20-682-cr US v. DeJesus
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of April, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT: Guido Calabresi, Robert A. Katzmann, Steven J. Menashi, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________
United States of America,
Appellee, v. No. 20-682-cr Alexis DeJesus,
Defendant-Appellant. * ____________________________________________
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above. For Appellee: ELENA L. CORONADO, Assistant United States Attorney (Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for John H. Durham, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
For Appellant: JONATHAN J. EINHORN, Jonathan J. Einhorn Law Offices, New Haven, CT.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Shea, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Alexis DeJesus appeals from the district court’s
judgment entered on February 20, 2020, sentencing him to 108 months’
imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release. On appeal, he
argues that the imposition of the above-guidelines sentence was procedurally
defective because the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement
and departed upwards pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. We disagree and affirm. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
2 I
After a federal grand jury indicted DeJesus and fifteen co-conspirators for
federal narcotics and firearms offenses—and fourteen of his co-conspirators were
arrested under federal arrest warrants—DeJesus engaged in a weeklong,
dangerous flight from police, committed multiple car thefts, and repeatedly
assaulted a domestic partner. During this weeklong run from law enforcement,
DeJesus assaulted the mother of his child, effectively kidnapped her, threatened
to kill her, and otherwise continued his extended attack on her. She eventually
escaped.
During his weeklong flight, DeJesus caused a road accident in West
Hartford, causing heavy front-end damage to his own vehicle, and fled the scene
of the accident in his car. He stole three cars during the course of the week,
including a taxi and a car he stole from a car dealership while displaying a gun.
When law enforcement located and pursued him, he engaged in a high-speed car
chase during which he accelerated over sidewalks, sped through traffic lights and
stop signs, and drove into the oncoming traffic lane, maneuvering around
numerous vehicles stopped at a red light. When he was finally subdued and
arrested, he had in his possession eight firearms, one of which he brandished at
3 the police and which was loaded at the time; a substantial amount of ammunition;
and 55 grams of cocaine.
After entering a guilty plea with the benefit of a written plea agreement,
DeJesus was sentenced principally to 108 months’ imprisonment. He timely
appealed.
II
On appeal, DeJesus argues that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing an above-guidelines sentence and erred in applying an enhancement
and an upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. We disagree.
A
We review sentencing challenges for “reasonableness,” which is “a
particularly deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review.” United States v.
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d
180, 188 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Decisions to depart or to vary from the
Guidelines are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 97-100 (1996).
It is a “well-settled legal principle that the sentencing judge is of course not
bound by the estimated [Guidelines] range in a plea agreement.” United States v.
4 Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B) reiterates that, although a plea
agreement may “recommend … that a particular sentence or sentencing range is
appropriate” under the Guidelines, “such a recommendation or request does not
bind the court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11(c)(1)(B).
In this case, moreover, both the plea agreement and the district court at the
plea hearing notified the defendant that the court was not bound by the plea
agreement on the Guidelines range. The plea agreement, for example, expressly
stated that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement on the
Guidelines range. Further, at the plea hearing, the district court confirmed at least
four separate times that DeJesus understood that the court was not bound by the
estimated Guidelines range.
Thus, not only did the district court have the authority to depart from any
guidelines range in the plea agreement, but the district court also ensured that
DeJesus was on notice that the district court could exercise that authority.
B
DeJesus argues that the district court improperly applied U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2
for a two-level enhancement for dangerous flight as well as an upward departure
5 for conduct that “pose[s] a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to more than
one person.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, Application Note 6. This court reviews the district
court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo but reviews its factual
findings only for clear error. United States v. Adams, 955 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 2020).
Section 3C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
enhancement if a defendant “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer.” Application Note 6 to § 3C1.2 notes that “an upward
departure may be warranted” if “the conduct posed a substantial risk of death or
bodily injury to more than one person.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, Application Note 6. We
think both the enhancement and the departure were properly applied.
First, the district court did not clearly err by rejecting DeJesus’s argument
that he was not fleeing from the federal charges but from state authorities who
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20-682-cr US v. DeJesus
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to a summary order filed on or after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and this court’s Local Rule 32.1.1. When citing a summary order in a document filed with this court, a party must cite either the Federal Appendix or an electronic database (with the notation “summary order”). A party citing a summary order must serve a copy of it on any party not represented by counsel.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of April, two thousand twenty-one.
PRESENT: Guido Calabresi, Robert A. Katzmann, Steven J. Menashi, Circuit Judges. ____________________________________________
United States of America,
Appellee, v. No. 20-682-cr Alexis DeJesus,
Defendant-Appellant. * ____________________________________________
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption as set forth above. For Appellee: ELENA L. CORONADO, Assistant United States Attorney (Sandra S. Glover, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief), for John H. Durham, United States Attorney for the District of Connecticut, New Haven, CT.
For Appellant: JONATHAN J. EINHORN, Jonathan J. Einhorn Law Offices, New Haven, CT.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut (Shea, J.).
Upon due consideration, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Alexis DeJesus appeals from the district court’s
judgment entered on February 20, 2020, sentencing him to 108 months’
imprisonment followed by a five-year term of supervised release. On appeal, he
argues that the imposition of the above-guidelines sentence was procedurally
defective because the district court improperly applied a two-level enhancement
and departed upwards pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. We disagree and affirm. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
2 I
After a federal grand jury indicted DeJesus and fifteen co-conspirators for
federal narcotics and firearms offenses—and fourteen of his co-conspirators were
arrested under federal arrest warrants—DeJesus engaged in a weeklong,
dangerous flight from police, committed multiple car thefts, and repeatedly
assaulted a domestic partner. During this weeklong run from law enforcement,
DeJesus assaulted the mother of his child, effectively kidnapped her, threatened
to kill her, and otherwise continued his extended attack on her. She eventually
escaped.
During his weeklong flight, DeJesus caused a road accident in West
Hartford, causing heavy front-end damage to his own vehicle, and fled the scene
of the accident in his car. He stole three cars during the course of the week,
including a taxi and a car he stole from a car dealership while displaying a gun.
When law enforcement located and pursued him, he engaged in a high-speed car
chase during which he accelerated over sidewalks, sped through traffic lights and
stop signs, and drove into the oncoming traffic lane, maneuvering around
numerous vehicles stopped at a red light. When he was finally subdued and
arrested, he had in his possession eight firearms, one of which he brandished at
3 the police and which was loaded at the time; a substantial amount of ammunition;
and 55 grams of cocaine.
After entering a guilty plea with the benefit of a written plea agreement,
DeJesus was sentenced principally to 108 months’ imprisonment. He timely
appealed.
II
On appeal, DeJesus argues that the district court abused its discretion in
imposing an above-guidelines sentence and erred in applying an enhancement
and an upward departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. We disagree.
A
We review sentencing challenges for “reasonableness,” which is “a
particularly deferential form of abuse-of-discretion review.” United States v.
Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 278 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d
180, 188 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Decisions to depart or to vary from the
Guidelines are also reviewed for abuse of discretion. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S.
81, 97-100 (1996).
It is a “well-settled legal principle that the sentencing judge is of course not
bound by the estimated [Guidelines] range in a plea agreement.” United States v.
4 Hamdi, 432 F.3d 115, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(B) reiterates that, although a plea
agreement may “recommend … that a particular sentence or sentencing range is
appropriate” under the Guidelines, “such a recommendation or request does not
bind the court.” Fed. R. Crim. P. Rule 11(c)(1)(B).
In this case, moreover, both the plea agreement and the district court at the
plea hearing notified the defendant that the court was not bound by the plea
agreement on the Guidelines range. The plea agreement, for example, expressly
stated that the district court was not bound by the plea agreement on the
Guidelines range. Further, at the plea hearing, the district court confirmed at least
four separate times that DeJesus understood that the court was not bound by the
estimated Guidelines range.
Thus, not only did the district court have the authority to depart from any
guidelines range in the plea agreement, but the district court also ensured that
DeJesus was on notice that the district court could exercise that authority.
B
DeJesus argues that the district court improperly applied U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2
for a two-level enhancement for dangerous flight as well as an upward departure
5 for conduct that “pose[s] a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to more than
one person.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, Application Note 6. This court reviews the district
court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo but reviews its factual
findings only for clear error. United States v. Adams, 955 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 2020).
Section 3C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level
enhancement if a defendant “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or
serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer.” Application Note 6 to § 3C1.2 notes that “an upward
departure may be warranted” if “the conduct posed a substantial risk of death or
bodily injury to more than one person.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, Application Note 6. We
think both the enhancement and the departure were properly applied.
First, the district court did not clearly err by rejecting DeJesus’s argument
that he was not fleeing from the federal charges but from state authorities who
might apprehend him for his violence toward the mother of his child. The district
court reasonably concluded that the defendant was “aware [he] w[as] being
sought for federal charges” based on the fact that the defendant was engaging in
some of his federal offense conduct while fleeing. Appellant’s App’x 169.
6 Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion by applying the
upward departure contemplated in Application Note 6. The district court noted at
least four discrete incidents during DeJesus’s flight that created the substantial risk
of death or bodily injury to others. DeJesus escaped from New Britain police in a
stolen Subaru and rammed into a police cruiser; he escaped from West Hartford
police by accelerating the vehicle that he was driving toward the police officers;
during the final chase DeJesus drove away at a high rate of speed, drove over
sidewalks, disregarded stop signs and traffic lights, drove into the oncoming
traffic lane, maneuvered around numerous vehicles stopped at a red light, crossed
multiple lanes, and drove over the divider toward oncoming traffic a second time;
finally, he brandished a loaded gun at a pursuing police officer while fleeing on
foot. It is beyond dispute that DeJesus put multiple people at risk of serious bodily
injury.
For these reasons, we are not left with a “definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130, 141 (2d Cir.
2019). The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an above-
guidelines sentence.
7 * * *
We have considered DeJesus’s remaining arguments, which we conclude
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court