United States v. DeLeon

53 M.J. 658, 2000 CCA LEXIS 128, 2000 WL 694388
CourtArmy Court of Criminal Appeals
DecidedMay 31, 2000
DocketARMY 9900943
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 53 M.J. 658 (United States v. DeLeon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Army Court of Criminal Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. DeLeon, 53 M.J. 658, 2000 CCA LEXIS 128, 2000 WL 694388 (acca 2000).

Opinion

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

A military judge sitting as a special court-martial convicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of indecent liberties with a child and indecent exposure (two specifications) in violation of Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934 [hereinafter UCMJ]. The convening authority approved the adjudged sentence of confinement for 100 days, a bad-conduct discharge, and reduction to Private E1. The case was submitted upon its merits for our review under Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866.

The appellant personally asserts, pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A.1982), that the military judge erred in his computation of pretrial confinement credit and asks that he be credited with one additional day of pretrial confinement credit. We agree.

The Bell County, Texas, Sheriffs office confined the appellant on 10 February 1999 for the offenses for which he was ultimately sentenced at his court-martial. The appellant remained confined at the Bell County Confinement Facility for all or part of forty-five days, 10 February 1999 to 26 March 1999. He was released to the military on 26 March 1999, and not reconfined until the date of his court-martial, 6 October 1999. The military judge calculated the amount of pretrial confinement credit due to the appellant to be forty-four days. The appellant’s trial defense counsel countered that the appellant should be granted forty-five days of credit against confinement, arguing that both the first and last day of confinement should be counted because the appellant was released from confinement prior to the day his sentence was adjudged. After he announced the sentence, the military judge ordered that the appellant be “credited with 44 days towards any approved period of confinement.” In support of his ruling on credit, the military judge cited United States v. New, 23 M.J. 889, 891 (A.C.M.R.1987), wherein this court held that “for purposes of determining ... credit due, the first day ... shall not be counted and the last day so served will be counted.” The convening authority credited the appellant with forty-four days against the sentence to confinement.

Prior to the then Court of Military Appeals’ decision in United States v. Allen, 17 M.J. 126 (C.M.A.1984), a military accused who had served a period of pretrial confinement was not entitled to administrative credit against his adjudged confinement. In Allen, however, the court interpreted Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 1325.4 as subjecting the military to the procedures employed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) for sentence computation. Allen, 17 M.J. at 128. Department of Defense Instruction 1325.4, Treatment of Military Prisoners and Administration of Military Correction Facilities, page 22 (Oct. 7, 1968), stated that “[procedures employed in the computation of sentences will be in conformity with those published by the [DOJ], which govern the computation of sentences of federal prisoners and military prisoners under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department.”

When Allen was decided, the DOJ rule governing federal sentence computation directed that an accused “be allowed credit toward the service of his sentence for any days spent in custody [pretrial confinement] in connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed.” 28 C.F.R. § 2.10(a) (1980) (emphasis added). In addition to the DOJ rule, the then existing federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3568, also mandated that pretrial sentence credit be given for “any days” spent in pretrial confinement, but the statute specifically exempted “offense[s] triable by court-martial, military commission, provost court, or other military tribunal.” Act of June 22, 1966, Pub.L. No. 89-465, § 4, 80 Stat. 217 (repealed 1984). The appellant in Allen argued that “while Congress decided not to make § 3568’s provisions mandatory [660]*660for the military, the Secretary of Defense ha[d] ... voluntarily adopted them on the basis of [DODI 1325.4].” Allen, 17 M.J. at 127. The Court of Military Appeals agreed and required day-for-day credit for periods of pretrial military confinement.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. O'Bryan
Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 2020
United States v. Staff Sergeant MICHAEL E. HARRIS
Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 2018
United States v. Specialist BENNIE B. GOGUE
Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 2007
United States v. Oliver
56 M.J. 779 (Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 2002)
United States v. Redlinski
56 M.J. 508 (U S Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, 2001)
United States v. Dingwall
54 M.J. 949 (Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 2001)
United States v. Doane
54 M.J. 978 (Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals, 2001)
United States v. Chapa
53 M.J. 769 (Army Court of Criminal Appeals, 2000)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
53 M.J. 658, 2000 CCA LEXIS 128, 2000 WL 694388, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-deleon-acca-2000.