United States v. Davies, Turner & Co.

16 Ct. Cust. 50, 1928 CCPA LEXIS 34
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedApril 9, 1928
DocketNo. 3025
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 16 Ct. Cust. 50 (United States v. Davies, Turner & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Davies, Turner & Co., 16 Ct. Cust. 50, 1928 CCPA LEXIS 34 (ccpa 1928).

Opinions

BlaNd, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

Ten casks of ammonium sulphocyanide were classified by the collector under paragraph 5 of the Tariff Act of 1922, which is as follows:

Par. 5. All chemical elements, all chemical salts and compounds, all medicinal preparations, and all combinations and mixtures of any of the foregoing, all the foregoing obtained naturally or artificially and not specially provided for, 25 per centum ad valorem.

The importer had entered the same as free of duty under paragraph 1565 of the same act, and protested the classification of the collector, claiming it to be free of duty as entered. Paragraph 1565 follows:

Par. 1565. Cyanide: Potassium cyanide, sodium cyanide, all cyanide salts and cyanide mixtures, combinations, and compounds containing cyanide, not specially provided for.

The case was submitted on the record and a sample of the merchandise. The report of the assistant collector was as follows:

Sirs: I transmit herewith the protest No. 13738, with accompanying invoice (1) and entry 011674, of Davies, Turner & Co., against the assessment of duty at the rate of 25% ad valorem on ammonium sulphocyanide, imported by them per S. S. West Celina and entered for consumption Mar. 23, 1926.
The claim of the importers is set forth in the inclosed protest.-
The liquidation of the entry was based on the advisory classification of the appraiser.
I inclose herewith the special report of the appraiser, dated the 2d instant, who states that “The merchandise subject of protest consists of ammonium sulphocyanide, entered free under par. 1565, and returned for duty at the rate of 25% ad valorem under par. 5 of the present tariff act as a chemical salt or compound, in accordance with T. D. 41120.”
The appraiser reports “Sample retained.”
Entry 011674 was liquidated April 22, 1926. Protest was filed May 21, 1926, therefore filed within the statutory period.
A return of the invoice and entry is requested.

The court below sustained the protest, in what appears to us to be a very well written and well considered opinion by Mr. Justice Brown, from which action the Government has appealed to this court.

The Government, first, contends that the court below should have been bound by the classification of the collector, since there was no testimony contradicting the finding of the collector, and that his assessment for duty of the merchandise under paragraph 5 was presumptively correct, and that, under the rule set out in Vitelli & Son v. United States, 7 Ct. Oust. Appls. 243, T. D. 36544, and other authorities, his assessment under paragraph 5 carries with it the presumption of a finding of all the essential facts which bring it within the paragraph.

[52]*52The court below very ably discusses this first question and holds:

That the importer had a right to submit his case on the facts as they appear in the official certificate of the collector without further evidence is clear from the following authorities: * * *

Here the following authorities are cited and quoted from at length: Lehigh Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 153 Fed. 596, T. D. 28055; Francois Coste, G. A. 7837, 30 Treas. Dec. 15; Mills & Gibb, Abstract 41214, 33 Treas. Dec. 560.

The court below quotes from, the last cited authority (Mills & Gibb) as follows:

' The presumption in favor of official action can not overcome facts which clearly appear from the record. In the case of Seattle Brewing & Malting Co., 1 Ct. Oust. Appls. 362; T. D. 31454, Judge Barber, writing for the court, disposed of that claim in the following vigorous language:
As to the Tremont shipment, the assessment of the entire importation at the higher rate is concededly unlawful and incorrect, because both sides agree that some portion of the rice would pass through the prescribed sieve, and it would be strange if a due regard for the law should require us to hold that this presumption in favor of the correctness of the collector’s action is so potent as to make lawful that which is unlawful and to treat as correct that which is an error. Such a conclusion contravenes good law and good morals, and we decline to adopt it. (Italics ours.)

We think this is the law and that the court properly consulted the authorities as to the common meaning of cyanide salts and cyanide mixtures, combinations, and compounds containing cyanide, in order to ascertain if the merchandise, ammonium sulphocyanide, properly came within paragraph 1565.

The court below, in determining this question, said:

In United States v. Merck & Co., 8 Ct. Oust. Appls. 171, T. D. 37288, Judge De Vries, affirming this division (then Board 1 of the Board of General Appraisers), held that it was this court’s duty to classify merchandise upon the definitions and statements given in commercial works. In pages 172 and 173 he says:
There was no testimony upon this point introduced before the board, their decision being predicated upon the definition of “lanolin” as given in certain scientific treatises, which, it was held by the board, conformed with the lexicographic definitions of lanolin. On the other hand, the Government maintains, among other matters urged, that “lanolin” as commonly used and understood includes both these products, and that the board erred (1) in resorting to and (2) in adopting the scientific definitions in the publications in question in order to determine and in determining the issue presented.
At the threshhold of the inquiry the Government presents the proposition, generally, that resort to scientific definitions and publications in the determination of tariff issues is error.
In consideration of this question it may be well to observe primarily the distinction which is pointed out by the authorities between receiving in evidence scientific publications and the consultation of them by the court as aids in refreshing the memory as to scientific facts, truths, and laws. * * *
After citing and reviewing authorities, he concludes, on page 176, as follows:
The clearly deductible rule from authorities therefore seems to be that a court is warranted, that the ends of justice may not be defeated, in taking judicial notice of such public records, documents, dictionaries, and scientific treatises which the court under all the circumstances of the case “may deem safe and proper.”
It may be appropriate to remark that this conclusion perfectly accords with the practice of all courts, tribunals, and officials interpreting customs laws since ■ [53]

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
16 Ct. Cust. 50, 1928 CCPA LEXIS 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-davies-turner-co-ccpa-1928.