USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4410
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEION TYRELL LILES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 25-4411
No. 25-4412
Plaintiff - Appellee, USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 2 of 7
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:18-cr-00238-WO-1; 1:19-cr-00230- WO-2; 1:24-cr-00271-WO-1)
Submitted: April 8, 2026 Decided: May 22, 2026
Before KING, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
No. 25-4410 affirmed, No. 25-4411 affirmed and remanded, and No. 25-4412 affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brian Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 3 of 7
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Deion Tyrell Liles appeals the 66-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8) (No. 25-4410), and the 21-month sentences imposed
upon the revocation of his supervised release (Nos. 25-4411, 25-4412). On appeal, Liles’s
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Liles’s sentences are
reasonable and whether the district court erroneously found Liles committed violations of
the conditions of his supervised release that the Government did not pursue. The
Government has declined to file a response brief, and Liles has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief after being notified of his right to do so.
Beginning with Liles’s 66-month sentence for the § 922(g) offense, we review
criminal sentences for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
United States v. Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In reviewing whether a sentence is reasonable, we must first ensure the district
court did not commit “significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Fowler, 948
F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 4 of 7
“If the court finds no significant procedural error, it then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172
(4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). We look to “the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose
satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Where, as here, the sentence is outside the advisory Guidelines range, we must consider
whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose
such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”
United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons
justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,
944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court properly calculated Liles’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range, heard and engaged with Liles’s arguments for a within-Guidelines sentence, and
thoroughly explained why its chosen upward-variant sentence was sufficient but not greater
than necessary to adequately account for the needs for just punishment and deterrence.
Accordingly, the 66-month sentence on the new § 922(g) offense is reasonable.
Regarding the revocation of Liles’s supervised release, a district court may revoke
a defendant’s supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review
a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. George, 95 F.4th 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2024). Here, Liles admitted
4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 5 of 7
five violations of the conditions of his supervised release. Because Liles admitted a Grade
B violation—committing a new federal criminal offense—the district court did not err by
revoking his supervised release. The revocation judgment, however, reflects that Liles
committed eight violations of his supervised release conditions—including three violations
the Government did not pursue and the district court did not find Liles committed. Upon
review, we conclude that this is a clerical error in the judgment and may be corrected
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
As for the revocation sentences, “a district court . . . has broad discretion to impose
a particular sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United
States v. Celedon, 165 F.4th 873, 879 (4th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We will affirm a revocation sentence “unless it is above the statutory maximum or plainly
unreasonable.” Id. “For a revocation sentence to be plainly unreasonable, we must first
determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. “Only
if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consider whether it is plainly
unreasonable—meaning the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
A district court imposes a procedurally reasonable revocation sentence if it
“adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’
nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and “meaningfully respond[s] to the
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USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 1 of 7
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-4410
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEION TYRELL LILES,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 25-4411
No. 25-4412
Plaintiff - Appellee, USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 2 of 7
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen, Jr., District Judge. (1:18-cr-00238-WO-1; 1:19-cr-00230- WO-2; 1:24-cr-00271-WO-1)
Submitted: April 8, 2026 Decided: May 22, 2026
Before KING, AGEE, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
No. 25-4410 affirmed, No. 25-4411 affirmed and remanded, and No. 25-4412 affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brian Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Julie Carol Niemeier, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 3 of 7
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Deion Tyrell Liles appeals the 66-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8) (No. 25-4410), and the 21-month sentences imposed
upon the revocation of his supervised release (Nos. 25-4411, 25-4412). On appeal, Liles’s
attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Liles’s sentences are
reasonable and whether the district court erroneously found Liles committed violations of
the conditions of his supervised release that the Government did not pursue. The
Government has declined to file a response brief, and Liles has not filed a pro se
supplemental brief after being notified of his right to do so.
Beginning with Liles’s 66-month sentence for the § 922(g) offense, we review
criminal sentences for reasonableness “under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
United States v. Claybrooks, 90 F.4th 248, 257 (4th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks
omitted). In reviewing whether a sentence is reasonable, we must first ensure the district
court did not commit “significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or
improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing
to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” United States v. Fowler, 948
F.3d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
3 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 4 of 7
“If the court finds no significant procedural error, it then considers the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed.” United States v. Arbaugh, 951 F.3d 167, 172
(4th Cir. 2020) (citation modified). We look to “the totality of the circumstances to see
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose
satisfied the standards set forth in § 3553(a).” Id. at 176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Where, as here, the sentence is outside the advisory Guidelines range, we must consider
whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose
such a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing range.”
United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 215 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “We will generally find a variance sentence reasonable when the reasons
justifying the variance are tied to § 3553(a) and are plausible.” United States v. Provance,
944 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court properly calculated Liles’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range, heard and engaged with Liles’s arguments for a within-Guidelines sentence, and
thoroughly explained why its chosen upward-variant sentence was sufficient but not greater
than necessary to adequately account for the needs for just punishment and deterrence.
Accordingly, the 66-month sentence on the new § 922(g) offense is reasonable.
Regarding the revocation of Liles’s supervised release, a district court may revoke
a defendant’s supervised release if it “finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant violated a condition of supervised release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). We review
a district court’s revocation decision for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for clear
error. United States v. George, 95 F.4th 200, 208 (4th Cir. 2024). Here, Liles admitted
4 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 5 of 7
five violations of the conditions of his supervised release. Because Liles admitted a Grade
B violation—committing a new federal criminal offense—the district court did not err by
revoking his supervised release. The revocation judgment, however, reflects that Liles
committed eight violations of his supervised release conditions—including three violations
the Government did not pursue and the district court did not find Liles committed. Upon
review, we conclude that this is a clerical error in the judgment and may be corrected
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
As for the revocation sentences, “a district court . . . has broad discretion to impose
a particular sentence upon revocation of a defendant’s term of supervised release.” United
States v. Celedon, 165 F.4th 873, 879 (4th Cir. 2026) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We will affirm a revocation sentence “unless it is above the statutory maximum or plainly
unreasonable.” Id. “For a revocation sentence to be plainly unreasonable, we must first
determine whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” Id. “Only
if we find a revocation sentence unreasonable do we consider whether it is plainly
unreasonable—meaning the unreasonableness is clear or obvious.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
A district court imposes a procedurally reasonable revocation sentence if it
“adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’
nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted), and “meaningfully respond[s] to the
parties’ nonfrivolous arguments” for a different sentence, United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d
202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). A court complies with substantive reasonableness requirements
5 USCA4 Appeal: 25-4412 Doc: 25 Filed: 05/22/2026 Pg: 6 of 7
by “sufficiently stat[ing] an appropriate basis for imposing its sentence.” Celedon, 165
F.4th at 879; see id. at 879-80. “If, after consideration, the sentencing court concludes a
sentence outside the advisory guideline range is appropriate, that departure should be
supported by a more significant justification than would be otherwise required for an in-
range sentence.” Id. at 880 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our review of the record confirms that the district court accurately calculated the
applicable policy statement range and heard and engaged with Liles’s arguments for 12-
month revocation sentences. The district court then thoroughly explained that the chosen
upward-variant sentences were necessary to account for the severity of Liles’s breach of
the court’s trust, the escalation of Liles’s criminal behavior, and the need for deterrence.
Accordingly, the revocation sentences are reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgments
and remand No. 25-4411 and No. 25-4412 for correction of the revocation judgment to
strike the references to Violations 1, 2, and 4. This court requires that counsel inform Liles,
in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review.
If Liles requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Liles.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
No. 25-4410: AFFIRMED No. 25-4411: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED No. 25-4412: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED