United States v. David Reeves

Second Circuit

United States v. David Reeves

348 F.2d 469, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5082

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJune 28, 1965

Docket29613_1

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 348 F.2d 469 (United States v. David Reeves) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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United States v. David Reeves, 348 F.2d 469, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5082 (2d Cir. 1965).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of violation of narcotics laws, 21 U.S.C. §§ 173 and 174 (1958) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 4705(a) and 7237(b) (1964).

Appellant claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the use of certain of his own statements purportedly made in the absence of counsel and without advice as to his constitutional rights. The statements to which he refers were, first, a statement to the effect that he might at some indefinite time have handled some cocaine “just once” and, second, that he remembered an unspecified “something” about heroin. There is a question as to whether these statements can properly be classified as admissions since they do not appear to be incriminating. But even if they were improperly admitted we do not consider the error sufficient to justify a reversal, especially since the case was tried by a judge sitting without a jury.

“[I]n reviewing proceedings before a judge alone, appellate courts may presume that improper evidence and comments have been rejected, at least absent a showing of substantial prejudice.” In re Bonanno, 2d Cir., 344 F.2d 830, April 30, 1965.

“It is presumed that in reaching a decision the trial judge has rejected improper evidence. This rule is particularly applicable where the evidence of guilt is strong and convincing, as in the case here.” Teate v. United States, 297 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1961).

Appellant’s other specifications of error are equally without merit.

Affirmed.

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PER CURIAM.

Appellant was convicted of violation of narcotics laws, 21 U.S.C. §§ 173 and 174 (1958) and 26 U.S.C. §§ 4705(a) and 7237(b) (1964).

Appellant claims that his constitutional rights were violated by the use of certain of his own statements purportedly made in the absence of counsel and without advice as to his constitutional rights. The statements to which he refers were, first, a statement to the effect that he might at some indefinite time have handled some cocaine “just once” and, second, that he remembered an unspecified “something” about heroin. There is a question as to whether these statements can properly be classified as admissions since they do not appear to be incriminating. But even if they were improperly admitted we do not consider the error sufficient to justify a reversal, especially since the case was tried by a judge sitting without a jury.

“[I]n reviewing proceedings before a judge alone, appellate courts may presume that improper evidence and comments have been rejected, at least absent a showing of substantial prejudice.” In re Bonanno, 2d Cir., 344 F.2d 830, April 30, 1965.

“It is presumed that in reaching a decision the trial judge has rejected improper evidence. This rule is particularly applicable where the evidence of guilt is strong and convincing, as in the case here.” Teate v. United States, 297 F.2d 120, 122 (5th Cir. 1961).

Appellant’s other specifications of error are equally without merit.

Affirmed.

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348 F.2d 469, 1965 U.S. App. LEXIS 5082, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-david-reeves-ca2-1965.

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