprisonment followed by 5 years of supervised release for attempted possession
with intent to distribute cocaine. The district court imposed conditions on his
supervised release, including the requirements that he must refrain from violating
the law and must not possess a firearm, destructive device, or any other dangerous
weapon.
While on supervised release, Lightfoot was arrested in August 2017 after a
stabbing victim identified him as the perpetrator. The victim’s statement was
recorded under oath by a detective, and used at Lightfoot’s supervised release
revocation hearing when the victim invoked the Fifth Amendment rather than
testify about who stabbed him. Lightfoot objected to the use of the recording as
hearsay. The district court overruled his objection and revoked his supervised
release, sentencing him to 8 months imprisonment, followed by 24 months of
supervised release.
Lightfoot now appeals his 24-month term of supervised release, to follow his
unchallenged 8-month imprisonment sentence. He argues that the new supervised
release term was unreasonable in light of his prior compliance with the terms of his
supervision and the weakness of the evidence against him, which largely rested on
the recorded statement by a victim who invoked the Fifth Amendment at the
hearing.
2 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 3 of 6
If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release, the district court
may, after considering certain factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), revoke his
supervised release and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). If the district
court imposes a prison term, it may also impose a new term of supervised release
following imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).1
We review for an abuse of discretion the reasonableness of a district court’s
sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. United States v. Trailer,
827 F.3d 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2016). We also review a district court’s
evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d
968, 1005 (11th Cir. 2001).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we follow a two-step process.
Trailer, 827 F.3d at 935. First, we ensure that the sentence was procedurally
reasonable by reviewing whether the district court miscalculated the guidelines
range, treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, based the sentence “on clearly erroneous facts,” or failed “to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 936; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)
(incorporating § 3553(a) factors for district courts’ consideration in imposing a
term of supervised release).
1 The term of supervised release may not exceed the term of supervised release originally authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original supervised release term—60 months for a Class A or Class B felony—less any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), (h). 3 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 4 of 6
The second step in ascertaining the reasonableness of a sentence is whether
the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. The weight
given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is left to the district court’s sound
discretion. 2 United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Notably,
“[a] sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of
a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir.
2014).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation
hearings. United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir. 1994); 3 see also 18
U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence.”). Nevertheless, defendants in revocation proceedings are
entitled to the due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Thus, in order to admit hearsay testimony, the court must:
2 We “will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). 3 In Frazier, we determined that the district court violated a defendant’s due process rights by considering hearsay evidence without explicitly finding that it was reliable and without weighing the defendant’s right of confrontation against the government’s reasons for not producing the witness. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Nonetheless, we held that the error was harmless because the properly considered evidence demonstrated that the defendant had breached the terms of his supervised release. Id. 4 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 5 of 6
(1) “balance the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the
grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation”; and (2) determine
that the hearsay statement is reliable. Id.
Here, Lightfoot does not challenge the revocation of his supervised release
itself; nor does he contest that hearsay statements can be admissible in a revocation
hearing. Rather, he simply challenges the length of his term of supervised release,
asserting that the evidence against him was so weak as to render the 24-month term
unreasonable.
The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
unreasonable, and Lightfoot has not met that burden here. See Trailer, 827 F.3d at
936.
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Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 18-11528 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:07-cr-60242-KMW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEMETRIUS LIGHTFOOT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida ________________________
(October 17, 2018)
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 2 of 6
In May 2008, the district court sentenced Demetrius Lightfoot to a term of
imprisonment followed by 5 years of supervised release for attempted possession
with intent to distribute cocaine. The district court imposed conditions on his
supervised release, including the requirements that he must refrain from violating
the law and must not possess a firearm, destructive device, or any other dangerous
weapon.
While on supervised release, Lightfoot was arrested in August 2017 after a
stabbing victim identified him as the perpetrator. The victim’s statement was
recorded under oath by a detective, and used at Lightfoot’s supervised release
revocation hearing when the victim invoked the Fifth Amendment rather than
testify about who stabbed him. Lightfoot objected to the use of the recording as
hearsay. The district court overruled his objection and revoked his supervised
release, sentencing him to 8 months imprisonment, followed by 24 months of
supervised release.
Lightfoot now appeals his 24-month term of supervised release, to follow his
unchallenged 8-month imprisonment sentence. He argues that the new supervised
release term was unreasonable in light of his prior compliance with the terms of his
supervision and the weakness of the evidence against him, which largely rested on
the recorded statement by a victim who invoked the Fifth Amendment at the
hearing.
2 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 3 of 6
If a defendant violates a condition of his supervised release, the district court
may, after considering certain factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), revoke his
supervised release and impose a prison term. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). If the district
court imposes a prison term, it may also impose a new term of supervised release
following imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h).1
We review for an abuse of discretion the reasonableness of a district court’s
sentence imposed upon revocation of supervised release. United States v. Trailer,
827 F.3d 933, 935–36 (11th Cir. 2016). We also review a district court’s
evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d
968, 1005 (11th Cir. 2001).
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we follow a two-step process.
Trailer, 827 F.3d at 935. First, we ensure that the sentence was procedurally
reasonable by reviewing whether the district court miscalculated the guidelines
range, treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, based the sentence “on clearly erroneous facts,” or failed “to
adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Id. at 936; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c)
(incorporating § 3553(a) factors for district courts’ consideration in imposing a
term of supervised release).
1 The term of supervised release may not exceed the term of supervised release originally authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in the original supervised release term—60 months for a Class A or Class B felony—less any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b), (h). 3 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 4 of 6
The second step in ascertaining the reasonableness of a sentence is whether
the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the
circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Trailer, 827 F.3d at 936. The weight
given to any specific § 3553(a) factor is left to the district court’s sound
discretion. 2 United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007). Notably,
“[a] sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of
a reasonable sentence.” United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353, 1362 (11th Cir.
2014).
The Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation
hearings. United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir. 1994); 3 see also 18
U.S.C. § 3661 (“No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the
background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a
court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an
appropriate sentence.”). Nevertheless, defendants in revocation proceedings are
entitled to the due process right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Thus, in order to admit hearsay testimony, the court must:
2 We “will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations omitted). 3 In Frazier, we determined that the district court violated a defendant’s due process rights by considering hearsay evidence without explicitly finding that it was reliable and without weighing the defendant’s right of confrontation against the government’s reasons for not producing the witness. Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. Nonetheless, we held that the error was harmless because the properly considered evidence demonstrated that the defendant had breached the terms of his supervised release. Id. 4 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 5 of 6
(1) “balance the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the
grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation”; and (2) determine
that the hearsay statement is reliable. Id.
Here, Lightfoot does not challenge the revocation of his supervised release
itself; nor does he contest that hearsay statements can be admissible in a revocation
hearing. Rather, he simply challenges the length of his term of supervised release,
asserting that the evidence against him was so weak as to render the 24-month term
unreasonable.
The party challenging a sentence bears the burden of showing that it is
unreasonable, and Lightfoot has not met that burden here. See Trailer, 827 F.3d at
936. We reverse only if left with the “firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation omitted). Simply put, there is
nothing in this case to support a “firm conviction” that the district court erred. The
new term of supervised release is well below the statutory maximum and the
calculated guideline range. It is neither substantively nor procedurally
unreasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the applicable 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
5 Case: 18-11528 Date Filed: 10/17/2018 Page: 6 of 6
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
victim’s recorded hearsay statement and considering that statement when imposing
Lightfoot’s term of supervised release. The district court explicitly took into
account the balancing of Lightfoot’s confrontation rights against the government’s
reasons for failing to produce the victim’s live testimony. As the district court
specifically stated at the hearing, the victim’s recorded statement was reliable, a
“detective took a statement from the victim while at the hospital,” “there has been
no suggestion that the equipment was malfunctioning,” and the detective “had
identification from others and also from the victim of Mr. Lightfoot.” Thus, the
court correctly concluded that “there is nothing to suggest that this hearsay is
unreliable.”
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.