United States v. Deaunta Tyler

139 F.4th 598

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
• Decided: June 5, 2025
• Docket: 24-2000
• Status: Published

Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ No. 24-2000 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.

DEAUNTA SENTREL TYLER, Defendant-Appellant. ____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. No. 4:17-cr-40011-SLD-1 — Sara Darrow, Chief Judge. ____________________

ARGUED APRIL 3, 2025 — DECIDED JUNE 5, 2025 ____________________

Before HAMILTON, BRENNAN, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Deaunta Tyler was convicted by a jury of attempted Hobbs Act rob- bery, possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of vio- lence, and unlawful possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. The Supreme Court then held in United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 858–59 (2022), that attempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Tyler moved to vacate his conviction on the 2 No. 24-2000

charge of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of vi- olence. The district court granted the motion, set aside the § 924(c) conviction, and resentenced Tyler on the two remain- ing counts to a shorter but still substantial overall sentence. Tyler now appeals his revised sentence. He contends that the district court failed to address his key arguments in mitiga- tion and provided an inadequate explanation for the sentence imposed. We affirm. Tyler waived any procedural objection regarding the court’s supposed failure to consider and ad- dress his arguments in mitigation by telling the court that it had addressed his principal points. Further, the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing a revised sen- tence within the guideline range. I. Factual and Procedural History In January 2017, Deaunta Tyler, accompanied by Ledell Tyler and Dalvent Jackson, forcibly entered a home in Rock Island, Illinois, armed with a rifle and a handgun and in search of cocaine. Instead of drugs, they found a family spending a quiet evening together. With weapons bran- dished, the intruders demanded to know where the cocaine was. None existed, so the victims could not provide an an- swer. Nevertheless, Tyler and his accomplices moved the family throughout the house at gunpoint looking for drugs. As they searched in vain, the intruders passed the two fire- arms among themselves and threatened to kill the victims. At one point, Jackson fired the handgun in the foyer of the home. The three men remained for about an hour, eventually leaving with a few hundred dollars in cash and a small amount of ma- rijuana. Law enforcement responded to the scene after being noti- fied. The next day, police officers identified the three men in No. 24-2000 3

downtown Rock Island. A high-speed chase ensued, with ap- pellant Tyler driving the getaway vehicle. He drove the wrong way down a one-way street for several blocks and, while speeding around a corner, lost control and crashed. Jackson and Ledell Tyler quickly surrendered, but appellant Tyler fled on foot. Officers eventually subdued him. The fire- arms used during the robbery were found in the wrecked ve- hicle. In February 2017, a grand jury indicted appellant Tyler on three counts. Count One charged Tyler with attempted Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Count Two charged him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Count Three charged him with being a felon in possession of a fire- arm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Count One carried a maximum prison term of twenty years. Count Two required a mandatory minimum sentence of ten years to be served con- secutively. Count Three carried a maximum prison term of ten years. Tyler’s co-defendants were charged with the same offenses, and a jury found the three men guilty on all counts. In April 2018, the district court held a joint sentencing hearing for appellant Tyler and accomplice Jackson. Both faced a Sentencing Guidelines range of 360 months (thirty years) to life in prison, and the government recommended a 360-month sentence for each. The government emphasized that Jackson’s conduct was the most aggravated. He fired a gun during the robbery, acted in the most threatening man- ner, and later tried to obstruct justice by directing his girl- friend to influence a witness improperly. Although Tyler’s conduct was comparatively less severe, it was still serious. He willingly participated in the attempted robbery, handled the 4 No. 24-2000

firearms, led police on a high-speed chase that ended in a se- rious crash, and resisted arrest. He also had a prior federal drug conspiracy conviction, for which he had avoided a man- datory minimum and received a below-guideline sentence. The court sentenced Jackson first, describing him as “the leader of this operation.” It called the offense “incredibly dis- turbing,” noting that the defendants had broken into a home and terrorized a family at gunpoint for nearly an hour. The court also emphasized that Jackson fired a firearm inside the house and had an extensive criminal history. The court sen- tenced Jackson to a total of 360 months in prison: concurrent terms of 240 months for attempted Hobbs Act robbery and 120 months for firearm possession, followed by a mandatory con- secutive 120-month term for the conviction under § 924(c). Turning to Tyler, the court observed that many of its ear- lier comments applied equally. The offense was “incredibly serious,” had a lasting impact on the victims, and the defend- ants had passed firearms among themselves during the rob- bery. The court also noted Tyler’s “long string of uninter- rupted criminal activity,” repeated failures on supervision, and placement in the highest criminal-history category. Em- phasizing the value of the Guidelines in avoiding unwar- ranted disparities, the court found that a sentence “slightly less” than Jackson’s was appropriate. Accordingly, the court sentenced Tyler to a total of 330 months: concurrent terms of 210 and 120 months on Counts One and Three, followed by the mandatory consecutive 120-month sentence on Count Two under § 924(c). Two months later, the court sentenced co-defendant Ledell Tyler to a total of 180 months—60 months on the attempted robbery and firearm possession counts and a No. 24-2000 5

consecutive 120-month term under § 924(c). All three defendants filed direct appeals, but we dismissed them when all three of their lawyers filed Anders briefs asserting that no non-frivolous challenges were available. United States v. Tyler, 780 F. App’x 360 (7th Cir. 2019); see generally Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In July 2022, appellant Tyler moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that, in light of United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845 (2022), an attempted Hobbs Act robbery no longer qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The government agreed, and the district court granted the motion. The court vacated Tyler’s § 924(c) convic- tion and scheduled resentencing on the remaining counts. Ty- ler faced a new guideline range of 210 to 262 months. At re- sentencing, he objected to several enhancements, arguing that, because attempted Hobbs Act robbery was not categori- cally a crime of violence, no violence-related enhancements should apply. The court disagreed, emphasizing that it still must consider the offense conduct when applying the Guide- lines. The government urged the court to impose a new sen- tence that mirrored the original term, consistent with the re- duction granted to co-defendant Ledell Tyler after his § 924(c) conviction was also vacated. The court acknowledged that, although the offense no longer qualified as a “crime of vio- lence” under the categorical approach, the defendants’ actual conduct was in fact “extremely violent.” Tyler, for his part, argued for a 120-month sentence, highlighting his supposedly lesser role in the offense. The court thoroughly reviewed the sentencing factors and reaffirmed its prior assessment that Tyler’s conduct remained serious despite the vacating of the § 924(c) conviction. The 6 No. 24-2000

court emphasized the profound impact on the victims, Tyler’s attempt to flee, and his history of criminal behavior. It also noted that Tyler’s post-sentencing conduct was mixed—he was involved in an altercation with another inmate but also attended prison programs. The court ultimately imposed a to- tal sentence of 240 months, including concurrent terms of 240 months on Count One and 120 months on Count Three. The new sentence amounted to a 90-month reduction from Tyler’s original sentence. Tyler has appealed his revised sentence. During the pen- dency of Tyler’s appeal, the district court also resentenced co- defendant Jackson to consecutive terms of 240 months and 48 months on the remaining counts, for a total sentence of 288 months in prison. II. Analysis Tyler challenges his sentence on two grounds. First, he ar- gues that the district court failed to address his principal ar- guments in mitigation. Second, he asserts that the court pro- vided an inadequate explanation for his sentence. 1 The gov- ernment counters that Tyler waived any objection to the court’s treatment of his arguments in mitigation and that, even in the absence of waiver, the sentencing explanation sat- isfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). We start with the dispute about waiver.

1 In his opening brief, Tyler also contested the substantive reasonable-

ness of his within-guideline sentence. Because he later withdrew the argu- ment, we do not address it. No. 24-2000 7

A. Waiver By confirming that the court had addressed sufficiently his arguments in mitigation, Tyler waived a challenge based on a supposed failure to do so. A little history may be useful. In United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005), we wrote that, when imposing a sentence, a district court must generally address a defendant’s principal arguments in mitigation. Courts are afforded broad discretion during sen- tencing, but the record must show that the court actually ex- ercised that discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Miranda, 505 F.3d 785, 792–94 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding for resentencing where district court failed to address defendant’s principal, non-frivolous argument for a lower sentence based on well- documented and severe mental health problems); Cunning- ham, 429 F.3d at 679–80 (ordering resentencing because sen- tencing court “passed over in silence the principal argument made by the defendant even though the argument was not so weak as not to merit discussion”); see generally Carr v. O'Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1999) (“a discretionary ruling … cannot be upheld when there is no indication that the judge exercised discretion”), citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). We then began to see numerous appeals invoking the Cun- ningham principle. Because a sentencing judge’s explanation of the reasons for a sentence often came last in time, defend- ants did not have opportunities to raise the Cunningham prin- ciple when it would do the most good—when the judge could cure any problem. We encouraged sentencing judges to ask defense counsel whether they were satisfied that the court had addressed their principal arguments in mitigation, so that any further explanation could be provided on the spot rather 8 No. 24-2000

than a year or more later after an appeal. See United States v. Garcia-Segura, 717 F.3d 566, 568–69 (7th Cir. 2013). If the de- fense said it was satisfied that the court had addressed the principal arguments in mitigation, a challenge under Cun- ningham would be deemed waived. Id. at 569. We soon began to apply that waiver principle. E.g., United States v. Donelli, 747 F.3d 936, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2014), and other progeny of Garcia- Segura. Cunningham and other decisions enforcing the require- ment that sentencing courts address defendants’ principal, nonfrivolous arguments do not limit a court’s substantial dis- cretion in selecting an appropriate sentence under the frame- work of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See Donelli, 747 F.3d at 939–40. Rather, our precedents are designed to ensure that courts meaningfully address the key arguments influencing sentenc- ing decisions. Id. This safeguard rests on the principle that a “judge who fails to mention a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a factual basis) is likely to have com- mitted an error or oversight.” Cunningham, 429 F.3d at 679. In resentencing Tyler in this case, the district court fol- lowed the path we encouraged in Garcia-Segura. After explain- ing the basis for Tyler’s sentence, the court asked defense counsel: “Have I addressed all of your principal arguments in mitigation?” Counsel responded that the court had but re- quested additional explanation regarding its reasons for ap- plying the contested sentencing enhancements. The court fur- ther clarified its reasoning and asked: “So does that provide sufficient clarification?” Defense counsel replied, “Yes, Judge.” This confirmation waived Tyler’s Cunningham proce- dural challenge in this appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Perez, 21 F.4th 490, 494 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying Garcia-Segura No. 24-2000 9

waiver to argument about unwarranted sentencing dispari- ties where defense counsel twice responded affirmatively when asked if the court had addressed principal arguments in mitigation); Donelli, 747 F.3d at 940–41 (finding waiver). To be clear, this process results in waiver, which forecloses ap- pellate review of the point, not mere forfeiture, which could allow plain-error review. The sentencing court gave defense counsel more than one opportunity to invite attention to any overlooked mitigation arguments. He declined. That proce- dural safeguard—and check against avoidable appeals—is what we envisioned with the Garcia-Segura path toward waiver. We turn next to Tyler’s related but distinct argument that the district court inadequately explained the reasons for the revised sentence. B. The Adequacy of the District Court’s Explanation We review de novo a sentence’s procedural reasonable- ness. United States v. Stephens, 986 F.3d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 2021). Our analysis is guided by a practical assessment of the entire record as well as the defendant’s individual character- istics. See Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 486 (2022). We do not demand artificial thoroughness in sentencing. United States v. Sanchez, 989 F.3d 523, 540 (7th Cir. 2021). “A short explanation will suffice where the context and record make clear the reasoning underlying the district court’s con- clusion.” United States v. Schroeder, 536 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2008), citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 359 (2007). As we have said in many cases, a sentencing judge “need not be- labor the obvious.” E.g., United States v. Caraway, 74 F.4th 466, 469 (7th Cir. 2023), quoting United States v. Baker, 56 F.4th 1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v. Wade, 890 F.3d 629, 10 No. 24-2000

632 (7th Cir. 2018), quoting United States v. Reed, 859 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 2017). We typically require less explanation when, as here, the sentence is within the correct guideline range. E.g., United States v. Curby, 595 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2010) (affirming sen- tence where court’s discussion of mitigation arguments was brief but sentence was at bottom of guideline range). It is enough if the record gives us confidence that the court mean- ingfully considered the defendant’s arguments, “even if im- plicitly and imprecisely.” United States v. Diekemper, 604 F.3d 345, 355 (7th Cir. 2010). A sentencing court must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, citing United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336–37 (1988). The district court met that standard here. Despite receiv- ing positive responses to its Garcia-Segura inquiries, the court nonetheless addressed Tyler’s principal mitigation argu- ment—that he was less culpable than his co-defendants—and the other factors affecting the sentence. The court acknowl- edged that Tyler was less violent than his co-defendants in some respects but emphasized the overall violent nature of the offense. It also underscored his resisting arrest, substantial criminal history, heightened risk of recidivism, and mixed disciplinary record while in custody. After weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the court imposed a within-guideline sen- tence. The Supreme Court has upheld sentences supported by far less detailed reasoning. See, e.g., Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109, 118–20 (2018) (holding that sentencing court’s “minimal” explanation of sentencing modification was sufficient); Rita, 551 U.S. at 356–58 (upholding sentence No. 24-2000 11

where judge explained simply that the guideline sentence im- posed was “appropriate” and noting that the “law leaves much” to “the judge’s own professional judgment” with re- spect to the depth of a sentencing explanation). The district court’s explanation here easily met the standard established by precedent for procedural reasonableness. This case offers a useful reminder, though: We reaffirm that a Garcia-Segura waiver bars procedural objections based on the court’s alleged failure to address a defendant’s princi- pal arguments in mitigation when counsel confirms that the court has considered those arguments. It may be prudent in the future for courts to repeat the Garcia-Segura question, as Chief Judge Darrow did here, if substantive exchanges take place in response to the question when first asked. A brief, on- the-record confirmation that the court has considered a de- fendant’s principal arguments is a simple yet powerful tool to promote perceived fairness in sentencing and to avoid unnec- essary appeals. AFFIRMED.