United States v. Davion Davis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
• Decided: April 23, 2024
• Docket: 23-1855
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ___________

No. 23-1855 __________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

DAVION PRESTON DAVIS, Appellant __________

On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. Crim. No. 3:10-cr-00187-001) District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion __________

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) March 25, 2024

Before: RESTREPO, MATEY, and McKEE, Circuit Judges

(Filed: April 23, 2024) ___________

OPINION * ___________

RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.

Davion Preston Davis appeals the 18-month sentence imposed by the District Court

following the revocation of his term of supervised release, arguing that the sentence was

* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding precedent. both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we will

affirm.

I

In 2010, Mr. Davis pleaded guilty pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure

11(c)(1)(C) to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute heroin in

violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The original District Judge, Richard P. Conaboy, accepted

the parties’ agreement and sentenced Mr. Davis within the agreed-upon Guidelines range

to 120 months in federal prison and five years on supervised release.

The Bureau of Prisons released Mr. Davis some nine years later, in March 2019, at

which point he began his supervision term. In September of that year, Mr. Davis was

involved in a domestic dispute that resulted in him pleading guilty to a third-degree

misdemeanor harassment charge in Pennsylvania state court. In response, United States

Probation filed a petition charging Mr. Davis with violating the mandatory condition of

supervision that he not commit additional crimes. The case was reassigned to Judge

Malachy E. Mannion, and Mr. Davis sought to enter a guilty plea to the violation.

Concerned after allocution that Mr. Davis may have pleaded guilty in state court to a crime

he did not commit, Judge Mannion rejected the proposed guilty plea and ordered the parties

to produce all relevant witnesses at a rescheduled revocation hearing.

About a month later, in January 2020, the parties reconvened. Mr. Davis again

wished to admit to the Grade C violation for having committed another federal, state, or

local offense while on supervised release. This time, Judge Mannion accepted his plea and 2 sentenced him to one year and one day in prison followed by four years on supervised

release. Mr. Davis served his sentence and returned home in December of that year, but his

difficulty with supervision continued.

Most notably, in 2022, local law enforcement arrested Mr. Davis three separate

times and charged him with various state crimes. Probation subsequently filed a petition

alleging that he had violated three of the mandatory conditions of his supervised release.

The allegations included two failed drug tests and three separate charges for possession of

marijuana and drug paraphernalia, forgery related to circulating counterfeit bills, and

disorderly conduct and criminal mischief.

Finding himself once again before Judge Mannion, Mr. Davis pleaded guilty in

April 2023 to Grade C violations for his possession and use of marijuana and

methamphetamine. Judge Mannion determined that his Guidelines range for these

violations was eight to fourteen months’ imprisonment, with a statutory maximum of

twenty-four months. He ultimately revoked Mr. Davis’s supervised release and imposed

an above-Guidelines sentence of eighteen months followed by twelve more months of

supervision. After the imposition of the sentence, Judge Mannion asked if there was

anything further for the record, to which Mr. Davis’s counsel replied, “No.” App. at 76.

Mr. Davis timely appealed.

II 1

1 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3231 and 3583. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 3 We review claims of procedural and substantive error for abuse of discretion. Gall

v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But when, as here, the asserted procedural error

was not raised during the sentencing proceedings, we review for plain error. United States

v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). Accordingly, we will review

the procedural reasonableness of Mr. Davis’s sentence for plain error and its substantive

reasonableness for abuse of discretion. See Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 255 (holding that the

“party must object to the procedural error complained of after sentence is imposed in order

to avoid plain error review on appeal”); United States v. Woronowicz, 744 F.3d 848, 851

(3d Cir. 2014) (stating that this Court reviews a sentence’s “substantive reasonableness

under an abuse of discretion standard”).

“An error is plain if it is ‘clear’ or ‘obvious,’ ‘affects substantial rights,’ and ‘affects

the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d

at 259 (quoting United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 505 (3d Cir. 2006)). “An error

‘affects substantial rights’ when it is prejudicial, that is, when it ‘affected the outcome of

the District Court proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Dragon, 471 F.3d at 505). Under plain error

review, we give great deference to “sentencing courts’ ability to examine all relevant

information.” United States v. Ferguson, 876 F.3d 512, 517 (3d Cir. 2017).

Meanwhile, a sentencing court abuses its discretion only if “no reasonable

sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular [individual] for

the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d

Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009)). “Where, as 4 here, a district court decides to vary from the Guidelines’ recommendations, we ‘must give

due deference to the district court’s decision that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on a

whole, justify the extent of the variance.’” Tomko, 562 F.3d at 561 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S.

at 51).

III

A. The District Court Did Not Commit a Procedural Error

A district court commits a significant procedural error if it fails to (1) consider the

§ 3553(a) factors or (2) provide an adequate explanation for deviating from the Guidelines

range. Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567 (citing Gall, 522 U.S. at 51). However, a court need not

address parties’ arguments or the sentencing factors at length; they need only be given

“meaningful consideration.” Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256. To demonstrate meaningful

consideration, a district court must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it]

has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own

legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

Mr. Davis argues that the District Court procedurally erred by failing to adequately

consider the § 3553(a) factors and sufficiently articulate its reasoning in sentencing him to

eighteen months in prison. Specifically, he claims that the District Court failed to consider

his history and characteristics, including his mental health issues, and that he had sought

help from his probation officer regarding his substance abuse. Respectfully, we disagree.

The District Court was no stranger to Mr. Davis’s history and characteristics, as it

had adjudicated Mr. Davis’s first revocation of supervised release. At sentencing on the 5 second revocation, it acknowledged Mr. Davis’s various statements shedding light on his

personal circumstances (including those related to a then-pending state court case),

reviewed his ex-wife’s letter, noted his high criminal history category and the significance

of his original sentence, and stressed its concerns about his previous revocation of

supervised release. App. at 75 (“Now out on supervised release initially I had you back in

front of me for a violation. I gave you a year and a day. It doesn’t go down when you come

back again on future violations. It doesn’t go down.” 2). Aware of Mr. Davis’s mental health

concerns, 3 the District Court directed the Bureau of Prisons to “find and begin a process

for [Mr. Davis] that hopefully [he could] continue after [he was] released from

imprisonment.” 4 Id. Finally, while the District Court recognized that Mr. Davis viewed his

2 While this is often the case in practice, it is not true as a matter of law. Just as the District Court here had the discretion to impose a sentence above the Guidelines, so too can judges elect not to escalate penalties and instead address these “breach[es] of trust” without resorting to incarceration. United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 853 (3d Cir. 2006). While 83.2% of Grade C violations in 2013–2017 resulted in prison terms and nothing more, the remainder were adjudicated using prison terms plus alternatives, increases in supervision, or community service. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n, Federal Probation and Supervised Release Violations, 35 (July 2020), available at https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research- publications/2020/20200728_Violations.pdf. It is also worth noting that 22.1% of Grade C violations during this period were adjudicated through below-range prison sentences. Id. at 37. 3 See App. at 75 (“Is there any question that you have mental health issues? There isn’t, and you acknowledge that. . . . What is clear to me is that you do need mental health counseling.”). 4 This was perhaps aspirational at best considering both the state of the Bureau of Prisons’ mental health programming and the relative brevity of Mr. Davis’s sentence. See, e.g., Christie Thompson & Taylor Elizabeth Eldridge, Treatment Denied: The Mental 6 relationship with his probation officer as contentious, it made it clear that officers could

not “follow [him] around and hold [his] hand.” Id. In the District Court’s view, it was

ultimately up to Mr. Davis to “take [his] own responsibility” and “find a way to move on.”

Id.

Under our caselaw, the District Court’s commentary suffices as “meaningful

consideration” of Mr. Davis’ sentencing arguments and the § 3553(a) factors. Flores-

Mejia, 759 F.3d at 256. So, too, was its explanation for the four-month upward variance as

“appropriate in this case to provide adequate protection and deterrence to [Mr. Davis] and

to the public[.]” App. at 76. While another district court may have taken a different

approach with this case, we cannot conclude that Mr. Davis has met the high standard of

review required of his alleged procedural error.

B. Nor Was the Sentence Imposed Substantively Unreasonable

To determine the substantive reasonableness of a sentence, we look to “whether the

final sentence, wherever it may lie within the permissible statutory range, was premised

upon appropriate and judicious consideration of the relevant factors.” United States v.

Young, 634 F.3d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Doe, 617 F.3d 766, 770

(3d Cir. 2010)). Mr. Davis argues that the District Court imposed a substantively

unreasonable sentence because no reasonable court would have imposed the same

Health Crisis in Federal Prisons, MARSHALL PROJECT, (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/11/21/treatment-denied-the-mental-health- crisis-in-federal-prisons. 7 eighteen-month sentence. Specifically, he claims that the District Court failed to give

sufficient weight to his mitigating factors. Again, we respectfully disagree. As previously

discussed, the District Court considered the mitigating factors, tethered Mr. Davis’s

sentence to the facts of the case, and explained its reasoning for granting an upward

variance. Furthermore, “a district court’s failure to give mitigating factors the weight a

[sentenced person] contends they deserve” does not render a sentence substantively

unreasonable. United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 546 (3d Cir. 2007). Simply put, we

cannot say that no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence.

Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.